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Human cognition is supported, in part, by adaptive changes in perception that
occur as a result of experience. This dissertation proposes a mechanism by
which perception can adaptively change to reflect the structure of the environ-
ment. Environmental structure produces statistical regularities in sensory in-
put. Starting very early in infancy and continuing across the lifespan, humans
have the ability to pick up on these statistical regularities through a process
called statistical learning. This dissertation presents empirical findings that sta-
tistical learning occurs through a dynamic andmutually-influential relationship
between perceptual and learning and memory systems, where perceptual pro-
cesses support and constrain learning, and learning and memory systems, in
turn, shape future perception.
To this end, infants and adults participated in incidental learning paradigms.
In these paradigms, participants experience sensory input endowed with novel
environmental structure that can be learned through statistical regularities. Af-
ter exposure, memory for the structure is tested. A number of experiments ex-
amined learning where the statistical information is held constant but the per-
ceptual character of the information varied (e.g., whether the stimuli are audi-
tory or visual or whether statistical information is based on perceptually vary-
ing exemplars).
Using these methods, Chapters 2 and 3 present evidence that auditory and
visual perceptual processing biases what is learned from novel statistical regu-
larities. Thus, perceptual processing can affect statistical learning even though
statistical information is held constant. Chapter 4 presents evidence for a dy-
namic influence of perception on statistical learning throughout development.
Specifically, the results in this chapter demonstrate that the relationship of au-
ditory and visual learning is different in infant and adult learners and that au-
ditory statistical learning changes in infants aged eight to ten months. Finally,
Chapter 5 presents evidence that changes in perception can occur through expe-
rience with environmental structure and points to the involvement of learning
and memory systems in this process. Experiments in this chapter find that vari-
able yet regular exposure with a novel object supports changes in object percep-
tion. A combined eye-tracking/functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
methods approach highlights the involvement of the medial temporal lobe, an
important learning and memory system, in integrating across successive expe-
riences to support changes in object perception.
Taken together, this dissertation presents empirical evidence that during ex-
perience with novel statistical regularities, perceptual processing affects learn-
ing, and learning and memory systems can affect perception. The interrelation-
ship of perceptual and learning and memory systems could act as a dynamic
mechanism supporting adaptive changes in perception across the lifespan. Im-
plications for the fields of Developmental Psychology, Cognitive Psychology
and Cognitive Neuroscience are explored.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Perception is where cognition and reality meet.
Neisser, 1976
Perception is the process of uncovering meaningful information about the
world that is present in sensory input (J. J. Gibson, 1966; E. J. Gibson, 1969). Our
sensory organs (e.g., eyes, ears) detect energy that comes from the environment
(e.g., light reflecting off of a face, oscillations of air molecules emanating from a
plucked guitar string). However, we do not perceive what lands on our sensory
organs. For example, if we perceived the patterns of light that enter our eyes,
our perception would change with every eye movement. Instead, we perceive
the meaningful entities in the world: the objects, people, spatial layouts. The
process of sensory transduction provides sensory input to perceptual systems
which in turn engage in a process of differentiation, recognition and/or inter-
pretation of this sensory input to arrive at a meaningful view of the external
world.
While it seems natural for the Cognitive Scientist to approach perception as
a kind of recording device, this dissertation adopts a theoretical framework in
which vision is not like a camera, audition is not like an audio recorder, etc.
Specifically, the author adopts an Ecological approach to perception, pioneered
by J. J. and E. J. Gibson, which posits that perception ”is an ongoing activity, a
search for information .. and it provides us with fundamental knowledge that
we take for granted” (E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000, p. 3). While a camera takes
discrete, independent snapshots, perception is ongoing and continuous, which
entails that different moments of perception are not independent of each other
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and cannot be considered in isolation. While a camera passively accepts visual
input, perception is an activity and part of this activity is related to actively seek-
ing out information about the world. While a camera takes a picture the same
way regardless of what is in the picture, perception is biased by the information,
or meaning, contained in the sensory input. In sum, while a camera passively
records the sensory energy present at a particular point in space and time, per-
ception is a temporally unfolding process and one that is closer to a type of
exploration.
Moreover, perception is not a static process but one that is adaptively chang-
ing as a result of experience with the environment. Knowledge of the struc-
ture of the environment can facilitate a greater ability to pick out meaningful
information in sensory input. Correspondingly, perceptual change can occur
through a progressive incorporation of knowledge about the external world. In-
deed, such experientially-dependent changes to perception are believed to sup-
port key perceptual-cognitive tasks such as language comprehension and face
perception. Thus, changes in perception can be produced through experience
with structure in the environment.
Even though ongoing research has identified many aspects of perception
that change with experience, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms or
neural systems that operate during experience to shape future perception. This
dissertation is focused on the elucidating the nature of the mechanism(s) that
translate experience into perceptual change. Specifically, the current work sug-
gests that perception can be adaptively and progressively shaped through an
interrelationship of perceptual systems with learning and memory systems,
where an interrelationship is a mutual influence of two entities. Specifically,
perceptual and learning and memory systems can influence each other during
experience with novel patterns or statistical regularities in sensory input. In
this way, perceptual processing can ground what is learned from novel statis-
tical regularities and the resulting knowledge or memories can shape future
perception.
Learning andmemory are interrelated concepts in cognitive psychology and
cognitive neuroscience: Learning is a “relatively long-lasting change in be-
havior that is contingent upon the occurrence of a specific event or events”
(Milgram, MacLeod, & Petit, 1987, p. 3); memory can be considered the con-
sequence of learning and, through memory recall, past experience affects future
cognition. Learning and memory can be “conceived as a fundamental property
of brain systems and a natural outcome of the brain’s various processing activ-
ities, rather than an entity in the brain.” (Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2001, p. 11).
For the purposes of this dissertation, the author does not distinguish between
the specific contributions of learning and memory. For example, current stud-
ies investigating the nature of learning depend upon quantifying the resulting
memories. Thus, learning and memory are collectively considered the process
by which past experience can affect future behavior.
The current studies employ on a specific learning and memory task, sta-
tistical learning, and examine the role of perception in learning as well as the
effects of learning on perception. Broadly, statistical learning is the acquisition
of knowledge from incidental exposure to patterns or statistical regularities in
sensory input. This type of learning has been implicated in the development of
a number of perceptual-cognitive skills; many of these skills have are also sup-
ported by changes in perception. However, the role of perception in statistical
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learning not been examined in depth and neither has the relationship between
statistical learning and subsequent perceptual changes.
This dissertation argues for a dynamic andmutually-influential relationship,
or interrelationship, between perceptual and learning and memory systems in
the presence of novel statistical regularities in sensory input: Chapters 2 and 3
find evidence that perceptual processing both supports and constrains what is
learned from novel statistical regularities; Chapter 4 presents evidence that the
influence of perception in statistical learning is dynamic across stages of devel-
opment; finally, Chapter 5 argues that learning from statistical regularities can
directly change future perception.
1.1 Adaptive Changes in Perception
Experience supports lasting changes in perception. Effects of experience have
been documented in a wide variety of perceptual phenomena, and notably in
many phenomena that are relevant for daily life (i.e., ecologically-valid). Per-
ceptual changes have been documented in the domains of speech perception
(Kuhl, Williams, Lacerda, Stevens, & Lindblom, 1992; Werker & Tees, 1984),
face perception (Kelly et al., 2007; Nelson, 2010), cross-modal processing of faces
and voices (Pons, Lewkowicz, Soto-Faraco, & Sebastia´n-Galle´s, 2009), and spa-
tial localization of sensory objects (Pagel, Heed, & Ro¨der, 2009). In addition,
many learning paradigms in the contemporary field of perceptual learning re-
port changes in perception that are not ecologically-valid (e.g., increased sensi-
tivity to a specific subthreshold sine-wave grating in a specific retinotopic region
as demonstrated in Nishina, Seitz, Kawato, & Watanabe, 2007). These wide-
ranging findings suggest that perceptual processing is malleable and changes
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with experience.
Perceptual processing has been shown to be affected by a number of differ-
ent types of life experience, including under conditions of altered experience
such as sensory deprivation (e.g. deafness: Bavelier, Dye, & Hauser, 2006),
type of language experience (Neville & Bavelier, 2002; Winawer et al., 2007)
and even playing a musical instrument (crossed hand effect: Ko´bor, Furedi,
Kova´cs, Spence, & Vidnya´nszky, 2006). The development of perceptual exper-
tise has been shown to dramatically affect perception: Gauthier, Tarr and col-
leagues trained participants to categorize a novel class of visual object called
’Greebles’ and found changes in visual perception (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997) as
well as changes in neural activity of regions of the neocortex associated with
face perception (Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999). Further
research has established that these changes to visual perception are not specific
to Greebles or to expertise acquired in the laboratory (Tanaka & Curran, 2001;
Harel, Gilaie-Dotan, Malach, & Bentin, 2010).
Overall, the research reviewed above reveals a rich link between past expe-
rience and perceptual processing. Broadly, the ability for experience to affect
perception is available in the first postnatal year of life (e.g. Kuhl et al., 1992;
Nelson, 2010) and continues across the lifespan (e.g. Gauthier & Tarr, 1997).
While there is evidence that some perceptual systems that are less permeable
to experience-based change (see Neville, 2006), there has been increasing em-
phasis on the ability of experience to change perception in the field of cognitive
psychology and cognitive neuroscience (e.g. Green & Bavelier, 2008).
5
1.2 Ecological Approaches to Learning and Development
Changes in perception will be considered within the context of Ecological ap-
proaches to learning and development. This theoretical approach emphasizes
that learning can change what is perceived from sensory input, not simply what
is responded to (E. J. Gibson, 1969; J. J. Gibson & Gibson, 1955; E. J. Gibson &
Pick, 2000), and perception changes as a result of experience with the structure
of the environment in the service of achieving a better fit between the external
environment and an observer’s perception of it.
In brief, Ecological approaches conceive of the world, existing indepen-
dently of the observer, as structured and meaningful: this world has objects,
people, events, etc. Moreover, the sensory input that an observer receives is
filled with information about this richly structured environment (see J. J. Gib-
son, 1966); however, this information may not immediately available to the ob-
server. Instead, with experience, the observer will have an increased ability
to pick out meaningful and relevant information from sensory input. Such a
process is the essence of perceptual learning and development, as outlined by
E. J. Gibson (1969).
An intuitive example of perceptual learning is wine tasting. Before acquiring
any expertise, one has a rich sensory experience of wine. After learning about
the red wines of Bordeaux and the Rhoˆne, one still receives the same sensory
input. However, this prior experience changes one’s ability to pick out relevant
information from it. For example, one is able to detect the presence of the Syrah
grape when experiencing wine from the Rhoˆne while the wine from Bordeaux
includes information about the Cabernet Franc grape. In this way, the sensory
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information remains the same but experience changes what information the ob-
server is able to pull out of sensory input.
Similarly, ecologically-valid changes of perception, as reviewed above, can
result from changes in the ability to pick out information from sensory input.
For example, infants’ ability to pick out speaker identity is influenced by lan-
guage experience. Specifically, 7-month-old infants are unable to detect changes
of speaker in an unfamiliar language but are able to do so for familiar languages
(E. Johnson, Westrek, Nazzi, & Cutler, 2011). 1 Thus, in the second half of the
first post-natal year, infants’ ability to pick out identity in sensory information
about voices is influenced by experience with the sensory input. Taking evi-
dence from a very different domain, the crossed hand effect is a phenomenon
where perceptual processing, even of non-tactile stimuli, is biased when par-
ticipants’ hands are crossed in space. Recent work on the development of this
effect has found that early in childhood, there is no difference in processing of
tactile input between crossed and uncrossed positions. However, between the
ages of three and five, children become increasingly better at processing tactile
stimuli in the uncrossed position (the position that they use most often when
interacting with their world) with no changes in processing in the crossed po-
1The visual analogue to this effect could be considered to be the other-race effect. The other-
race effect, reviewed above, is an example of perceptual narrowing: the other-race effect is the
decreased sensitivity to the individual identity of faces from non-familiar racial groups. This
effect begins to develop by six months of age (Kelly et al., 2007) and is affected by experience
(Pascalis et al., 2005). Pioneering work on perceptually narrowing was done by Kuhl, Lewkow-
icz, and their colleagues (e.g., Kuhl et al., 1992; Kuhl & Rivera-Gaxiola, 2008; Lewkowicz &
Ghazanfar, 2009; Pons et al., 2009). Given that E. Johnson et al. (2011) are the first to document
a difference in talker identification as a result of language experience, and only in a single age
group, it is not clear whether this effect is also the result of perceptual narrowing. Relatedly, it
is interesting to consider whether perceptual narrowing could also be an example of increases
in the ability to pick out information in sensory input. Perceptual narrowing is often consid-
ered to be a by-product of the process of neural specialization that arise through experience
and has been proposed to support increased perceptual abilities in the areas of specialization
to the detriment of processing for stimuli that are not experienced (see Kuhl & Rivera-Gaxiola,
2008). In accord with this view, perceptual narrowing could be considered the by-product of an
increased ability to pick out information in sensory input.
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sition (Pagel et al., 2009). Thus, the crossed hand effect can be considered to
be a result of an increased ability to pick out sensory information when hands
are in an uncrossed position. In sum, taking examples from two very different
domains, the author argues that changes in perceptual abilities during develop-
ment could be considered as differences in the ability to pick out information in
sensory input.
1.2.1 Adaptive Fit or Learning through a Reduction of Uncer-
tainty
Why do changes in perception occur as a result of experience? According to the
Ecological approach, perceptual changes occur to support a more harmonious
fit between the observer, specifically their perception, and their environment
or niche (J. J. Gibson, 1966; E. J. Gibson, 1969). Similarly, many contemporary
views characterize learning as a progressive reduction of uncertainty between
internal predictions and the outcomes of events (e.g. McClelland, 2002; Schultz,
2006). These two views are essentially complementary to each other as the best
fit between the organism and its niche would result in the least possible predic-
tion error.
Effective perception is a key aspect of this process. According to E.J. Gibson,
“[p]erceptual activity searches the environment in the service of adaptive, eco-
nomical action. Locating the path perceptually saves one from stumbling. Per-
ceiving the cliff edge can save a climb up again or even save life” (E. J. Gibson,
1969, p. 121). Thus, changes in perception serve to support a better organism-
niche fit and can be conceptualized as occurring through a reduction of uncer-
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tainty.
1.2.2 Experience in a Structured Environment
As summarized above, sensory input contains information about the organiza-
tion or structure environment. In this way, sensory input could be said to be
structured. An alternative theoretical view would hold that sensory input is not
rich with information about the structure of the world either through a lack of
coherent structure in the environment or the inability of sensory input to con-
vey this information. If sensory information was not structured (e.g., a learner
was presented with random or unstructured sensory input), there would likely
be no changes to perception as a result of experience because there would be no
method for increasing the fit of perception or decreasing uncertainty. Thus, ex-
perience with structure present in sensory input is necessary to support changes
in perception.
In sum, Ecological approaches postulate that experience with structure or
meaningful information in sensory input can influence perception. While the
goal of development may be “to learn structure through space and time”
(Goldstein et al., 2010, p. 249), this section suggests that learning of environmen-
tal structure can occur incidentally through an organisms pursuit of a better fit
with its ever changing niche through reducing uncertainty about sensory input.
These changes occur with an observer’s increased ability to pick out relevant
information in sensory input.
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1.3 What is Statistical Learning?
Through experience, the structure of the environment can increasingly influ-
ence perception. This dissertation aims to investigate the nature of the mecha-
nisms that support experience-based perceptual change. To this end, the studies
presented focus on the relationship of a specific learning paradigm–statistical
learning–and perception. This section presents a brief survey of the field of sta-
tistical learning, the phenomena that it strives to explain and the paradigms it
employs. This section begins with a brief examination of statistical learning in
relation to the theoretical framework set out in the previous section.
1.3.1 Ecological Statistical Learning
Broadly, statistical learning is the process of gaining knowledge of the struc-
ture of the world through incidental experience with statistical regularities in
sensory input. Building from the Ecological approaches presented above, one
way that the structure in the environment can be instantiated in sensory input
is through the presence of statistical patterns. For example, take the phrase
“pretty baby” which would typically be produced as a continuous utterance
/prI’tibeI’bi/. For an infant exposed to English, this phrase is a part of the
structure of the ambient language. The transitional probabilities, the probabil-
ity that one will perceive Y given the perception of X, as well as other statistical
regularities (e.g. co-occurrence frequency) are higher between syllables that co-
here to form a word in this phrase (e.g. “pre” and “ty”) than syllables that cross
word boundaries (e.g. “ty” and “ba”). Numerous studies have demonstrated
that infants as young as 8-months-old and adults can use statistical information
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defined across syllables to segment a continuous speech stream (Saffran, Aslin,
& Newport, 1996). In other words, an observer can learn to pick out meaningful
information through experience with statistical patterns in sensory input.
The detection of statistical regularities in their sensory input is a fruitful av-
enue to reducing uncertainty or prediction error and to learn about the structure
of the environment. Returning to the example of the phrase ”pretty baby,” iden-
tification of ”pret” as the first syllable in the word ”pretty” will reduce uncer-
tainty of what will be heard next by predicting that one will hear ”ty.” Thus, one
of the methods for effective reduction of prediction error is to identify patterns
in input that can be used to predict future events. Indeed, infants and children
have been found to exploit the statistical patterns present in their environment
for more efficient or rapid processing of sensory input. Relevant to the previ-
ous example, infants as young as 18 months can use the first half of a spoken
word to pick out its visual referent as quickly as infants who hear the full word
(Fernald, Swingley, & Pinto, 2001). Similarly, children have also been found to
use markers of grammatical gender, spoken preceding words, (e.g., la vs. el in
Spanish) to identify visual referents (Lew-Williams & Fernald, 2007). Thus, the
identification of patterns found in sensory input is one important way that or-
ganisms can learn about the structure of the world and thus reduce uncertainty.
It has also been argued that observers engage in predictions based on statis-
tical regularities even when they do not have control over their sensory input.
While many studies have found that observers across the lifespan demonstrate
changes in behavior as a result of experience with statistical regularities in sen-
sory input. Few studies have examined the learning mechanisms by which this
occurs and specifically whether learning in these behaviorally passive tasks oc-
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curs through a reduction of prediction error and/or a generation of predictions.
However, Haith, Hazan, and Goodman (1988) found that 3.5-month-old infants
do develop predictions simply as a result of passive experience with a sequence
of visual input. Infants were presented with alternating visual scenes. During
exposure, infants exhibited more anticipatory eye movements (produced before
visual presentation) but also faster, non-anticipatory, eye movements (produced
in response to visual presentation) as compared to infants in a control group
that viewed similar scenes in an unpredictable order. The authors ask “[w]hy
would a baby gratuitously develop expectations for series of events over which
it has no control?” The infants could simply respond ad hoc or reflexively to
the stimuli. While this is still an open question, Haith et al. (1988) argue that the
development of expectations allows the infant to bring some aspect of an uncon-
trollable sequence under their control. The author argues that the development
of these expectations may be akin to building an internal model of the external
environment that can in turn shape cognitive processes such as eye movements.
Turk-Browne, Scholl, Johnson, and Chun (2010) also argues that passive expe-
riences with statistical regularities results in neural expectations or predictions
for successive visual stimuli (see also E. J. Gibson, 1969, for an argument for an
endogeneous motivation to reduce uncertainty even as a result of passive ex-
perience). Thus, while there are few studies that have explicitly examined the
mechanisms of incidental learning through passive experience with statistical
regularities, there is some evidence that statistical learning also occurs gener-
ation of predictions and a reduction of prediction error (see Section 6.2.1 for a
more in depth discussion of this topic).
In sum, statistical learning is the process of gaining knowledge of the struc-
ture of the world through incidental experience with statistical regularities in
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sensory input. Statistical learning is one method for an observer to learn to pick
out meaningful information in sensory input and reduce prediction error.
1.3.2 Language-Inspired Statistics
While there is a potentially vast range of environmental statistics that an organ-
ism could encounter and learn from, the literature which identifies itself with
the term “statistical learning” focuses on a small subset of these statistics. This
field, and correspondingly the statistics they are concerned with, are inspired
by the problem of language learning.
Part of what makes the acquisition of language a compelling developmen-
tal task from the perspective of learning from statistics, is that there are many
different “levels” of statistical information in a single speech stream; there are
statistical regularities corresponding to phonological, lexical and grammatical
levels of language processing. In fact, the relevance of statistical learning has
been demonstrated for many of the important developmental aspects in lan-
guage acquisition across levels of processing. Table 1.1 presents a list of differ-
ent language learning tasks and the “level” of statistical information believed to
underlie that part of language learning. Below, some of these language learning
tasks are explained in greater detail:
• Acquisition of phonological categories: This language learning task is believed
to, in part, be facilitated through exposure to exemplars in different distri-
butions along acoustic dimensions (e.g. Voice Onset Time). Exposure to a
bimodal distribution can reflect a language which makes a phonological
distinction within this dimension whereas a unimodal distribution likely
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Table 1.1: Examples of Statistical, Language Learning Tasks and Their
Corresponding “Level” of Learning in the Speech Stream
Learning Task Level Sample Study
Phonological categories Phonological Maye, Werker, and Gerken
(2002)
Phonological pattern (e.g. VCV) Phonological Goldstein and Schwade
(2008)
Word segmentation Lexical Saffran et al. (1996)
Word–visual referent association Lexical Yu and Smith (2007)
Artificial grammar learning Syntactic Gomez and Gerken (1999)
Sentence frames Syntactic Fernald and Hurtado
(2006)
reflects that the language does not make such a distinction (Clayards,
Tanenhaus, Aslin, & Jacobs, 2008; Maye et al., 2002; Yoshida, Pons, Maye,
& Werker, 2010).
• Learning the characteristic phonology of the ambient language through social in-
teraction: A statistical learning task pioneered by Goldstein and Schwade
(2008) combines exposure to a variable phonological pattern with social
feedback. When varying exemplars of this novel phonological pattern
are presented contingently with infant babbling, infants will exhibit novel
production of this pattern.
• Segmentation of words from a continuous speech stream: Co-occurence fre-
quencies and transitional probabilities of successive sounds in a contin-
uous speech stream facilitate the segmentation of words. For example,
if a speech stream includes novel words such as “dakpel” and “rusjux,”
the learner can use the higher-order statistical information to differentiate
within vs. between word sequences of syllables (Saffran et al., 1996). This
is the most common statistical learning task and has been demonstrated
with a wide range of stimuli. Novel variants on this task will be employed
in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
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• Artificial grammar learning (AGL): A finite-state grammar is designed to
produce a large number of possible sequences of novel words. For ex-
ample, a sequence that is produceable from the finite-state grammar illus-
trated in Figure 1.1 would be “PEL-TAM-RUD-RUD” whereas a sequence
like “RUD-PEL-VOT-TAM” would not be permitted by the grammar. The
learner is asked to discriminate between permissible and non-permissible
sequences after exposure to a number of different sequences from this
grammar. This task is aimed at examining a higher-level abstraction for
sequence learning reflecting syntactic processing (Gomez &Gerken, 1999).
Figure 1.1: Sample artificial grammar for a statistical learning task by Gomez
and Gerken (1999)
Likely because the field of statistical learning is focused on the developmen-
tal task of language acquisition, even statistical learning experiments that do not
directly relate to language learning employ similar language-inspired statistical
patterns. Most saliently, the statistical information is presented sequentially in
a stream and employs similar types of statistical regularities (e.g., transitional
probabilities between sensory objects).
Even though the sequential statistics explored by the field are inspired by
language, statistical learning is not a skill that is specific to the domain of lan-
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guage and thus is domain-general. Many studies have found learning using
non-linguistic stimuli. For example, the statistical learning task of (Saffran et
al., 1996) has been replicated using non-linguistic auditory stimuli (e.g. Saf-
fran, Johnson, Aslin, & Newport, 1999) and a number of types of visual stimuli
(Brady & Oliva, 2008; Kirkham, Slemmer, & Johnson, 2002). Statistical learn-
ing has also been established using spatial-arrayed stimuli presented simultane-
ously (Fiser & Aslin, 2001, 2002; Saffran, 2002), extending evidence of statistical
learning from sequential presentation of visual and auditory stimuli. This work
is theoretically vital for establishing statistical learning as a domain-general con-
tribution to language learning and opening up the possibility for contributions
of SL to development in other domains. This will be expanded upon in Chap-
ters 3, and 4.
1.3.3 What Is Statistical Learning: Conclusions
Essentially, statistical learning is the process of gaining knowledge of the struc-
ture of the world through experience with statistical regularities in sensory in-
put. Consistent with Ecological theories of learning and development, the use
of these regularities can increase the accord between an observer and their en-
vironmental or developmental niche.
The field of statistical learning is largely coalesced around the important de-
velopmental task of learning an ambient language. As a result, the paradigms of
the statistical learning literature are language-inspired. This is most evident in
the use of sequential statistics in statistical learning tasks. Despite a grounding
in language, the field of statistical learning is domain-general in focus, as sta-
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tistical learning has been demonstrated with many different sources of sensory
input, suggesting a role for statistical learning in many different developmental
tasks.
1.4 What Isn’t Statistical Learning?
As outlined above, the widely-accepted definition of statistical learning is a sen-
sitivity to statistical information in sensory input (Conway&Christiansen, 2006;
Go´mez, 2006; Perruchet & Pacton, 2006; Saffran & Sahni, in press). This defini-
tion encompasses the wide range of phenomena that have been studied un-
der the term “statistical learning,” such as learning from the distribution of ex-
emplars in a phonological category and using transitional probabilities defined
across syllables to segment words in a speech stream. However, this definition
also easily engulfs many other types of learning and memory. In this section,
we consider what isn’t statistical learning and how statistical learning relates to
other forms of learning. We begin with a brief discussion of the view of learning
and memory taken in this dissertation.
1.4.1 Multiple Learning and Memory Systems as Computa-
tional Niches
Learning and memory is not a singular behavioral phenomenon, nor is it me-
diated by a single brain region, neural system or cognitive mechanism. It is
commonly accepted that learning and memory comprise multiple systems and
constructs. However, there is no consensus on how to characterize the multiple
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types of learning and memory.
Arising from memory research in the second half of the 20th century, the
most well-known and influential characterizations of learning and memory
are based on crisp psychological and corresponding neural dissociations. The
Declarative Memory hypothesis makes a distinction between declarative and pro-
cedural (non-declarative) memory (see Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004, for a recent
review). Figure 1.2 presents a visual depiction of the major divisions of learn-
ing and memory systems according to this hypothesis. Declarative memory
is conscious and detailed; semantic knowledge, such as consciously remem-
bering a dissertation defense date, is the classic example of declarative mem-
ory. This type of memory is contrasted with procedural skills, such as visuo-
motor tasks, that cannot be verbally articulated and operate outside conscious
awareness. According to the Declarative Memory hypothesis, these two forms
of memory are supported by distinct neural systems: Declarative memory is
supported by the medial temporal lobe (MTL) and non-declarative memory
is supported by the basal ganglia (BG), possibly in combination with other
neural structures. The dichotomous characterization between declarative and
non-declarative memory is often employed analogously to the explicit–implicit
learning distinction (with and without conscious awareness, respectively; e.g.
Keele, Ivry, Mayr, Hazeltine, & Heuer, 2003; Nomura & Reber, 2008). A similar
characterization based in part upon a combination of these two psychological
characteristics comes from Schacter and Tulving (1994) and characterizes five
major types of memory based on psychological characteristics.
However, the theory of distinct declarative and procedural systems of learn-
ing and memory has increasingly come under fire. Notably, a number of recent
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the surgical lesion sustained by patient H.M. He proposed that
conjoint damage to both the hippocampus and amygdala is required
to produce severe amnesia in monkeys and humans (11). This
proposal was consistent with the fact that all the human surgical
cases with amnesia had damage to both the hippocampus and
amygdala (1, 7).
In 1986, a role for the hippocampus itself in human memory was
established from a case of amnesia (12). Patient R.B. developed
memory impairment in 1978 at the age of 52, after an episode of
global ischemia. He survived for 5 years, during which time he had
significant memory impairment in the absence of other cognitive
dysfunction. Upon his death, histological examination of the brain
revealed a circumscribed bilateral lesion involving the entire rostro-
caudal extent ofthe CA1 field ofthe hippocampus. Studies ofanimal
models of global ischemia in the rodent have confirmed the vulner-
ability of CA1 neurons in the hippocampus to ischemia and
implicated a mechanism for this selective lesion that involves the
excitotoxic effects of a glutamate neurotransmitter (13). Findings
from patient R.B. allowed two conclusions. First, the hippocampus
itself appeared to be a critical component of the medial temporal
lobe memory system. This idea was later supported by an additional
case in which memory impairment was associated with a bilateral
lesion confined to the hippocampus (14). Second, because R.B. was
not as severely amnesic as H.M. (15), other hippocampal regions in
addition to the CAI field, or structures outside the hippocampus,
must be important for memory functions.
Further confirmation for these ideas has come from improve-
ments in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), which make it
possible to obtain anatomical information from living patients (Fig.
2, A and B). With the use ofhigh-resolution MRI, the hippocampal
region (defined in those studies as the fimbria, dentate gyrus,
hippocampus proper, and subiculum) was found to be shrunken and
atrophic (57% ofnormal size) in four amnesic patients (16, 17). The
temporal lobe was ofnormal size. Because these patients were not as
memory-impaired as patient H.M., the findings with MRI reinforce
Fig. 2. (A) A Ti-weighted MR coronal image from a healthy normal subject
(R.C.) at the level of the left hippocampal formation. (B) An image at the
same level as in (A) in a severely amnesic patient ofthe same age (W.I.). Note
the markedly shrunken hippocampal formation in the patient. (C) A coronal
image of a monkey brain showing three CuSO4-filled beads (white circles)
anchored to the skull, which were used as landmarks to establish stereotaxic
coordinates for making hippocampal lesions. (D) An image of the same
monkey as in (C) after the hippocampal lesion. The image is in a plane
perpendicular to the long axis ofthe hippocampus. [Reprinted from (17) and
(47) with permission, 1990 Oxford University Press]
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Fig. 3. Classification of memory. Declarative (explicit) memory refers to
conscious recollections offacts and events and depends on the integrity ofthe
medial temporal lobe (see text). Nondeclarative (implicit) memory refers to
a collection of abilities and is independent of the medial temporal lobe (60).
Nonassociative learning includes habituation and sensitization. In the case of
nondeclarative memory, experience alters behavior nonconsciously without
providing access to any memory content (19, 20).
the conclusion that structures in addition to the hippocampus itself
are likely to be important for memory functions.
Development of the Animal Model
In the early 1980s, an animal model of human amnesia became
available in the nonhuman primate (11, 18). The animal model made
it possible to investigate systematically which anatomical structures
are important for memory. The research strategy is straightforward.
Monkeys can be prepared with bilateral, circumscribed lesions
limited to a particular structure or combination of structures. The
effects of the removals on memory are then determined quantita-
tively by evaluating the performance of these monkeys on tasks that
are identical to, or in some cases analogous to, tasks used to detect
memory impairment in human patients. To determine whether the
impairment in monkeys is long-lasting, as it is in humans after
medial temporal lobe damage, monkeys can be tested several years
after surgery.
One of the reasons that it took so long to develop an animal
model of human amnesia was that, until the early 1980s, human
amnesia itself was incompletely understood, and it was therefore
unclear what parallels should be looked for in experimental animals.
It is now appreciated that memory is not a single faculty but is
composed instead of multiple separate systems, only one ofwhich is
impaired in amnesia (19). Accordingly, only certain kinds of mem-
ory tests are appropriate for demonstrating an impairment in
animals that corresponds to human amnesia.
Human amnesia impairs the ability to acquire information about
facts and events (declarative memory) but spares the capacity for
skill learning, certain kinds of conditioning and habit learning, as
well as the phenomenon of priming (Fig. 3). Declarative memory is
accessible to conscious recollection and available to multiple re-
sponse systems. Nondeclarative (implicit) memory includes several
kinds of abilities, all of which are nonconscious and expressed
through performance. These abilities provide for cumulative
changes in perceptual or response systems and for the development
of new skills and habits. The information is not accessible to
conscious recollection, and it is inflexible, that is, it has limited access
to systems not involved in the initial learning. The idea that the
medial temporal lobe is involved in only one kind of memory also
developed in the animal literature (20, 21), and the findings from
humans and experimental animals are now in substantial agreement
that limbic lesions have selective and specific effects on memory (22).
The development of the animal model in the monkey began with
large bilateral lesions of the medial temporal lobe that approximated
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Figure 1.2: Division of multiple learning and memory systems as proposed by
Squire and Z l -M rgan (1991)
studies have found the involvement of the MTL in non-declarative learning and
memory tasks (e.g. Chun & Phelps, 1999; Turk-Browne, Yi, & Chun, 2006). Rel-
evant to the current series of studies, the MTL has been implicated in implicit
learning of sequ nces (e.g. Schendan, Searl, Melrose, & Stern, 2003). Curran
(1997) examined performance of MTL amnesiac patients on the serial reaction
time task, SRTT, a well-known example of procedural memory believed to be
mediated by the BG. In this task, visual stimuli with distinct locations ar pre-
sented, nd participa ts are simply asked to press a correspon ing response key
as quickly as possible. Unbeknownst to them, the stimuli are presented in a pre-
dictable sequence. Previous studies had found spared performance in the SRTT
by MTL amnesiacs supporting the canonical divisions of learning and memory.
However, Curran (1997) found that when sequences’ statistical properties were
controlled such that they could only be learned by second-order associations,
MTL amnesiacs show impaired performance. The first- and second-order se-
quences employed by Curran (1997) are presented in Figure 1.3. This finding
demonstrated that modifications of the computational demands of the learning
task, ot the psychological character of the task changed the mediating neural
19
systems.
Figure 1.3: Illustrations of the Serial Reaction Time Task (SRTT, adapted from
Clark & Ivry, 2010) with sequences employed by Curran (1997)
An alternative characterization of multiple learning and memory systems
is proposed by O’Reilly and colleagues (see Atallah, Frank, & O’Reilly, 2004;
McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; O’Reilly, 2006). The core idea of
this approach is that “different brain areas are specialized to satisfy fundamen-
tal tradeoffs in the way that neural systems perform different kinds of learning
andmemory tasks” (Atallah et al., 2004, p. 253). As such, this view does not pro-
pose psychological or neural dichotomies between types learning and memory.
Instead, the view presented by O’Reilly and colleagues characterizes different
learning and memory systems according to their neurocomputational proper-
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ties. The diversity of computational properties of the MTL, the basal ganglia
(BG) and other neural regions involved in learning and memory tasks (e.g. the
prefrontal cortex, PFC), can be described as complementary in that different
learning and memory tasks require different types of computation.
O’Reilly and colleagues propose viewing the relationship between types of
learning and memory tasks and their mediating neural systems in relation to
their neurocomputational properties. This entails that learning and memory
tasks can differentially engage neural systems based on their computational de-
mands as exemplified by Curran (1997). Second, this characterization highlights
the possibility that multiple systems, previously viewed to be distinct, dissocia-
ble or competing (Poldrack & Packard, 2003), could all contribute to a given
learning and memory task, albeit to different aspects of the task. Thus, multiple
learning and memory systems can be viewed as computationally complemen-
tary.
1.4.2 Computational Demands of Statistical Learning Tasks
Holding the view that the engagement of neural systems can be characterized
based on computational characteristics of a task places focus on the types of com-
putational demands of a given task rather than the psychological character of
the task (e.g. procedural vs. declarative). Correspondingly, in order to answer
the question, “What isn’t statistical learning?” we must consider the computa-
tional demands of statistical learning as they relate to other learning tasks.
To this end, canonical learning and memory tasks will be discussed in rela-
tion to their intended learning outcomes. For example, episodic memory tasks
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designed for human participants, typically present multiple sources of infor-
mation to remember such as a picture presented in a specific color (Ghetti &
Angelini, 2008). The intended information to be learned and remembered is the
conjunction of these sources of information and/or one part of the stimulus (e.g.
the identity of the picture). However, participants could encode any number of
memories based on this task (e.g. the order of trials). The current section will
only discuss the computational aspects of the intended task outcomes.
An important characteristic of statistical learning studies is that the informa-
tion to be learned is instantiated over many individual experiences. A statistical
pattern is not evident in any single sensory object or event but is characterized
through successive events. This is true both for sequential statistical learning
tasks focused on segmentation (e.g. Saffran et al., 1996) and for distributional
statistical learning tasks (Maye et al., 2002; Yoshida et al., 2010). Thus, in statis-
tical learning tasks, the information intended to be learned is highly distributed
over many successive stimuli or experiences.
There are a number of learning and memory tasks where the information in-
tended to be learned is presented in a very few number of trials and sometimes
a single trial: This is the case for perceptual priming tasks where recently en-
countered words or pictures influence subsequent performance on recognition
or completion tasks (e.g. Graf & Schacter, 1985) and for episodic memory tasks
as described above. Considering the distribution of the to-be-learned informa-
tion provides the first answer to what isn’t statistical learning: If learning task
could be completed in a single or very few number of trials, it isn’t a statistical
learning task.
Figure 1.4 presents a graph illustrating the position of a number of learning
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Figure 1.4: Learning and memory tasks presented in three dimensions of
computational demands: distribution (x axis), variability (y axis) and
abstraction (z axis). Inspired by: Spivey and Knowlton (2008)
and memory tasks along the computational dimensions to be discussed in this
section. The x-axis (closest and to the left) represents the distibution of to-be-
learned information in a given task. As discussed above, perceptual priming
and episodic memory are very low in the dimension of distribution (forward
and right) while tasks like the SRTT and statistical learning are very high on the
dimension of distribution (back and left).
A second defining characteristic of statistical learning tasks is the variability
of exposure. Statistical learning tasks have a relatively high degree of variabil-
ity: In a segmentation task, the different “words” to be learned are presented
in random order. This effectively reduces the higher-order statistics of between
word syllables while reinforcing within-word statistics. Similarity, in a distri-
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butional statistical learning task, there is a high degree of perceptual variability
(e.g. eight different exemplars for a given category used in Maye et al., 2002;
Yoshida et al., 2010). Moreover, a specific form of statistical learning task (non-
adjacent statistical learning) has been found to rely on high variability (Onnis,
Monaghan, Christiansen, & Chater, 2004).
There are other learning and memory tasks that present their stimuli with
a high degree of variability. These are tasks where participants are expected
to learn a set of “rules” or categories such as the aptly named rule-learning
task (Marcus, Vijayan, Rao, & Vishton, 1999; Saffran, Pollak, Seibel, & Shkol-
nik, 2007), artificial grammar learning (AGL), and weather prediction task
(Shohamy, Myers, Onlaor, & Gluck, 2004).
The amount of variability in a task is related to the distribution of infor-
mation in so far as tasks with very low distribution simply cannot allow for
variability (e.g. perceptual priming). However, consider the SRTT where dis-
tributed information (e.g. a sequence of ten trials) is simply repeated without
variation (e.g. Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). Thus, a second dimension that dis-
tinguishes statistical learning from some other learning tasks is the degree of
variability during exposure (see Green & Bavelier, 2008, for a discussion of the
role of variability in procedural learning tasks and behavioral plasticity). The
dimension of variability is presented along the y-axis in Figure 1.4.
A third dimension which distinguishes SL tasks is abstraction, which refers
to the level of fidelity of the to-be-learned information. At a level of high ab-
straction, there is low fidelity between what a participant is exposed to and the
to-be-learned information and vice versa. Recall the SRTT employed by Curran
(1997), where participants could only learn the sequence based on second-order
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statistics. This task has a higher degree of abstraction than an SRTT such as
the version employed by Nissen and Bullemer (1987) where participants were
intended to simply learn the succession of the entire sequence.2 A task with
a very low degree of abstraction is an episodic memory task which requires a
very precise recall between exposure and test. Tasks with a very high degree of
abstraction are rule-learning tasks (AGL, rule-learning).
Tasks that can be described as statistical learning have an intermediate de-
gree of fidelity. Statistical learning does not require participants to learn the
actual order of the sequence as in SRTT tasks. Instead they are asked to find
the probabilistic patterns in the input which requires a greater degree of ab-
straction. However, statistical learning tasks are distinct from tasks where the
participant is expected to generalize as in a rule-learning task (However, see
Brady & Oliva, 2008; Lany & Saffran, 2010, which present a higher degree of
both variability and abstraction than the typical statistical learning task). A dis-
tinction between the mechanisms of rule-learning and statistical learning has
been suggested, but their intersection, if any, is still an open question (See Mar-
cus et al., 1999; Seidenberg, MacDonald, & Saffran, 2002). Thus, examining the
dimension of abstraction presents three groups of learning tasks: those with
high abstraction that exemplify rule-learning tasks, those that require a low de-
gree of abstraction like the canonical SRTT, episodic memory and perceptual
priming and tasks that require an intermediate degree of abstraction that best
fit the definition of statistical learning. Abstraction is presented along the z axis
in Figure 1.4. 3
2As pointed out by Curran (1997), participants likely learned the sequence in Nissen and
Bullemer (1987) using simple two-response associations which would be a lower level of ab-
straction than the second order sequence employed by Curran (1997) and a higher level of ab-
straction than intended by the authors.
3There is a positive relationship between the dimensions of abstraction and variability: Tasks
that tend to be high in variability also tend to be high in abstraction. This relationship is dis-
25
This section considered statistical learning–learning from statistical regular-
ities presented in sensory input–and other learning tasks along three dimen-
sions. Statistical learning cannot occur in a single trial like perceptual priming
or episodic memory. Instead, a statistical pattern must be presented over many
trials. Thus, statistical learning has a greater distribution than other learning
tasks. However, unlike the SRTT, statistical learning is not simply a memoriza-
tion of a sequence of stimuli. Thus statistical learning tasks have a higher degree
of variability and a higher degree of abstraction. Statistical learning can also be
dissociated from tasks more focused on learning an abstract rule based on sen-
sory input. These tasks require a higher degree of abstraction and often also
have a higher degree of variability. However, tasks such as classical condition-
ing occupy a similar space in this multidimensional space as statistical learning
tasks do.
1.4.3 Statistical Learning As Theoretical Point of View
This current section has been considering what isn’t statistical learning. This
section is necessary because the definition of statistical learning can be seen to
encompass other types of learning. The previous section argued that tasks that
are considered statistical learning can be dissociated from many other learn-
ing tasks along a number of computational dimensions, such as variability and
abstraction. This section explores an alternate, if complementary, way to dis-
tinguish statistical learning from other forms of learning: The field of statistical
learning embodies a theoretical point of view. Specifically, this section examines
the differences in theoretical motivations for classical conditioning and statisti-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
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cal learning.
Consider these two definitions of classical conditioning:
Conditioning refers to the acquisition of a reflexive response to stim-
uli that are repeatedly paired with an unconditioned stimulus that
elicits the reflex, following the Pavolvian protocol. Eichenbaum &
Cohen, 2001, p. 155
The second definition is from Rovee-Collier (1986): “[Classical conditioning is] a
process by which organisms acquire predictive information about the structure
of their environments” (p. 140). These definitions notably diverge on the theo-
retical focus the authors are bringing to the definition. Eichenbaum and Cohen
focus on the psychological dissociations between types of learning and mem-
ory, while Rovee-Collier approaches questions of learning and memory from an
Ecological perspective emphasizing the interrelationship of an organism and its
environment and the role of learning in development.
Both of these definitions can be considered for how they relate to the defini-
tion of statistical learning: The former definition of classical conditioning does
not overlap with the definition of statistical learning. It emphasizes the role of
the changing reflexive response in classical conditioning and the importance of
both conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. None of these aspects of classi-
cal conditioning are included in the paradigms comprising the field of statisti-
cal learning. However, the latter definition emphasizes the importance of pre-
dictability in learning and the function of learning for an organism and in this
way, it overlaps with the definition of statistical learning. In fact, the definition
of classical conditioning presented by Rovee-Collier (1986) could be a substitute
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definition for statistical learning.
The field of statistical learning is borne from the assertion that there is
enough structure present in sensory input to support development, specifically,
the development of language abilities. In this way, the field of statistical learning
is in accord with an Ecological perspective. This is discussed in greater detail in
Section 1.3.1.
Essentially, there is a convergence between the definition of classical condi-
tioning presented by Rovee-Collier and statistical learning within an Ecological
perspective. Such a convergence could be also envisioned for learning tasks
such as the SRTT and perceptual priming. Uniting different learning and mem-
ory tasks through their theoretical focus provides an important synergy be-
tween interrelated related learning and memory processes even though they
may be dissociable on the dimensions of distribution, variability, and abstraction.
1.5 The Interrelationship of Perception and Learning and
Memory during Statistical Learning
This dissertation argues that perceptual and learning and memory systems in-
fluence each other during experience with novel statistical regularities. An in-
fluence of learning and memory on perception would allow knowledge gained
through statistical learning to shape future perception. An influence from per-
ceptual processing on learning and memory would ground knowledge, gained
through exposure to statistical regularities, in current perceptual processes.
This section asserts that a grounding of statistical learning follows from the
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theoretical framework for this dissertation, provided by Ecological approaches
to perception and development. The implications are explored, starting with
considering statistical learning relative to an observer’s niche. Conceptualiz-
ing learning as being grounded provides a novel proposal for the nature of
the mechanisms supporting statistical learning, and this section begins with a
review of the current understanding of the mechanisms supporting statistical
learning.
1.5.1 Current Views on the Mechanisms of Statistical Learning
Statistical learning is commonly believed to be supported by a largely abstract
learning mechanism focused on the statistical information in the sensory input.
There have also been suggestions that statistical learning is developmentally
invariant, and in this way cognitively separated from developmental changes
in perception, for example.
Early statistical learning studies focused on establishing the domain-
generality of this learning ability. Seminal papers established that SL is not
limited to language input (e.g. Saffran et al., 1999) or sequential statistics (e.g.
Fiser & Aslin, 2001, 2002). Some studies argued that not only can learning pro-
ceed with non-linguistic input but that learning can be equivalent across input
types (Saffran et al., 1999). As discussed in Section 1.3.2, this work was theoret-
ically vital for establishing statistical learning as a domain-general mechanism
that supports language learning. The establishment of domain-generality also
introduced the possibility that statistical learning could contribute to the devel-
opment in other perceptual-cognitive domains.
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Domain-generality is has been a prominent influence on the investigation
of the cognitive mechanisms underlying statistical learning. Many influential
models and theories have presupposed a mechanism that treats all types of in-
put stimuli (e.g., tones, shapes, syllables) as equivalent beyond the statistical
structure of the input itself (e.g., Altmann, Dienes, & Goode, 1995; Perruchet
& Pacton, 2006; Reber, 1989; Shanks, Johnstone, & Staggs, 1997). Thus, statisti-
cal learning is commonly seen to be supported by an abstract learning system
focused on statistics exclusively.
Some studies have also suggested that the mechanisms supporting statisti-
cal learning are invariant across developmental time: Saffran, Newport, Aslin,
Tunick, and Barrueco (1997) compared auditory SL between adults and chil-
dren and Kirkham et al. (2002) examined visual SL in infants from two to eight-
months-old; both studies found no difference in learning outcomes across age
groups. If statistical learning is developmentally invariant, then it is separate
from changes of perception across developmental time. However, statistical
learning studies typically employ stimuli that are novel to the observer (e.g.,
novel words consistent with the phonology of the ambient language) that may
not be perceived differently as no observer (an infant or an adult) has had prior
experience with them.
Building from the importance of domain-generality, there has been recent
interest in the constraints on statistical learning by other cognitive factors such
as attention. Early studies argued that statistical learning could occur outside
of selective attention, the process that biases cognitive processing to specific
aspects of sensory information (Saffran et al., 1999). However, recent work
has suggested that selective attention does modify statistical learning and in
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fact, may be essential for learning to occur (Toro, Sinnett, & Soto-Faraco, 2005;
Turk-Browne, Junge´, & Scholl, 2005). It has also been suggested that perceptual
grouping and attention may interact when learning from statistical regularities
(Baker, Olson, & Behrmann, 2004; Pacton & Perruchet, 2008). Beyond establish-
ing attention as an important factor in learning, this work provides some initial
evidence that statistical learning is not unaffected by other cognitive processes.
Thus, the understanding of statistical learning has progressed from being
characterized as language-specific, to domain-general and abstract. Some cur-
rent thinking has emphasized the effects of cognitive constraints such as atten-
tion.
1.5.2 Statistical Learning As Grounded in the Observer’s Niche
This dissertation diverges from the domain-general view of statistical learn-
ing reviewed above. Domain-general views imply that statistical learning is
affected mainly, or exclusively, by the presence of statistical information in sen-
sory input. The Ecological framework employed for this dissertation empha-
sizes that what is learned must be grounded in the niche in which the observer
exists (E. J. Gibson, 1969; E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000; Rovee-Collier & Cuevas,
2009). A niche is the relationship between an observer’s cognitive system and
their environment. An observer’s current niche is affected by situational factors,
such as where the observer lives (e.g. Providence vs. Ithaca), physical factors,
such as how the observer locomotes or how tall they are, but also by devel-
opmental factors, such as is the observer a child or their caregiver. Given that a
niche is comprised of a number of dynamic factors that change over the lifespan,
31
an observer’s niche is not static but changing. Building from a domain-general
view, an Ecological approach emphasizes that while statistical learning might
be a general, robust learning ability that is driven by statistical information that
it cannot be considered in a vacuum. The importance of grounding statistical
learning is especially important when considering how it can contribute to per-
ceptual change and development.
While the interrelationship of learning and an observer’s niche has been pro-
posed broadly (e.g. E. J. Gibson, 1969; E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000; Rovee-Collier
& Cuevas, 2009), the dependence of statistical learning upon the learner’s niche
has not been clearly established. The current section argues that statistical learn-
ing is both grounded in an observer’s niche but can potentially result in changes
to their niche. In addition, this section considers how the concepts of embodi-
ment and situated cognition contribute to the theoretical view of grounded sta-
tistical learning.
The Observer’s Niche Can Affect Learning
An observer’s niche can affect statistical learning in two important ways: Niches
can change the statistical information present in an observer’s sensory input;
changes in niche will also affect what statistical information is relevant to the
learner and thus what is learned.
The environment can be thought of as having an objective structure and the
corresponding statistical regularities present in sensory input could be deter-
mined based on this objective structure (e.g. Christiansen, Onnis, & Hockema,
2009). However, the statistical information that is received by the learner will
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be affected by their niche in this environment. Figure 1.5 provides an example
of how the same environment, in fact the same events, could result in different
statistical information in the sensory input as a result of developmental niche.
Yu, Smith, Christiansen, and Pereira (2007) examined the visual input received
by children and their caregivers in the same interaction and found large dif-
ferences in the structure of sensory input that each observer received. While
the caregiver’s view included multiple objects in a spatial array occupying a
small proportion of their visual field, the toddler’s visual input tended to be
dominated by the relevant objects in the interaction and sometimes was occu-
pied by single objects in succession (Figure 1.6). This difference in sensory input
is mediated in part by differences in arm length between children and adults:
Children have shorter arms, so held objects occupy a greater proportion of their
field of vision (Smith et al., 2011). However, there are likely a number of con-
tributions to these differences in visual input. For example, adults hold objects
closer to toddlers’ faces than they would for another adult, suggesting socially-
mediated differences in statistics. All of these factors (body composition, social
interactions) comprising the niche of the observer can in turn affect what kind of
statistical information they receive in their sensory input, and, correspondingly,
what kind of structure they perceive in the world.
Differences in an observer’s niche also affects what statistical information
is learned even given the same sensory input. With prior experience, an ob-
server is able to distill different perceptual information from the same sensory
input. Thus, if two observers received identical sensory information, the one
with prior experience would be able to pick out more information from the
same sensory input. Take the example of language. Upon hearing the same ut-
terance, the information picked out by an infant just learning the language and
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Figure 1.5: Differences in developmental niche can lead to different statistical
information in sensory input even for two observers viewing the same event.
Pictures from Chen Yu, Indiana University.
measure of how the child’s own activity selects visual
information. These, then, are the principal dependent
measures in the following analyses.
Figure 2 shows the frame-by-frame changes in the
head camera image sizes of the three objects for one dyad
for one trial. For this figure, size for each object is cal-
culated in terms of the proportion of pixels in the image
that belong to each of the three toys. Also shown is the
proportion of the image taken up by body parts (faces
and hands of both participants in aggregate as these are
not discriminated in the automatic coding). The pattern
shown in the figure is characteristic of all dyads on all
trials and is the main result. The toddler view is one in
which, at any one moment, one toy is much larger than
the other toys in the image and the largest object in the
image changes often. In contrast, the parent view is
broad, stably containing all three objects, with each
taking up a fairly constant and small portion of the head
camera field.
Statistics of the sizes of objects calculated over all
dyads show the same pattern. Over all head camera
frames, the toys took up three times as much area in the
child’s head camera image as in the parent’s head camera
image (M = .15 versus .05, t(18) = 8.78, p < .001) which
means that the toys were closer to the toddlers’ heads
and eyes than to the parents’ heads and eyes. Moreover,
the two sitting arrangements for parents did not differ
(t(8) = 0.711; p > .491) on this (or any other) measure.
Finally, the average proportion of the head camera image
occupied by body parts (faces and hands) was small (.05)
and was the same for both parents and children.
Dominating objects
A visual world in which one object is often closer to the
sensors than others is a form of selection, potentially
reducing competition among scene objects for attention
and processing. Accordingly, our first measures of
selectivity asked whether there was a ‘dominating object’
in the child and parent views, with the dominating object
defined in terms of its relative size, that is, as being the
largest – and thus closest to the sensors – compared to
the other in-view objects. More specifically, each frame
was defined as having a single dominating object if the
size of one object was at least twice the combined size of
all other objects (or object fragments). Only .08 of the
frames from the parent view but .30 of the frames from
the child view had a single dominating object; thus,
substantially more toddler views were dominated by a
single object than were parent views, both when parents
sat on chairs (t(8) = 5.48, p < .001) and when parents sat
on the floor (t(8) = 4.86, p < .005). These differences
were calculated in terms of proportions of all frames;
however, sometimes children were ‘off-task’ – not playing
with the toys and not looking at the table top but rather
looking at the ceiling camera, the door, the floor, or the
parent’s face. Specifically, for .21 of the frames there was
no object in the child’s view, compared with .07 of the
adult view frames. If we exclude all the no-object frames
from consideration, then the difference between the child
and parent head camera images in terms of a dominating
object is even larger (.38 of children’s head camera
frames are characterized by one dominating object
whereas only .09 of parent head camera frames are). In
sum, the adult view includes and is equal distance from
all of the objects on the table top; but in marked con-
trast, the child’s view often contains one dominating
object that is closer to the head and eye and thus often
blocks the view of the other objects.
Figure 3 provides converging evidence for these con-
clusions. Here we define the dominating object as sim-
ply the largest of the three objects (that is, as having a
head camera size that is greater than .33 of the total
size of all three objects combined). Figure 3 shows a
histogram of the proportion of all frames with objects
in view in which the dominating object dominates the
other objects by varying degrees (beginning at .33 when
three objects are all in view and roughly the same size).
Several aspects of these results are noteworthy. First, a
dominating object constitutes 100% of the size of the
Figure 2 Time series of the changing dominance of the objects in the head camera images from child and parent dyad. The figures
show proportion of the head camera field (size of object in terms of pixels relative to the size of the whole head camera image) taken
up by each of the three toy objects and by hands in the images from the child camera and the parent camera. The changing frame-by-
frame sizes of the three toy objects (red, green and blue) are indicated by the corresponding colored lines. The yellow line indicates
the proportion of the field that is images of exposed body parts (combined mother and child hands and faces). The text provides
aggregate statistics across all participating dyads.
12 Linda B. Smith et al.
! 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Figure 1.6: A time series of the visual input for a toddler or child (left),
caregiver (right) dyad. The proportion of the field of view occupied by
individual objects (green, red, blue) and body parts (yellow) is shown for each
time point. From Smith et al. (2011).
an adult already proficient in the language will be different. Given that learning
is a progressive and ongoing process to reduce uncertainty, the different per-
ceptual information available to these two observers will affect what statistical
information would be beneficial to learn from: The infant might determine the
functional categories of the speech sounds, while the adult might focus on the
relationship between the semantics of the utterance and the visual environment.
In this way, the observer’s niche will determine what is learned even given the
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same sensory input.
While it might be possible to objectively qualify the structure, and relatedly
the statistics available in sensory input, the current section argues that statis-
tical learning tasks engaged in by an observer will be affected by their niche:
Differences in niche will result in different statistical information in sensory in-
put; moreover, even if the same sensory input is received, the current niche of
the observer will affect what perceptual information is picked out of that in-
put and thus, what patterns might be most relevant to learn in order to reduce
uncertainty.
Embodiment and Situated Cognition
The concepts of embodiment and situated cognition are connected to the view
that learning occurs relative to an observer’s niche. Embodiment is essentially
the view that the operations of the brain are closely tied to the operations of
the body and the cycles of perception and action (e.g., Barsalou, Simmons, Bar-
bey, & Wilson, 2003; Glenberg, 1997). Similarly, situated cognition emphasizes
that cognition occurs within an external environment and these two systems
are coupled such that they affect each other. These two terms can be consid-
ered as emphasizing the same point: that cognition cannot occur in a vacuum,
that the brain must be considered in relation to the body’s motor and perceptual
systems and also in relation to the environment in which it is situated.
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Learning Can Change the Observer’s Niche
Section 1.1 argued that experience supports perceptual changes vital to tasks
such as language learning and face processing. While the exact role of learning
in these developmental changes is under dispute (see recent evidence for innate
face processing abilities in macaque monkeys, Sugita, 2009), there is mount-
ing evidence for the role of experience, in part mediated by statistical learning,
in the development of these abilities. According to Ecological theories, such
changes in perceptual abilities are part of a change in the learner’s niche. For
example, an observer who is able to functionally categorize the speech sounds
of their ambient language exists in a different niche than another learner that is
unable to do so. Thus, learning from the statistical regularities in sensory input
could result in changes in the learner’s niche.
In sum, this section argues that statistical learning, as it exists in the wild,
must be considered in relation to the observer’s niche. Specifically, what is
learned from sensory input is affected by the observer’s niche as the niche deter-
mines both what statistical regularities are present in sensory input, this could
be considered as a form of embodied cognition. Moreover, what statistical regu-
larities are relevant to be learned given identical sensory input are also affected
by the observer’s niche. In addition, statistical learning has the potential to af-
fect the observer’s niche as new information gained through statistical learning
might affect future perception. However, the influence of knowledge gained
through statistical learning on perception has not been directly tested in labora-
tory experiments and is a topic of empirical study in this dissertation.
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1.5.3 The Argument and Layout of This Dissertation
The relationship between the observer’s niche and statistical learning, as out-
lined above, could be seen to be mediated by changes in perception. The pre-
vious section argued that an observer’s niche can affect what is learned based
on the perception of sensory input; differences in the ability to pick out infor-
mation will change what statistical regularities are available to the observer.
In turn, knowledge gained through experience with statistical regularities can
result in changes of the observer’s niche through changing the ability of the ob-
server to pick out information in future sensory input. In this way, the dynamic
relationship between an observer’s niche and statistical learning can be consid-
ered to be mediated by perceptual change. Thus, Ecological approaches suggest
a role for perception in statistical learning. Similarly, for statistical learning to
be considered an embodied and situated cognitive process it must be affected
by sensory-motor processes and/or the environment (see Barsalou et al., 2003;
Markman & Brendl, 2005).
Following from this theoretical framework, this dissertation takes a different
perspective from the domain-general accounts of statistical learning presented
above. The current work broadly proposes that statistical learning arises from
an interrelationship between perception and learning and memory during ex-
perience with statistical regularities. Figure 1.7 presents an illustration of this
framework. Specifically, during the experience with statistical regularities per-
ception can both support and constrain what is learned and learning and mem-
ory systems can influence perception though the integration of knowledge of
environmental structure gained through experience.
To support of this proposal, one must demonstrate that perceptual processes
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Figure 1.7: Illustration of the theoretical framework proposed in this
dissertation: during experience with statistical regularities, perceptual and
learning and memory processes are mutually influential.
non-trivially influence what is learned from experience statistical regularities
and that learning from statistical regularities influences what is perceived. The
empirical work presented in this dissertation provides evidence for both of these
claims.
In Chapter 2, perceptual organization is found to both support and constrain
what is learned from perceptually variable statistical patterns. This finding is
discussed in relation to the application of statistical learning to language acqui-
sition.
Chapter 3 presents a novel demonstration that perceptual identity (i.e.
whether statistics are presented as auditory or visual stimuli) affects what is
learned; specifically, that changes in rate of presentation have opposite effects on
visual and auditory statistical learning. This chapter demonstrates that the dif-
ferences in perceptual processing across perceptual modalities can affect what
is learned despite receiving identical statistical information.
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Chapter 4 presents evidence for a dynamic relationship between perception
and statistical learning over development. Specifically, this chapter examines
the relationship of auditory and visual learning in infancy and finds a different
pattern than that found in adult learners (e.g. in Chapter 3). Moreover, the
paper finds evidence for changes in auditory SL for infants aged eight to ten
months.
Finally, Chapter 5 finds that structured experience can support changes in
object perception. Neuroimaging data highlight the involvement of the medial
temporal lobe, an important learning and memory system, in integrating across
successive experiences to support changes in perception.
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CHAPTER 2
IS STATISTICAL LEARNING CONSTRAINED BY LOWER LEVEL
PERCEPTUAL ORGANIZATION?
The content of this chapter is currently under review at Cognition; see Emberson,
Liu, and Zevin (under review)
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In order for statistical information to aid in complex developmental
tasks such as language acquisition, learning from higher-order statis-
tics (e.g. across successive syllables in a speech stream to support seg-
mentation) must be possible while organization at lower levels of de-
scription (e.g. speech categorization) is still developing. The current
study is the first examination of how differences in lower level organi-
zation and higher level statistical information shape statistical learning.
To this end, we presented adult participants with multiple sound exem-
plars from novel, complex sound categories, designed to reflect some
of the spectral complexity and variability of speech. Higher-order sta-
tistical information, determined based on sound categories not individ-
ual exemplars, could support stream segmentation. However, percep-
tual similarity judgments and multi-dimensional scaling revealed that
participants only discriminated three of four experimenter-defined cat-
egories, creating a tension between lower level perceptual organization
and higher-order statistical information. We examined whether statis-
tical learning is more consistent with statistical learning being bottom-
up, constrained by the lower levels of organization, or top-down, opti-
mal learning despite lower level organization. We consistently find that
learning is constrained by perceptual organization. Moreover, partic-
ipants generalize their learning to novel sounds that occupy a similar
perceptual space, suggesting that learning occurs based on regions of
perceptual space. Overall, these results reveal a constraint on the statis-
tical learner where statistical information is determined based on lower
level organization and thus current categorization abilities. These find-
ings have important implications for the role of statistical learning in
language acquisition.
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2.1 Introduction
Starting in infancy and continuing into adulthood, humans are highly sensitive
to regularities in their environment. From these regularities, which can also be
conceptualized as statistical information, it is possible to learn a large amount
about the structure of the world without explicit feedback or innate knowledge.
In a little over a decade, learning from statistical information has been impli-
cated in the processing and acquisition of a variety of perceptual and cognitive
skills, including knowledge of causal structure and human action (Baldwin, An-
dersson, Saffran, &Meyer, 2008; Oakes & Cohen, 1990, 1995; Sobel, Tenenbaum,
& Gopnik, 2004), visual processing (Brady & Oliva, 2008; Yuille & Kersten,
2006), and, the focus of this paper, language learning (Goldwater, Griffiths, &
Johnson, 2009; Saffran et al., 1996).
It is common practice for the learning tasks and models that populate this
literature to investigate learning from statistical information at a single level of
description, for example, to investigate statistical learning available at a rela-
tively low-level of the sensory signal (e.g. acquiring the internal structure of
categories through distributional statistics) and in a separate study to examine
learning from statistical regularity characterizing relationships at higher levels
of description (e.g. segmentation of lexical items statistical information across
sound categories or syllables). As a consequence, most existing statistical learn-
ing literature implicitly assumes that learning of the statistics at lower levels
is resolved prior to learning from the statistics present at higher levels of de-
scription. However, developmental trajectories of statistical learning suggest
that this assumption is not borne out. Furthermore, the nature of interactions
between different levels of statistical learning may have important implications
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on our understanding of the specific mechanisms that support learning at each
level.
In the current paper, we focus on the domain of language acquisition and
examine how statistical learning proceeds when lower and higher level infor-
mation must be resolved simultaneously, a situation we argue is more akin to the
task faced by the natural language learner. The lower level learning challenge
we chose to investigate is that of acquiring auditory categories which models
the problem listeners face when having to categorize substantial acoustically-
variable vocal utterances into functionally-equivalent items (in their linguistic
interpretation). The higher level learning challenge we chose to investigate is the
acquisition of transitional probabilities defined across entire auditory categories
that contain multiple acoustically-varying exemplars. To this end, we created a
set of auditory categories, each containing acoustically-varying non-speech ex-
emplars that are novel to adult listeners, and exposed participants to familiar-
ization streams characterized by specific experimenter-determined transitional
probabilities defined across categories. We then probed the nature of statistical
learning resulting from this exposure. We contrast two broad theoretical possi-
bilities: 1) statistical learning is primarily top-down – that is, statistics at higher
levels can be optimally learned, regardless of how lower level information is
processed; 2) statistical learning is primarily bottom-up – that is, the organization
at lower levels is relied upon to define statistical information at higher levels re-
gardless of whether the resulting statistics are optimal at higher levels.
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2.1.1 Statistical Learning across Levels of Description in Lan-
guage
Statistical information has the potential to aid language learning at many differ-
ent levels of description, including speech categorization, word segmentation
and lexical development, and syntactic processing (for reviews, see Romberg &
Saffran, 2010; Saffran & Thiessen, 2007). The large proportion of research iden-
tified by the term statistical learning has focused on the use of transitional prob-
abilities to accomplish word segmentation and lexical development. To illus-
trate, take the phrase “pretty baby” (Saffran et al., 1996) which would typically
be produced as a continuous utterance /prI’tibeI’bi/. In this phrase, as well
as the ambient language, transitional probabilities–the probability that one will
perceive Y given the perception of X–and other statistical regularities (e.g. co-
occurrence frequency) are higher between syllables that cohere to form a word
(e.g. “pre” and “ty”) than syllables that cross word boundaries (e.g. “ty” and
“ba”). Not only can infants use transitional probabilities to segment words from
a speech stream (Saffran et al., 1996; Aslin, Saffran, & Newport, 1998), but they
are also more likely to use syllables linked by high transitional probability as
lexical labels (Graf Estes, Evans, Alibali, & Saffran, 2007). Thus, learning from
statistical regularities likely contributes to lexical development, characterized
in part by the vocabulary explosion beginning around 14-months (Saffran &
Thiessen, 2007).
However, the experiments that populate this literature and the correspond-
ing models typically ignore a key challenge infants face in dealing with natural
speech input: Transitional probabilities are necessarily accumulated over many
different utterances of the same phrase (e.g. “pretty baby” or /prI’tibeI’bi/),
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and it is well known that, even within the productions of a single speaker, there
exists a large amount of acoustic variability across the multiple utterances of
any given linguistic unit.1 Essentially, each utterance “pretty baby,” or any par-
ticular speech sound, has a unique acoustic waveform and is, in essence, a new
exemplar of the functional category to which it belongs. Most statistical learn-
ing studies eliminate the variability across successive experiences by employing
a corpus of acoustically identical repetitions of sounds (e.g. Saffran et al., 1996).
Thus, this work includes the assumption that acoustic variation is already re-
solved, likely through the process of speech categorization – a phenomenon
in which variable utterances within the same functional speech categories are
treated equivalently – before transitional probabilities across the speech cate-
gories are learned.
However, reliable speech categorization is cognitively difficult and not fully
developed until well beyond the age during which infants segment and learn
most of their words. While there can be coherence within the distribution of
acoustic properties of utterances that are functionally equivalent (e.g. within
a speech category), there is also substantial overlap between the distributions
of sounds that are not functionally equivalent (e.g. from different speech cat-
egories). That is, there is no clear boundary between the entire array of possi-
ble utterances intended to be one speech sound (for example, the syllable “ra”)
and the array of possible utterances intended to be a different, but acoustically
similar, speech sound (for example, the syllable la). The distinction between all
utterances of “ra” vs. “la” is defined only probabilistically, as is the case for
many other speech sound contrasts. Furthermore, in the case of most speech
1While this paper focuses on acoustic variability, there are many other sources of information
that vary across utterances, including contextual and visual information and interaction with a
caregiver. All of these factors have been shown to modify cognitive processing in infancy and
thus variation of these factors will alter the informational content of each utterance.
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sounds, there is a lack of sufficient acoustic cues available to reliably catego-
rize and discriminate phonemes, which have long been thought to be the basic
“unit” of speech processing (Lotto, 2000; Peterson & Barney, 1952; Shankweiler,
Strange, & Verbrugge, 1977). However, researchers from a broad spectrum of
theoretical positions have questioned the primacy of overt, phoneme-level cate-
gorization in language use (Port, 2007; Lotto & Holt, 2000). The use of temporal
windows of integration greater than the phoneme (Nusbaum & Henly, 1992;
Poeppel, Idsardi, & VanWassenhove, 2008) and dependence on communicative
context (Flynn & Dowell, 1999; Obleser & Kotz, 2010) in successful speech com-
prehension are commonly observed. In extreme cases, people are even capable
of understanding speech when the typical cues to phoneme identity are entirely
unavailable (Remez, Rubin, Pisoni, & Carrell, 1981; Shannon, Zeng, Kamath,
Wygonski, & Ekelid, 1995). Thus, the issue of how functional equivalence in
speech is used productively in higher-order cognitive processes (e.g. learning
from transitional probabilities across syllables) remains an unsolved problem in
language research.
While it has been demonstrated that infants in the first year begin to prefer-
entially discriminate the acoustic contrasts employed in their ambient language
(e.g. Werker & Tees, 1984; Kuhl et al., 1992), it is also known that the devel-
opment of speech categorization continues well beyond infancy (e.g. Hazan
& Barrett, 2000; McGowan, Nittrouer, & Manning, 2004; Serniclaes, Heghe,
Mousty, Carre´, & Sprenger-Charolles, 2004). These results indicate that the
emergence of speech categorization has a largely overlapping developmental
time course with that of using transitional probabilities between syllables to
segment and learn words. Even in the case where infant’s show evidence of
adult-like phoneme categorization and differentiation in isolation, they can fail
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to differentiate these sounds during language learning tasks such as word learn-
ing (e.g. Stager & Werker, 1997; Thiessen, 2007). Thus, even early demonstra-
tions of infants speech categorization abilities may be highly task-dependent
and might not be functionally applied when learning transitional probabilities
between syllables or when acquiring other language skills.
The empirical evidence suggesting fragility of early infant speech categories
combined with the overlapping developmental trajectories of speech category
acquisition and early lexical development cast doubt on the assumption that
speech categorization is resolved before infants are learning from higher order
statistical properties across speech sounds. Instead, infants must be able to learn
at higher levels of description without the benefit of well-developed or support-
ive categorization abilities at lower levels of description. While each of these
learning tasks has been extensively examined separately (i.e. the development
of speech categorization and learning from transitional probabilities between
syllables), learning at a higher level of description without resolution of lower
level regularities has largely gone unexamined.
2.1.2 The Current Paper
We aimed to investigate learning from regularities at a higher level of descrip-
tion (across categories) without assuming that perceptual variability within
categories has already been resolved. Specifically, we gave adult learners ex-
posure to sound categories containing spectrotemporally complex nonspeech
sounds with which the adults have no listening experience, modeling the chal-
lenge faced by infant language learners who must learn transitional probabili-
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ties across speech categories while their speech categorization abilities are still
developing. To this end, we examine a very simple model language where
four novel sound categories are organized into experimenter-defined pairs
(“words”) and presented in a sound stream such that higher level transitional
probabilities across units forming a “word” was always 100% and across units
spanning two different words was always 50%. The novel aspect of this ex-
periment is that each sound category is instantiated in multiple variable exem-
plars designed to model the natural acoustic variability that exists across any
given linguistic utterance in human speech. Critically, the transitional proba-
bilities across syllables cohering in a “word” are reliably higher as defined at
the category-level, but no specific exemplar of the first unit predicts any other
specific exemplar from the second unit with much higher probability than one
might observe across units spanning two different “words”. Thus, to reliably
learn the intended category-level transitional probabilities, participants would
need to resolve thewithin-category acoustic variability through grouping or cat-
egorizing sounds. This task would be trivial if participants somehow already
had the ability to categorize or perceptually group the exemplars into the ap-
propriate four experimenter-defined categories. However, participants’ naı¨ve
perception of the sounds supports, at most, the organization of these sounds
into three separate perceptual clusters.
Thus, this scenario creates a tension between participants’ lower-level per-
ceptual organization of sounds and the organization that they would need to
have in order to learn from the intended higher-order statistical regularities. In
a series of four experiments, we considered two broad theoretical possibilities
for how learning might proceed:
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1. Statistical learning is top-down. In this case, participants would be able to
learn from higher order statistical regularities even if their initial lower
level perceptual organization does not support it. This would result in the
most robust learning of transitional probabilities defined at the higher-
order category level and best possible prediction of successive sounds.
2. Statistical learning is bottom-up. Lower level organization is relied upon
to define statistical information at higher levels. Since participants’ naı¨ve
lower level organization does not support learning the intended higher-
order transitional probabilities in the current experiment, participants will
not have, or develop over the course of exposure, the best possible predic-
tion of successive sounds or uncover the intended structure of the system.
2.2 Experiment 1: Naı¨ve Perception of Novel, Spectrally-
Complex Non-Speech Sounds
First, we examined in detail participants naı¨ve perception of the sound cate-
gories used in subsequent learning studies. Specifically, listeners heard six dif-
ferent exemplars in each sound category. In this paper, the term sound category
corresponds to an experimenter-defined group of acoustically varying sounds.
We will use the term sound exemplar to refer to a single sound (out of the six in
each category) heard by the participants during the experiment.
The novel sound categories were adapted from the training study of Wade
and Holt (2005), which used a video game to implicitly train listeners to learn
categories of novel, spectro-temporally complex non-speech stimuli. These
sounds are carefully designed to capture key characteristics of natural speech
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categories without sounding speech-like (to listen: http://www.psy.cmu
.edu/˜lholt/php/gallery irfbats.php). While previous research has
shown that it is possible to develop some degree of specialized processing of
these sounds with adequate exposure and training (Leech, Holt, Devlin, & Dick,
2009; Liu & Holt, 2011), participants in the present study have not experienced
these sounds before and thus should not, a priori, categorize them or process
them in a specialized manner.
To characterize participants’ perceptual organization of these sound cate-
gories, we asked naı¨ve participants to perform a perceptual similarity judgment.
Results from this task uncover how participants perceive the sounds in relation
to each other, for example, whether they group exemplars from a single cate-
gory together or intermix them with exemplars from other categories. We will
refer to these perceptual tendencies broadly as a perceptual similarity space and
as an illustration of participants’ perceptual or lower level organization of the
sounds and likely stems from a combination of 1) raw acoustic similarities in
one or more cues characterizing the sounds, and 2) how much importance each
particular cue carries for the listener. If sound exemplars are perceived as dis-
tinct from all exemplars from other categories will be referred to as perceptual
clusters.
2.2.1 Methods
Participants
Twenty-eight students participated in the current study. All participants re-
ported in this paper were undergraduates at Cornell University who partici-
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pated in exchange for course credit. Participants were asked to report any au-
ditory, visual, or neurological deficits via post-experimental questionnaire; no
participants reported any such deficits.
Sound Stimuli
Adapted from Wade and Holt (2005), all four sound categories were designed
to have two spectral peaks, P1 and P2. Each peak has a steady-state frequency
portion and a transitioning frequency portion, similar to the acoustics of syl-
lables containing a vowel and a semivowel or liquid (for a schematic diagram
of the four categories of stimuli, see Figure 2.1). The two Easy categories (E1
and E2) each have a P1 which begins with a period of steady state frequency
and then gradually decreases in frequency. Both Easy categories also have a P2
which begins with a steady state period and either consistently increases (E1)
or decreases (E2) in frequency. The name Easy comes from the fact that these
categories are theoretically discriminable from each other based on one simple
acoustic cue: the direction of the frequency transition of P2. The two Hard cate-
gories (H1 and H2) have a P1 that begin with an increasing frequency transition
followed by a steady state. They also both have a P2 that begins with a fre-
quency transition followed by a steady state, but both H1 and H2 completely
overlap in their steady-state frequencies and both contain rising and falling
transitions within category. Thus, only a higher-order interaction between two
cues, the onset frequency and the steady state frequency, creates a perceptual
space in which H1 and H2 are discriminable from each other (see Wade & Holt,
2005, for a comprehensive discussion).
The learning curves of participants trained to categorize these sounds (Liu
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Figure 2.1: Schematic diagram of the spectrotemporal properties of the stimuli
employed in all experiments. Each sound has two components: P1 (constant
over all stimuli in a category) and P2 (varies for each stimulus).
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& Holt, 2011; Wade & Holt, 2005) suggests it is easiest to first discriminate the
Easy categories from the Hard categories and the two Easy categories from each
other. Participants learn relatively quickly to categorize E1 and E2 sounds well
above chance in the training paradigm, but substantially more training is neces-
sary to produce above-chance categorization of sounds in H1 and H2. Note that
it is reasonable for stimuli from Hard categories to be easily discriminable from
those of Easy categories because the P2 has different carrier waves for Hard
(sawtooth) vs. Easy (noise) sounds, and they have different P1 waves.
We used six different exemplar sounds from each of the four categories (e.g.
from E1, they would hear E11, E12, ... , E16), all of which share a common P1 but
diverge in their P2 which are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Stimulus Presentation
All sounds were presented using over-the-ear headphones (Sony MDR-V150)
at a comfortable, above-threshold volume. Instructions and stimuli were pre-
sented using PsyScope X B53 on MacMini computers. During sound presen-
tation, participants observed blank, white screens on 17 in CRT monitors. All
sounds were presented for 300 ms. Each trial began and ended with 500 ms of
silence, and the two sounds were presented separated by a pause of 500 ms.
Similarity Judgment
After hearing both sounds, participants were asked to report how similar the
sounds were on a scale of 1 to 4 (1 = the same and 4 = completely different) on
a keyboard. Participants were given an unlimited amount of time to make their
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responses.
For practical purposes, it was necessary to limit the number of trials by parti-
tioning the full set of 24 exemplars (six from each of the four categories) into two
subsets; one subset contained exemplars 1, 3, 5 from each category and the other
subset contained exemplars 2, 4, 6. Half the participants performed similarity
judgment on one subset, the other half on the other subset.
We performedMultiDimensional Scaling (MDS) of the aggregate data across
participants using the IsoMDS routine, part of the MASS library for R (Venables
& Ripley, 1999). We restricted the number of dimensions to two. ANOVAs were
also run on raw similarity scores, treating subjects and items (sound exemplars)
as random factors to complement the MDS results. Since participants did not
repeat judgments in the perceptual similarity task and received only a subset
of items to evaluate, these analyses are conducted on the responses not an ag-
gregate of subject responses. min F’will be reported whenever both subject and
item analyses were significant.
2.2.2 Results and Discussion
The results of the MultiDimension Scaling (MDS) of the aggregate data from all
participants, presented in Figure 2.2, indicate that participants are able to per-
ceive the Easy and Hard categories as distinct from each other: This is revealed
through the linear separability of E1, E2 and H1, H2. The figure also reveals a
distinction within the Easy categories: The exemplars from E1 are linearly sep-
arable from E2. This pattern of results indicates that participants also perceive
a difference between the two Easy categories: E1 occupies a distinct region of
54
!
Figure 2.2: Perceptual Distance between all stimuli for all subjects. Similarity
judgments were entered into MDS analysis with two dimensions.
perceptual space from E2, such that each E1 stimulus is on average more similar
to all other E1 stimuli than to the E2 stimuli. This is not true for the H1 and H2
stimuli which are more or less evenly distributed across the second perceptual
dimension.
We then analyzed raw similarity scores in a series of ANOVAs. First, we
tested whether participants separate E from H categories by examining the re-
sulting judgments of three possible trial types: comparison within the Easy cat-
egories (e.g. E11 vs. E23, E11 vs. E15), within the Hard categories, and a compari-
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son between Easy and Hard categories (e.g. E11 vs. H23). This analysis revealed
a significant effect of trial type, min F’ (2, 234) = 22.088, p < 0.0001. The means
for these contrasts are higher for between category types (E vs. H: 2.854) than
within either E or H category trials (E vs. E: 2.243, H vs. H: 2.200) demonstrating
that exemplars between Easy and Hard categories are rated as less similar than
exemplars within either Easy or Hard categories.
Next, we investigated how participants perceive the four experimenter-
defined categories (i.e. E1, E2, H1, H2), by crossing comparison type (Same
vs. Different category) with category type (Easy vs. Hard). A significant inter-
action between these factors was observed, min F’ (1, 119) = 27.955, p < 0.0001,
such that there was a large difference in perceived similarity for Same vs. Dif-
ferent comparisons that was restricted to the Easy categories. That is, consistent
with the MDS analysis, participants perceived the Easy items as forming two
clusters roughly corresponding to the experimenter-defined categories, whereas
the Hard items were equally similar between and within these categories. There
also was a main effect of Same-Different judgments, min F’ (1, 119) = 25.509, p <
0.0001 but no main effect of Easy-Hard trials. A planned comparison revealed
that the effect of comparison type was significant only for stimuli from the Easy
categories: min F’ (1, 73) = 90.738, p < 0.0001.
In sum, MDS (Figure 2.2) and statistical analyses reveal that participants per-
ceive Easy and Hard categories as distinct and they further perceive the dif-
ference between the two Easy categories (E1 and E2) but fail to perceive the
difference between the two Hard categories (H1 and H2). We will refer to orga-
nization of lower level perceptual information into three categories as the naı¨ve
or participant perceptual organization. These results confirm that naı¨ve perceptual
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organization does not conform to the experimenter-defined categories.
2.3 Experiment 2: Statistical Learning across Multiple Exem-
plars of Novel Sound Categories
Having determined that participants’ perceptual organization of the sound cat-
egories does not confirm to the four experimenter-defined categories used to
create the model language, we now ask how participants’ learn from statisti-
cal information defined based on these four categories of sounds. Does their
perceptual organization determine what statistics are learned (bottom-up) or
will participants learn based on the four experimenter-defined categories de-
spite lacking supportive lower level organization (top-down)?
As in previous statistical learning experiments, we examined whether par-
ticipants can distinguish pairs heard during familiarization from novel pairs of
sounds that violate the structure of the training exposure (i.e. foils). Unlike pre-
vious experiments, but like naturalistic experience, statistical regularities were
defined across sound categories with multiple exemplars (e.g. E11, E12, ... , E16).
The current learning paradigm creates an interrelationship between sound
categorization and higher order statistical information by making learning
based on the individual sound exemplars extremely difficult. First, there are
a large number of exemplars (24 exemplars across four categories of sounds).
Second, all exemplars from one sound category are presented with all others in
the paired category (e.g. E11-H21, E11-H22, ...) so that a single exemplar (e.g.
E11) predicts six other exemplars with equal likelihood, and a specific exemplar
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pair (e.g. E11-H22) is only presented together twice during familiarization. If
participants are to learn from transitional probabilities, this information must
be determined based upon groups or categories of sounds not individual exem-
plars: While each specific exemplar pair is only presented twice (e.g. E11-H22),
there are learnable transitional probabilities across these sound categories (E1-
H2) as the exemplars from a single category are presented together with the
groups of sounds comprising a second category many times. Thus, there is an
interrelationship between grouping sounds and higher level statistics entailing
1) that how one clusters or categorizes sound at the lower level affects the re-
sulting statistical information at higher levels and 2) that knowledge of certain
higher level statistics could arrange groups of sounds at the lower level of de-
scription.
The intended structure of the stream is based on the experimenter-defined
categories (E1, E2, H1, H2). Experiment 1 established that participants’ percep-
tual organization only supports three perceptual clusters: E1 and E2 categories
are separated in perceptual similarity space while the two remaining categories
are not perceived as distinct creating an omnibus H cluster or category. We aim
to consider statistical learning outcomes in terms of whether participants are
able to learn the intended structure or whether learning is constrained by the
lower level perceptual organization of the sounds.
At this point, it is important to consider the goal of the learner. Is the goal of
the learner more in line with one of these theoretical outcomes than the other?
We view the goal of the learner as two fold: The first goal is to uncover the
intended structure. This goal is especially relevant in language learning where
language structure is shared amongst members of a community, and a learner
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must decipher the language so that they will be able to use these structures
to communicate effectively to another. However, it is unclear how a leaner is
able to determine what the intended structure is beyond what they are able to
learn (e.g. the presence of statistical information). It is possible that interac-
tion between language learners and “teachers” (e.g. caregivers) is organized in
such a way as to scaffold a direction of learning (e.g. sentence frames support
word recognition, Fernald & Hurtado, 2006; speaking in variation sets to sup-
port more effective word segmentation and verb learning; Onnis, Waterfall, &
Edelman, 2008; Waterfall, 2006). The current experiment does not provide this
kind of interactive, guided experience for the learners. They are simply exposed
to the raw statistics based on a randomized stream of sound category pairs.
The second more cognitively reductionistic goal is to have the most accurate
prediction of the next sound. Learning can be broadly viewed as a progres-
sive reduction of uncertainty between internal predictions and the outcomes of
events (e.g McClelland, 2002; Schultz, Dayan, &Montague, 1997). Pursuing this
goal would result in statistical learning because uncovering structure allows for
better prediction of successive experiences. This goal makes use of predictive
processing to both reduce cognitive effort in processing correctly anticipated
events and provide an error signal for incorrect predictions. This view has been
applied to adult language processing (Altmann & Mirkovic´, 2009) but such a
link remains relatively uninvestigated in the domain of language learning.
Beyond the goal of learning the intended structure of the ambient language,
if we characterize the goal of the learner as the best prediction, the learner
should uncover the experimenter-intended structure of the model language (i.e.
use the statistics based upon four sound categories). If a learner predicts the
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next sound based on any six exemplars from a given sound category, the learner
has a 1/6 chance of correctly guessing the next sound and is making a predic-
tion based on a smaller region of perceptual space. If the learners prediction is
based on the three categories in the naı¨ve perceptual organization, the partici-
pant has a possible 12 exemplars to predict in the omnibus Hard category. Thus,
there is less effective prediction when grouping is based on the naı¨ve perceptual
organization. An alternative possibility is that participants could predict based
on the category and not the successive sounds. If participants predict succes-
sive sounds based on sound category, it would be advantageous to have larger
categories thereby increasing the chance of a correct prediction. Using reduc-
tio ad absurdum, if there is no penalty for predicting based on larger categories,
the best strategy for the learner would be to place all sounds into a single cate-
gory thus always correctly predicting the next category of sound. This strategy
would result in no discovery of structure or no statistical learning and would
not be beneficial in reducing processing costs as the predictions are too general.
Also, there is no added benefit from predicting using groupings that are smaller
than the experimenter-defined categories. As summarized above, variability
of exemplars within categories prevents participants from gaining predictive
value from predicting based on individual exemplars (i.e. individual exemplars
will only predict the next experimenter-defined category of six possible exem-
plars). Thus, to gain the best possible prediction of the successive utterance in
the model language, participants must use the experimenter-defined categories.
In sum, this experiment examines whether participants learn based on the
statistical information as defined by the four experimenter-define categories (il-
lustrated in top row of Figure 2.3) or whether the statistical information that
participants learn from is biased by their naı¨ve perceptual organization of the
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Figure 2.3: Differences in perceptual organization can change the transitional
probabilities of exposure. In this experiment, perception of the four
experimenter-define categories (top row) results in transitional probabilities
that reflect the intended structure of the familiarization stream, but perception
of only three categories (bottom row) produces transitional probabilities that
do not reflect the intended organization.
sound categories as assessed in Experiment 1 (illustrated in the bottom row of
Figure 2.3).
2.3.1 Methods
Participants
Fourty-five participants were recruited for this experiment. One participant was
excluded for failing to complete the entire experiment.
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Sound-Pair Assignment
For each participant, the four categories were counterbalanced and grouped
into two pairs (e.g. participant 1: E1-H2, H1-E2, participant 2: E1-E2, H2-H1,
etc.) with all possible pairings represented. We will refer to this as a sound-pair
assignment. While each participant is only given one sound-pair assignment, all
possible sound-pair assignments are used across participants in the experiment.
Familiarization
Sounds were presented for 300 ms each with a 115 ms inter-stimulus inter-
val (ISI). The familiarization stream comprised 648 pairs of stimuli generated
by presenting each exemplar from each category with each exemplar from its
paired category twice. Pairs (in terms of experimenter-defined categories, e.g.,
E1-H1) were presented in a pseudorandom order so that each pair type was
equally likely to be followed by both other pairs, creating the distribution of
transitional probabilities shown in the top row of Figure 2.3. In addition, six
instances of each sound were presented at attenuated volume (without disturb-
ing the sequence) for a total of 144 stimuli (of 1296) that served as targets for the
cover task. The duration of the familiarization period was approximately nine
minutes.
Cover Task
In order to encourage participants to pay attention to the familiarization stream
without explicitly asking them to track the relationships between sounds heard,
a cover task was employed which consisted of participants detecting the stimuli
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with attenuated volume. Participants were instructed that they would hear a
stream of sounds and to press the space bar when they heard the stream get
quieter. Button presses within 1.3 sec of presentation of the soft sound were
considered a correct response.
Test for Statistical Learning
After familiarization, participants were given a self-timed break. After the
break, they were told that they would be presented with two pairs of sounds
separated by a long pause (1000 ms) and after hearing both, they would be
asked to report which pair of sounds is more familiar based on their previous
task. They used the g and h keys to indicate which pair was more familiar. They
were also told that no new sounds are being introduced and encouraged to go
with their intuition or “gut instinct”. The responses were self-timed.
Participants were given 48 test trials. In each trial, one pair was composed
of two exemplars consistent with those in familiarization and the other was a
foil that violated the statistical structure from familiarization. Foils were con-
structed based on the four experimenter-defined sound categories: If pair 1 is
AB and pair 2 is CD then the foils are CA and DB. These sound categories in the
foils have a transitional probability of zero given the familiarization. Compared
to studies using part-words to evaluate learning (e.g., Saffran et al., 1996), these
foils should be more highly discriminable. All exemplars were heard and each
pair was compared to each foil an equal number of times and counterbalanced
order.
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Perceptual Similarity Judgment
After completion of the SL test, participants were asked to perform a perceptual
similarity judgment, as described in Experiment 1.
2.3.2 Results
Cover Task
Participants responded correctly to the “soft” sound with an average of 76%
accuracy. No participants were excluded based on Cover Task performance.
Perceptual Similarity Judgments
Next, we examined how participants perceive the four experimenter-defined
categories (i.e. E1, E2, H1, H2), by crossing comparison type (Same vs. Different
category) with category type (Easy vs. Hard). As with Experiment 1, a signif-
icant interaction between these factors was observed, min F’ (1, 125) = 26.322,
p < 0.0001, such that there was a large difference in perceived similarity for
Same vs. Different comparisons that was restricted to the Easy categories. That
is, consistent with the MDS analysis, participants perceived the Easy items as
forming two clusters roughly corresponding to the experimenter-defined cate-
gories; whereas the Hard items were equally similar between and within these
categories. There also was a main effect of Same-Different judgments, min F’
(1, 67) = 52.640, p < 0.0001 but no main effect of Easy-Hard trials. A planned
comparison revealed that the effect of comparison type was significant only for
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stimuli from the Easy categories: min F’ (1, 73) = 90.738, p < 0.0001.
Test for Statistical Learning: Overall
We begin by examining behavioral responses for evidence of learning overall.
Performance was evaluated against chance (24 out of 48 or 50%). Participants
were able to reliably distinguish the category pairs heard during familiarization
from foils: mean performance = 27.93 (58.2%), SD = 6.65, t(43) = 3.93, p < 0.001.
Thus, overall participants demonstrated sensitivity to the statistical information
presented during familiarization.
Test for Statistical Learning: Generating Learning Predictions Based on Hy-
pothetical Lower Level Organizations
Having confirmed overall learning in the current task, we went on to evaluate
what lower level organization participants employed in order learn. Specifi-
cally, we aimed to differentiate two possibilities, as outlined in the introduction:
One is that participants were able to learn based on the four experiment-defined
sound categories and the second is that participants were constrained by their
naı¨ve lower level perceptual organization and learned based on only three cat-
egories.
As illustrated in Figure 2.3 using perceptual organization to determine the
statistical information in the familiarization stream will change the statistical
information a participant receives from what was intended by the experiments
and what is optimal for prediction. Similarly, difference in perceptual organiza-
tion can change how difficult it is for foils to distinguish from the pairs during
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familarization.
Given the relationship between groupings of sounds and reliability of sta-
tistical information, we generated a set of predictions of whether a given par-
ticipant would be able to distinguish pairs from foils at test. To do this, we de-
termined the transitional probabilities for the pairs during familiarization and
for the foils used at test for the three hypothetical lower level organizations. If
the transitional probabilities between pairs are 1.0 during familiarization and
the transitional probability of the foils averaged less than the transitional prob-
abilities between pairs during familiarization (i.e., less than 0.5), we predicted
above-chance performance in discriminating learned pairs from foils. If these
conditions were not met, we predicted that participants would be unable to dis-
tinguish pairs from foils at test. A summary of predictions is presented in the
table of Figure 2.4; predictions for the first experiment are presented in the left
panel of the figure.
In addition to which lower level organization is used, the particular sound-
pair assignment that a participant is assigned to also affects predictions for test
performance. As outlined in Section 2.3.1, sound-pair assignment is how sound
categories were assigned to the pairs for a single participant (e.g. participant
1: E1-H2, H2-E2, participant 2: E1-E2, H2-H1, etc.). Figure 2.3 provides an ex-
ample from the E1-H1, H2-E2 sound-pair assignment. If participants use the
four experimenter-defined categories to learn, participants will receive robust
statistical information regardless of sound-pair assignment. This is reflected by
positive predictions for learning in the first row of the table in Figure 2.4. How-
ever, there are two other ways to organize lower level information there are
non-uniform grouping across four experimenter-defined categories and that in-
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teract with sound-pair assignment to affect the resulting statistical information.
There are three general types of sound-pair assignments where learning predic-
tions are equal for all functional groups:
Sound-Pair Assignment 1. Participants who had both Easy categories assigned
to one pair and the two Hard categories assigned to the other (i.e. EE, HH).
Sound-Pair Assignment 2. Participants who had Easy and Hard categories
mixed across pairs but in consistent ordinal position in both pairs (i.e. EH, EH
or HE, HE)
Sound-Pair Assignment 3. Participants who had Easy and Hard categories
mixed across pairs in different ordinal position (i.e. HE EH).
Test for Statistical Learning: Determining Sound Groupings Used to Learn
Participants were organized according to three types of sound-pair assign-
ments summarized above in order to examine differences in learning predic-
tions. If participants learn based on the four experimenter-define categories,
there should be no effect of sound-pair assignment (see first row of the table
in Figure 2.4). However, a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of
Sound-Pair Assignment (F(2, 41) = 7.71, p = 0.001). We next tested for learning
in each Sound-Pair Assignment type. This analysis revealed that Sound-Pair
Assignments 1 and 2 reliably discriminated correct pairs from foils (Sound-Pair
Assignment 1: mean = 28.5 (59.4%), SD = 7.06, t(13) = 2.37, p < 0.05; Sound-
Pair Assignment 2: mean = 31.8 (66.3%), SD = 5.83, t(14) = 5.18, p < 0.001)
whereas participants in Sound-Pair Assignment 3 failed to discriminate correct
pairs from foils: mean = 23.53 (49%), SD = 4.27, t(14) < 1, n.s. (Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4: Discrimination at test for each Sound-Pair Assignment compared to
predictions of whether or not we predict discrimination of pairs from foils
based on both the transitional probabilities during familiarization and at test.
Table: The three columns for each panel correspond to these three types of
Sound-Pair Assignments, and the two rows correspond to the two possible
ways to generate statistical information: top-down or consistent with
experimenter-defined categories and consistent with the naı¨ve perceptual
organization. Critical predictions for the current study are presented in
maroon.
Comparing this pattern of results to our predictions (table in Figure 2.4), this is
evidence that participants’ learning was constrained by their naı¨ve lower level
organization of the sound categories.
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2.3.3 Discussion
Participants are able to learn from the temporal structure of a sound stream com-
prising novel, spectro-temporally complex sounds for which participants had
no prior experience. This result confirms that participants are able to learn from
higher level statistical information amidst perceptual variability. Themodel lan-
guage was based on four experimenter-designed categories (E1, E2, H1, and
H2). Learning based on this organization of sound exemplars would produce
the best learning outcome. However, the pattern of learning observed suggests
that participants’ learning was constrained by their naı¨ve perceptual organiza-
tion.
2.4 Experiment 3: Generalizing the Pattern of Learning
The results of Experiment 2 were best fit by predictions based on sound-pair
assignments that were initially built into the experiment as part of a counterbal-
ancing scheme. A replication experiment was undertaken, in which different
sound-pair assignments would lead to different predictions about learning. Al-
though the familiarization stimulus streams were identical to those used in Ex-
periment 2, different foil stimuli were used at test (see Chapter 3 and the paper
in Appendix D for discussions of foils in statistical learning paradigms). The
differences in foils for the current experiment produce different learning pre-
dictions. See Figure 2.5 for an illustration of the differences in foils (Type 1 for
Experiment 2 and Type 2 for Experiment 3) for the critical change in learning
predictions between experiments. This manipulation thus permits us to test the
generality of the pattern of results observed in Experiment 2 and assess learning
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Figure 2.5: Transitional probabilities for one example sound-pair assignment
(E1-H1, E2-H2). Of critical importance is that post-test performance behavioral
predictions differ, when comparing Sound-pairs vs. Type 2 Foils, depending on
what perceptual grouping participants are assuming in learning transitional
probabilities during familiarization. This provides a clear way to use the
post-test performance patterns to assess which perceptual grouping
assumption participants are bringing to the learning task.
outcomes based on a priori predictions.
2.4.1 Methods
Forty additional participants were recruited from the same subject pool as in
prior experiments. Methods were the same as in Experiment 2 with the excep-
tion of the foils used during test: If pairs are AB and CD (with A - D being
the four categories of sounds), the foils in the current experiment were AD and
CB (cf CA and DB in Experiment 2 or Type 1 foils in Figure 2.5; Type 2 foils in
Figure 2.5). These new foils change the calculation of whether participants in a
given sound-pair assignment and set of functional units will be able to distin-
guish pairs from foils at test (i.e. prediction of learning). Based on these new
foils, a priori predictions of discrimination at test were generated in the same
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fashion as Experiment 2 and are reported in the right panel of the table in Fig-
ure 2.4.
2.4.2 Results and Discussion
Cover Task Results
Participants responded correctly to the “soft” sound with an average of 73%
accuracy. No participants were excluded based on their cover task performance.
Perceptual Similarity Results
As in Experiments 1 and 2, a significant effect on perceptual similarity judg-
ments was found in analyses considering the Easy and Hard stimuli, min F’ (2,
189) = 41.421, p < 0.0001. The means for these contrasts are higher between
category types (E vs. H: 3.000) than within either E or H category trials (E vs. E:
2.288, H vs. H: 2.040). These results indicate that participants make a distinction
between Easy and Hard exemplars.
Next, we investigated whether participants make further distinctions by ex-
amining the effects of same-different judgments within Easy and Hard cate-
gories. Following from the previous results, there was a main effect of Same-
Different judgments, min F’ (1, 135) = 18.223, p < 0.0001 but no main effect of
Easy-Hard trials. In addition, there was an interaction of Easy and Hard with
Same-Different judgments: min F’ (1, 133) = 21.910, p< 0.0001. Examining Same
vs. Different judgments separately for Easy and Hard categories, there was no
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effect of Same vs. Different judgments for the Hard category trials, but a sig-
nificant effect of Same vs. Different trials in the Easy categories: min F’ (1, 82)
= 42.169, p < 0.0001. These results indicate that participants perceive the dif-
ference between the two Easy categories but not the difference between the two
Hard categories, as in both previous experiments.
Test for Statistical Learning: Results
As in Experiment 2, participants correctly discriminated pairs from foils overall
(mean = 26.4, SD = 4.63, t(39) = 3.31, p < 0.01). A one-way ANOVA revealed
that performance was not uniform across Sound-Pair Assignment (F(2, 39) =
5.46, p < 0.01). Next, we examined learning for each Sound-Pair Assignment
to evaluate the pattern of test performance against the a priori predictions for
three possible lower level organizations of the sounds: Learning was found for
Sound-Pair Assignment 1, mean = 29.54, SD = 4.63, t(12) = 4.31, p = 0.01, but
not for the other assignments, both ts < 1 (Figure 2.4). This pattern of results is
consistent only with the predictions of learning based on the Naı¨ve Perceptual
Organization (E1, E2, and H, the second row of the table in Figure 2.4). Thus,
the findings of the current experiment confirm that, while participants use the
full extent of their perceptual organization captured by the perceptual similarity
judgments, their learning is constrained by the lower level organization brought
into the task.
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2.5 Experiment 4: Generalization to New Sounds
Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that participants’ learning of higher-order
statistical learning is constrained by their lower level perceptual organization of
these sounds. However, it is unclear exactly how participants are learning given
that participants have no prior experience with these sounds and no specialized
or explicit categorization abilities. However, we do find that participants have
a non-uniform organization of perceptual space that supports the grouping of
exemplars for some categories and fails to differentiate others. We find that
this organization constrains statistical learning, but do participants learn from
higher order statistical information defined based upon these regions of percep-
tual space? In the current experiment, we examine a crucial prediction of this
view: If learning is indeed based on naı¨ve perceptual organization, participants
should be able to generalize knowledge gained through statistical exposure to
novel exemplars that occupy a same region of perceptual space. To test this hy-
pothesis, we familiarized a new group of participants using identical methods
to Experiment 2. At test, however, both the target and foil stimuli were gener-
ated using exemplars from the four experimenter-defined categories that were
never presented during familiarization.
2.5.1 Methods
Thirty-seven additional participants were recruited for this experiment. We
used the same experimental procedures as Experiment 2 except for one cru-
cial difference: Novel exemplars from the four experimenter-defined categories
were used to assess learning during test. The experimenter-defined sound cate-
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gories each have 11 possible exemplars that vary incrementally based on the P2
component (Wade & Holt, 2005, see Figure 2.1). We used the odd-numbered ex-
emplars during familiarization in all previous experiments. During the current
learning test, we employed the even-numbered exemplars to test for general-
ization of knowledge to novel sounds.
To verify that these novel exemplars are in fact grouped in the same man-
ner as the familiarization exemplars, participants performed the same percep-
tual similarity test previous experiments with the novel exemplars. In order to
reduce the length of the perceptual similarity task, each participant receives a
subset of exemplars for each category to compare with all other selected exem-
plars. Because there is one fewer novel exemplar, the middle exemplar (6) was
used in both subsets (either 2, 6, 8 or 4, 6, 10).
The statistical learning test was identical to Experiment 2, with the excep-
tions of using the novel exemplars and a reduction of total test trials due to
the smaller number of novel exemplars (40 test trials). Thus, if participants are
able to generalize their knowledge to novel exemplars which occupy the same
perceptual similarity space, we should observe the same pattern of results as in
Experiment 2: We predict learning in Sound-Pair Assignments 1 and 2 but not
in Sound-Pair Assignment 3.
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2.5.2 Results
Cover Task
Participants performed the cover task with an average of 78% accuracy. No
participants were excluded based on cover task performance.
Perceptual Similarity of Novel Exemplars
Participants performed the perceptual similarity judgments after completing
the learning test using the sounds used to test generalization (i.e. sound used
during test but not heard during familiarization). Results from the perceptual
similarity judgments are consistent with our assumption that the novel exem-
plars are grouped in the same way as the exemplars tested in Experiments 1-3.
A one-way ANOVA examining the effects of three types of perceptual similarity
trials (within Easy or Hard categories: E vs. E, H vs. H, and between Easy and
Hard categories: E vs. H) revealed a significant effect of contrast type, min F’
(2, 181) = 35.314, p < 0.0001. The means for perceptual similarity judgments are
higher for between category types (E vs. H: 2.901) than within either E or H cat-
egory trials (E vs. E: 2.051, H vs. H: 2.092). We then examined how participants
perceive the four experimenter-defined categories (i.e. E1, E2, H1, H2), by cross-
ing comparison type (Same vs. Different category) with category type (Easy vs.
Hard). As with previous experiments, a significant interaction between these
factors was observed, min F’ (1, 101) = 19.486, p < 0.0001, such that there was a
large difference in perceived similarity for Same vs. Different comparisons that
were restricted to the Easy categories. There also was a main effect of Same-
Different judgments, min F’ (1, 71) = 41.327, p < 0.0001 but no main effect of
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Easy-Hard trials.
Test for Statistical Learning
Test performance is consistent with the hypothesis that participants are able to
generalize knowledge to novel sound exemplars. Overall, participants demon-
strate significant learning, mean = 22.4 out of 40 (56%), t(36) = 2.044, p = 0.048.
The predictions for learning according to Sound-Pair Assignment and level of
perceptual grouping are identical to Experiment 2 (see left panel of Figure 2.4).
Broken down by Sound-Pair assignment, significant learning was observed for
in Sound-Pair Assignment 1, mean = 24.08 (60.2%), t(11) = 2.512, p = 0.029 and in
Sound-Pair Assignment 2, mean = 25.31 (63.3%), t(12) = 2.284, p = 0.041. There is
a marginally significant but below chance-level performance for the Sound-Pair
Assignment 3 group, mean = 17.5 (43.8%), t(11) = -2.147, p = 0.055.
2.5.3 Discussion
In sum, the current experiment examines whether participants can generalize
knowledge gained from statistical learning to novel exemplars occupying the
same perceptual space. To do so, we examined whether we get the same pattern
of learning as Experiment 2 when the statistical learning test is administered us-
ing novel exemplars. The current experiment essentially replicates Experiment
2 which demonstrates that statistical learning during familiarization generalizes
to stimuli drawn from the same regions of perceptual space.
We hypothesized that participants use the regions of perceptual space in
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their naı¨ve perceptual organization to learn statistical regularities defined at a
higher level of description. The ability to generalize knowledge to new sounds
occupying the same perceptual region or cluster is a crucial prediction of this
hypothesis. Thus, we find further evidence to support the view that statistical
learning in the current task proceeds based upon lower level perceptual organi-
zation.
2.6 General Discussion
The current study examined a scenario where lower level perceptual organi-
zation does not readily support the learning of intended higher order statis-
tics. This captures an important feature of the task faced by the infant language
learner: Infants learn the words of their native language, based in part on statis-
tical information defined over sequences of speech sounds, before their ability to
categorize speech sounds is fully developed. Our goal was to examine whether
statistical learning is constrained by lower level organization (bottom-up) or if
optimum learning of the intended structure will proceed despite the current
lower level organization (top-down). We consistently found evidence that par-
ticipants’ learning was constrained by their lower level perceptual organiza-
tion, indicating that statistical learning is more bottom-up than top-down. This
finding suggests that learning from higher-order statistical regularities does not
readily proceed if it is not readily supported by lower level perceptual organiza-
tion. This finding has important implications for the role of statistical learning
in the development of complex cognitive tasks such as language acquisition.
These implications will be discussed in detail in this final section.
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One key assumption of this work is that adult learning from novel, com-
plex sound categories is at some level analogous to learning from speech in
the first year of life. Broadly, this assumption is based on the view that speech
sound categorization is a form of perceptual expertise. It follows that the speech
categorization abilities possessed by adults do not effectively transfer to novel,
non-speech sound categories. Thus, the cognitive processes of an adult listening
to novel sound categories are matched to an infant listening to speech sounds.
While this assumption is shared amongst many studies in the statistical and lan-
guage learning literature, it is important for future research to establish these
same effects using speech sounds in infant language learners.
To our knowledge, this is the first investigation of statistical learning where
participants must resolve information across multiple levels of description.
While two recent studies employed variable exemplars of visual stimuli, these
stimuli were drawn from categories with which participants have had consider-
able experience: Brady and Oliva (2008) used visual scenes organized by well-
learned semantic categories (e.g. kitchens and beaches), while Baldwin et al.
(2008) used pictures common actions such as pointing and grasping. In each
of these cases, it is very likely that participants organization of these exemplars
would confirm the experimenter-defined categories before the experiment pro-
viding perceptual support for the experimenter-defined, higher-order statistics.
In the auditory domain, a small number of statistical learning studies have used
variable natural productions of speech sounds (e.g. Thiessen, Hill, & Saffran,
2005), but neither the acoustics nor the perceptual similarity of the stimuli have
been systematically controlled or examined. Thus, it is unclear how these vari-
able productions were perceived by the learner, and what effect they had on
the learning task. In contrast, the current study confirmed participants’ per-
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ceptual or lower level organization of the multiple exemplars and found that
they did not conform to the experimenter-defined categories used to produce
higher-order statistical information.
2.6.1 Implications for Language Acquisition
The current learning paradigm is motivated by the following developmental
problem: How are infants able to learn their first words without the use of es-
tablished, adult speech categorization abilities? The developmental trajectories
of word learning and speech categorization substantially overlap. While the
possibility of simultaneous development of speech sound categorization and
word learning has been acknowledged (e.g. Swingley, 2008; Saffran & Thiessen,
2007), the canonical account of how statistical learning contributes to language
acquisition often assumes a sequential development from lower to higher levels
of description in the speech signal. Moving forward, it is essential to resolve
how learning proceeds when information must be resolved across levels of de-
scription, and specifically when there is tension between lower and higher level
statistical information.
The current study finds that learning can still occur despite conflict between
lower level organization and higher level statistical information. Specifically,
participants can gain some knowledge of the structure of the familiarization
stream by relying on their naı¨ve lower level perceptual organization to define
higher-order statistics. First, it is important to note that participants do not
have specialized processing for the current sounds. Thus, we find that learning
can proceed over a variable acoustic stream without specialized categorization
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abilities. Instead, we find that higher-order statistical knowledge, in the cur-
rent task, is possibly based on clusters or regions in their perceptual similarity
space. Specifically, Experiment 4 presents evidence that participants can gener-
alize knowledge gained from statistical learning to new sounds that occupy the
same perceptual similarity space.
If statistical learning can occur based on graded regions of perceptual space,
this has important implications for language learning. Instead of being based
on explicit or specialized categorization, perceptual clustering is likely based on
participants’ orientation towards acoustically salient features. Recent work has
found acoustic contrasts with large, perceptually separable differences are easily
distinguished by infants across the first year of life, whether or not these acous-
tic differences are part of their native environment (Narayan, Werker, & Bed-
dor, 2010). While these results suggest that infants might be able to use salient
acoustic differences to distinguish functional categories of sounds, it has yet to
be determined whether infants can use relative perceptual similarity to group
variable exemplars of sound categories and to subsequently apply this in an on-
line task of tracking statistical regularity. However, current results suggest that
it is possible that perceptual salience, by supporting lower level organization,
provides an initial entre´e into learning the structure of the speech stream.
While we do find evidence for learning in the current task, the pattern of
learning is unconstrained by perceptual organization. If participants were able
to learn using the higher-order statistics based upon the experimenter-defined
categories (top down), they would have been able to a) demonstrate learning
uniformly across all sound-pair assignments, b) uncover the intended structure
of the acoustic stream and c) achieve the best possible prediction for successive
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sounds. Instead, we find that statistical learning of higher-order regularities
is non-uniform across sound-pair assignments. In fact, the pattern of learning
across assignments is consistent with the three categories represented in partic-
ipants’ lower level perceptual organization. This finding entails that statistical
learning is constrained by perceptual organization and thus is more bottom-up
than top-down. In other words, the intended and optimal learning of higher-
order statistics is restricted by lower level organization.
Considering this result in relation to language acquisition, one of the im-
mediate implications us that the statistical information present in the speech
stream must be considered in relation to the infants’ current sound categoriza-
tion abilities. Previous modeling work has attempted to objectively determine
whether the statistical information available to the infant (e.g. the CHILDES
corpus, MacWhinney, 1991) is sufficient for certain aspects of language learning
(e.g. Christiansen et al., 2009). However, these models rely upon the processing
of the speech signal according to categorization abilities that the infant does not
possess. Despite positive findings in these studies, it is likely that this statis-
tical information is not immediately available to language learners because of
their current perceptual organization. Thus, an infant’s perceptual organization
and categorization abilities must be considered when considering what abilities
statistical information might support during language acquisition.
If the uncovering of language structure is indeed constrained by the orga-
nization of speech sounds, the early stages of language development might
be more dynamic than has been previously characterized. We find evidence
that statistical information does affect learning tasks across levels of description
with lower levels constraining higher levels. Thus, at any given moment, an
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infant’s knowledge of the structure of language is filtered based on her orga-
nization of speech sounds. However, we know that lower level organization
has a protracted development with changes occurring well beyond infancy (see
Section 2.1). Current findings suggest that each change in speech categorization
abilities could potentially have a cascading impact on the statistical information
available to the learner. This view presents the statistical language learner as
having a much more re-iterative and dynamic development than a sequential
view of language learning from lower to higher level statistical information.
In this dynamic view of language learning, learning based upon perceptu-
ally salient differences could drive changes of functionally-equivalent contrasts
that are not supported by initial perceptual organization. A recent study with
infants suggests such a possibility: Thiessen (2007) demonstrated that phone-
mic contrasts that are indistinguishable on their own in a word learning task
(daw/taw) are learnable when they are previously associated with more salient
phonemic distinctions (dawbow/tawgoo). According to Thiessen, the acousti-
cally salient difference between “bow” and “goo” provides a differential con-
text which can in turn support cognitive separation of the minimal pair of
“taw/daw” necessary for subsequent word learning. These results provide
some initial evidence that learning based on perceptually distinct sounds can
support the acquisition of more difficult acoustic contrasts.
According to Thiessen (2007), this finding is consistent with a distributional
account of the development of speech perception. According to this view, dis-
tributional statistics, based on lower level occurrence of the sound tokens, can
shape the perceptual representation of sound categories (see Clayards et al.,
2008; Maye et al., 2002; Yoshida et al., 2010). There is another possible mech-
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anism that could support this finding: It could be that functional differentiation
of sounds is supported by higher-order statistical information in the language,
such as the type of co-occurrence statistics manipulated here (e.g., Beckman &
Edwards, 2000). Feldman, Griffiths, and Morgan (2009) present evidence from
a Bayesian model that lexical acquisition can aid in distinguishing the highly
overlapping speech categories when the categories are lexically contrastive. In
other words, the higher-order statistical information (i.e. reflective of lexical
structure) can be used to modify representation and processing of lower-order
speech categories. This model presents one exciting alternative to sequential
learning across levels of description in a perceptually and informationally com-
plex signal, like language and is potentially complimentary to a distributional
account of the development of speech categorization.
In the current study, higher-order transitional probabilities functionally dis-
tinguish category distinctions now represented in participants naı¨ve perceptual
organization (i.e., H1 and H2). While we did not find evidence that exposure fa-
cilitated perceptual distinction between H1 and H2, this is not surprising given
the difficulty of learning this contrast and the length of training required to shift
behavior and perceptual treatment of these sounds in previous work (e.g., Leech
et al., 2009; Liu & Holt, 2011). Thus, this lack of perceptual shift could be due
to 1) our relatively short exposure to the higher-order transitional probabili-
ties; 2) the fact that the presentation of within-category sounds had a flat dis-
tribution because natural speech categories exhibit a more distinctive within-
category distributional structure which may make it easier to acquire categories
in general; or 3) the possibility that higher-order transitional probabilities sim-
ply do not facilitate sound category learning. While previous studies and mod-
els reviewed above suggest that the last possibility is unlikely, further research
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is needed. In general, our results suggest that learning functional equivalence
classes based on higher-order transitional probabilities is at least harder than
learning transitional probabilities derived from perceptual similarity spaces.
Models of language learning have relied on resolving the speech signal
into discrete units as a method to resolve perceptual variability inherent in the
speech signal and suggested that statistical language learning is a sequential ac-
quisition from lower- to higher-order statistical information. These approaches
have 1) lead the field to underestimate the potential interaction of learning at
multiple levels of description in the speech signal and 2) to largely ignore the
role of perceptual organization and perceptual salience of contrastive features in
language learning. The current results demonstrate that the issue of perceptual
salience and the interaction of statistical regularities defined at different levels
of description is important to consider in the investigation of language learning.
2.6.2 Learning from Statistical Regularities in a Perceptually
Variable World
A central problem to establishing how experience supports the development
of complex behavior is understanding how the learner is able to assimilate in-
formation embedded in the highly variable and complex natural environment.
Similarity, the development of effective knowledge in a variable world requires
the ability to generalize. In the current experiments, we demonstrate that adults
cannot only learn from higher-order transitional probabilities based on percep-
tually variable exemplars, but they are also able to generalize this knowledge to
other stimuli that occupy the same region of perceptual space.
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It is possible that the acquisition of generalizable knowledge is directly re-
lated to having received perceptually variable experience. Recent studies ex-
amining infant learning present some corroborative evidence for generalization
based on variable experience. Lany and Saffran (2010) exposed infants to novel
labels that have a similar morphological structure (e.g. three syllables) and then
created an association between a subset of these labels and a number of visual
referents from a single object category. They found evidence that infants at
22-months-old were able to generalize this information to unheard exemplars
sharing these morphological characteristics. While not explicitly tested, vari-
able experience during exposure may have facilitated generalization of these
higher-order statistical regularities in infants. Relatedly, rule-learning studies
present infants with a higher-order sequence where each new instance is per-
ceptually novel and find that infants can generalize this sequence to entirely
novel sounds or pictures (e.g. Marcus et al., 1999; Saffran et al., 2007). These
rule-learning studies are at an extreme level of both perceptual variability dur-
ing exposure and ability to generalize knowledge. In the current experiment,
learners received exposure to variable information throughout learning, and
possibility because of the variability of experience, they were able to general-
ization based of perceptual organization.
While the relationship between variability and generalization remains to be
directly established in relation to learning from environmental statistics or regu-
larities, this relationship has been established in related domains (e.g. E. J. Gib-
son, 1969). Recent work in word learning has explicitly examined the role of
acoustic variability: These results suggest that hearing labels produced by mul-
tiple speakers aids in learning label-object pairings (Rost & McMurray, 2009).
Moreover, Clopper and Pisoni (2004) linked speaker variability and successful
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speech perception. Overall, this work suggests that a learner may be better able
to extract abstract or generalizable relationships between stimuli with increased
perceptual variability during exposure.
While it seems intuitive that perceptual variability would obfuscate the sta-
tistical patterns, it may be that the variable experience that learners experience
in their everyday environment may support more robust, behaviorally-effective
learning within a complex environment. Specifically, variability of experience
could allow infants to distinguish which aspects of the sensory signal are an
integral part of a higher-order pattern or invariant (E. J. Gibson, 1969) without
having to a priori attend to the part of the relevant incoming information such
as the sequence of syllables (Saffran et al., 1996) or an abstract rule supporting
the choice of dog pictures (Saffran et al., 2007). In fact, without variability of
experience, it is unclear how infants are able to focus on some aspects of the
signal and uncover statistical patterns. Such an ability, if developed, could sup-
port changes in statistical learning over developmental time and differences in
learning across types of input.
An alternative possibility is that, regardless of perceptually variable expe-
rience, learners will be able generalize knowledge gained through experience
with statistical regularities to stimuli of the same perceptual space. This would
result in a generalization gradient for this statistically-based knowledge. In learn-
ing theory, as a stimulus becomes more perceptually distinct from the condi-
tioned stimulus, conditioned responses fall off according to a generalization
gradient (e.g., Guttman & Kalish, 1956). It is possible that an analogous effect
exists for knowledge gained through exposure to higher-order statistical infor-
mation: As sounds decrease in perceptual similarity, generalization of learning
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will decrease in a related fashion, and once a certain boundary of perceptual
space is exceeded, participants will fail to generalize altogether. Future research
is needed to more directly address the relationship between perceptual similar-
ity, variability of experience, and generalization of knowledge in learning from
statistical regularities.
2.6.3 Conclusions
In order for statistical information to aid in complex developmental tasks such
as language acquisition, learning from higher-order statistics must be possible
while organization at lower levels of description is still developing. The current
study is the first attempt to examine how such learningwould proceed. Broadly,
our results suggest some constraints on the statistical learner in this scenario: If
higher-order structure is not supported by lower level organization, then the
structure is not readily uncovered. Thus, statistical learning appears to be more
bottom-up than top-down (i.e., what is learned at higher levels is dependent
upon the organization at lower levels). This finding has important implications
for the conceptualization of how statistical learning contributes to language ac-
quisition. First, statistical information must be considered based on the current
categorization abilities of the learner not according to adult categorization abili-
ties because the differences in categorization abilities might obfuscate statistical
information and thus may not be available to the infant. This entails that the
statistical information about the ambient language could be radically different
for an infant and an adult. Second, the interrelationship of lower level per-
ceptual organization and statistical information present at higher levels suggest
a more dynamic and re-iterative process of language learning than previously
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conceived. Specifically, each change in lower level organization can potentially
reveal new statistical information at higher levels of description. Finally, the
current results suggest an important role for perception, and specifically per-
ceptual salience as an early and lasting influence on language learning.
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CHAPTER 3
TIMING IS EVERYTHING: CHANGES IN PRESENTATION RATE HAVE
OPPOSITE EFFECTS ON AUDITORY AND VISUAL IMPLICIT
STATISTICAL LEARNING
The content of this chapter is published in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental
Psychology; see Emberson, Conway, and Christiansen (2011)
Implicit statistical learning (ISL) is exclusive to neither a particular sen-
sory modality nor a single domain of processing. Even so, differences in
perceptual processing may substantially affect learning across modali-
ties. In three experiments, statistically equivalent auditory and visual
familiarizations were presented under different timing conditions that
either facilitated or disrupted temporal processing (fast or slow presen-
tation rates). We find an interaction of rate andmodality of presentation:
At fast rates, auditory ISL was superior to visual. However, at slow pre-
sentation rates, the opposite pattern of results was found: Visual ISL
was superior to auditory. Thus, we find that changes to presentation
rate differentially affect ISL across sensory modalities. Additional ex-
periments confirmed that this modality-specific effect was not due to
cross-modal interference or attentional manipulations. These findings
suggest that ISL is rooted in modality-specific, perceptually based pro-
cesses.
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3.1 Introduction
Implicit statistical learning (ISL) is a phenomenon where infant and adult be-
havior is affected by complex environmental regularities seemingly indepen-
dent of conscious knowledge of the patterns or intention to learn (Perruchet
& Pacton, 2006). Because young infants are sensitive to statistical regularities,
ISL has been argued to play an important role in the development of key skills
such as visual object processing (Kirkham et al., 2002) and language learning
(Saffran et al., 1996; Smith & Yu, 2008). Underscoring its importance for devel-
opment and skill acquisition, ISL has been observed using a wide range of stim-
uli from different sensory modalities and domains (nonlinguistic auditory stim-
uli: Saffran, 2002; Saffran et al., 1999; tactile stimuli: Conway & Christiansen,
2005; simple visual stimuli: Fiser & Aslin, 2001; Kirkham et al., 2002). Together,
these findings indicate that ISL is a domain-general learning ability spanning
sense modality and developmental time.
Given that ISL occurs with perceptually diverse input, many influential
models and theories of ISL have presupposed a mechanism that treats all types
of input stimuli (e.g., tones, shapes, syllables) as equivalent beyond the statis-
tical structure of the input itself (e.g., Altmann et al., 1995; Perruchet & Pacton,
2006; Reber, 1989; Shanks et al., 1997). While great strides have been made un-
der this equivalence assumption, there is evidence, contrary to this view, that
ISL is not neutral to input modality. Instead, the perceptual nature of the pat-
terns appears to selectively modulate ISL.
In this paper, we employ a known perceptual phenomenon to examine ISL
under different perceptual conditions. Specifically, we manipulated the tempo-
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ral distance of successive stimuli in auditory and visual ISL streams. The per-
ceptual literature predicts that changes of temporal distance will have opposite
effects on auditory and visual processing. If ISL were also differentially affected
by temporal distance, this would suggest that the mechanisms mediating ISL
do not in fact treat all types of perceptual input equivalently.
In addition, we investigated the role of selective attention in modifying
learning under these different perceptual conditions. While previous research
has suggested that selective attention can compensate for perceptual effects in
ISL (e.g., Baker et al., 2004; Pacton & Perruchet, 2008), this claim has only been
tested in a small range of perceptual conditions in the visual modality only.
Here we examine whether selective attention can compensate for large differ-
ences in rate of presentation in both the visual and the auditory modalities.
Specifically, we predict that while selective attention may be able to support
learning amidst mild disruptions to perceptual processing (as in Baker et al.,
2004), attention is not sufficient to overcome more substantial changes in per-
ceptual conditions like those explored in the current study.
In sum, wemanipulated attention to auditory and visual streams under tem-
porally proximal and distal conditions in order to examine what effect changes
of presentation rates have on auditory and visual ISL. If the mechanisms of ISL
are sensitive to the perceptual nature of stimulus input beyond statistical struc-
ture, then we predict that rate and modality will interact to affect learning out-
comes.
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3.1.1 Modality effects in implicit statistical learning
While ISL is perceptually ubiquitous, with adults and infants able to detect
statistical regularities in multiple sensory modalities, recent studies with adult
learners have pointed to systematic differences in ISL across these modalities
(Conway & Christiansen, 2005, 2006, 2009; Robinson & Sloutsky, 2007; Saf-
fran, 2002). Specifically, modality differences in ISL appear to follow the vi-
sual:spatial::auditory:temporal characterization seen in other perceptual and
cognitive tasks, where spatial and temporal relations are processed preferen-
tially by the senses of vision and audition, respectively (B. Kubovy, 1988).
While temporal and spatial information are both important for visual and
auditory processing, these sources of information appear to play different
roles across perceptual systems. The visual:spatial::auditory:temporal analogy
(B. Kubovy, 1988), used to explain auditory and visual processing differences,
has its roots in the nature of sensory objects. Sound is a temporally variable
signal, and, since sounds do not persist, their locations in space are ephemeral.
Conversely, visual objects are more spatially constant. Thus, it is adaptive for
auditory processing to be more sensitive to the temporal aspects of environ-
mental information (Chen, Repp, & Patel, 2002) whereas the adult visual sys-
tem appears to preferentially encode spatial information (Mahar, Mackenzie, &
McNicol, 1994). Furthermore, the visual:spatial::auditory:temporal characteri-
zation extends beyond perceptual tasks to memory (serial recall: Penney, 1989).
1
1The range of visual processing explored in the current paper is restricted: We are examining
visual processing and learning of sequentially presented, unfamiliar abstract shapes. Other
visual tasks have revealed the visual system to have sophisticated temporal processing (e.g.,
rapid serial visual presentation of scenes and photographs in Potter, 1976). However, with the
current visual task, it is well established that visual processing is relatively poor especially when
compared to auditory processing.
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These differences in processing between auditory and visual systems are also
present in ISL. Consistent with a spatial bias in visual processing, visual learn-
ing is facilitated when stimuli are arrayed spatially (Conway & Christiansen,
2009; Saffran, 2002). When stimuli are presented in a temporal stream, auditory
learning is superior to vision (Conway & Christiansen, 2005). These findings
point to important differences in the ways in which auditory and visual statisti-
cal patterns are learned.
We propose that comparisons of learning across perceptual modalities help
elucidate the nature of the mechanism(s) underlying ISL. Moreover, these
modality effects in ISL may indicate that the underlying mechanisms are sen-
sitive to the perceptual nature of the input beyond statistical structure. One
could think of these mechanisms as being “embodied” (Barsalou et al., 2003;
Conway & Christiansen, 2005; Glenberg, 1997) where the learning mechanisms
are situated in the perceptual process itself.
3.1.2 Modality-specific perceptual grouping and ISL
Modality differences can also be conceptualized through the lens of Gestalt
perceptual-grouping principles. The spatial bias in visual processing has been
formalized by the “law of proximity”: Visual stimuli occurring close together in
space are perceptually grouped together as a single unit (M. Kubovy, Holcombe,
&Wagemans, 1998; Wertheimer, 1938), with the strongest grouping occurring in
spatially contiguous visual objects (Palmer & Rock, 1994). Analogously, sounds
that are presented closer together in time aremore likely to form a single percep-
tual unit or stream (Handel, Weaver, & Lawson, 1983). A logical consequence of
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the law of proximity is that sounds that are far apart in time, and visual stimuli
that are far apart in space, will fail to form perceptual units (Bregman, 1990).
For example, previous research has indicated that sounds presented more than
1.8 – 2 s apart are not perceived as part of the same stream of sounds (Mates,
Mu¨ller, Radil, & Po¨ppel, 1994) and that the visual system fails to group objects
together as the space between them increases (Palmer & Rock, 1994).
Recently, Baker et al. (2004) examined the impact of spatial perceptual group-
ing on visual ISL. Participants were presented with statistical patterns of simul-
taneously presented pairs of visual shapes; pairs were either spatially connected
by a bar (a strong form of visual perceptual grouping) or not. They found that
participants in the stronger perceptual grouping condition had better learning
than those in the weaker perceptual grouping conditions. Similar results have
been found by Pacton and Perruchet (2008). These studies demonstrate that
spatial perceptual grouping conditions affect visual ISL.
To date, the relationship between perceptual grouping and learning in the
auditory modality has not been systematically investigated. If strong percep-
tual grouping aids ISL, then auditory perceptual grouping ought to improve as
sounds are presented at closer temporal proximity (i.e., at a faster rate). Conway
and Christiansen (2009) reported that increasing rates of presentation from 4
stimuli/second (250-ms stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA) to 8 stimuli/second
(125-ms SOA) did not impact learning in the auditorymodality. However, this is
a small range of presentation rates, with both rates being well within the limits
of auditory perceptual grouping (i.e., SOA less than 2 s). In order to more di-
rectly assess the effects of temporal perceptual grouping, more varied grouping
conditions need to be examined for both auditory and visual input.
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3.1.3 Current experiments
The current paper examines the effect of perceptual grouping along the tempo-
ral dimension using greater changes in presentation rate than have been pre-
viously investigated. Specifically, the current experiment examines both visual
and auditory ISL when the streams are presented either at fast rates of presen-
tation (similar to rates used in previous studies) or under much slower rates
of presentation. If auditory ISL is aided by temporal perceptual grouping, au-
ditory learning should improve when sounds are presented closer together in
time (i.e., at a faster rate) and should be disrupted when sounds are presented
further apart in time (i.e., at a slower rate).
In contrast, we predict the opposite effect of presentation rate on visual ISL:
Since visual processing has poorer temporal resolution, visual ISL should not
be facilitated by a fast rate of presentation as auditory ISL would. Instead,
visual ISL will improve with slower rates of presentation because this is less
temporally demanding on the visual system. Previous work has demonstrated
improvements to visual ISL with slower rates of presentation (Conway & Chris-
tiansen, 2009; Turk-Browne et al., 2005).
It is crucial to note that the changes in temporal rate employed in the current
study do not obfuscate the individual stimuli themselves. At the fastest rate of
presentation employed in the current study, previous work (Conway & Chris-
tiansen, 2005) as well as pilot testing revealed that there is robust perception of
individual visual and auditory stimuli. Thus, by “changes in perceptual con-
ditions” we are not referring to changing the ability of participants to perceive
individual stimuli. However, as reviewed above, changes in rate of presenta-
tion have been shown to affect perception of auditory stimuli as occurring in a
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single stream and to decrease ability of the visual system to resolve streams of
stimuli. Thus, it is the perception of these streams of stimuli in which statistical
regularities are presented, but not the individual stimuli that is being affected
by differences in rate of presentation.
In the current paradigm, participants are familiarized with both visual and
auditory statistical regularities. Conway and Christiansen (2006) observed that
statistical information from two different streams could be learned simultane-
ously if these streams were from different modalities (visual and auditory) but
not if they were instantiated in perceptually similar stimuli. In their design,
strings of stimuli were generated by two different artificial grammars and inter-
leaved with one another, as complete strings, in random order. In the current
study, we investigated statistical learning of triplets of stimuli within a single
stream (Figure 3.1A). Since triplet boundaries are key statistical information,
alternating between full triplets would provide an explicit boundary cue. To
avoid such a scenario while presenting both auditory and visual triplets, we
adapted the interleaved design from Turk-Browne et al. (2005) to present an
auditory and a visual familiarization stream (see Figure 3.1B for illustration
of the interleaved design as applied to the current study). In addition, inter-
leaving two familiarization streams avoids cross-modal effects in ISL that have
been observed when visual and auditory streams are presented simultaneously
(Robinson & Sloutsky, 2007).
Thus, if ISL is affected by modality-specific or perceptual processes, we pre-
dict that rate manipulations will have opposite effects on visual and auditory
ISL: (a) We expect auditory ISL to be poorer at slower rates of presentation than
learning at fast rates, and (b) we predict the opposite pattern of results in the
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visual modality: We expect learning to be stronger at slow presentation rates
and weaker at fast presentation rates.
In addition to manipulating the rate of presentation in the current study, we
also manipulate selective attention to the streams. While the necessity of at-
tention is unclear in ISL (Saffran et al., 1997), it has recently been established
that selective attention to the information containing the statistical regularities
boosts performance in both the visual and the auditory modalities (Toro et al.,
2005; Turk-Browne et al., 2005). Consistent with this work, we predict that there
will be significantly reduced learning for the unattended streams for both vi-
sual and auditory sensory modalities with both rates of presentation. Thus, we
do not expect to see an effect of rate in the unattended streams given that we
anticipate seeing no learning in conditions without attention.
Focusing on predictions for the attended streams, it has been proposed that
one way in which attention aids in ISL is through boosting performance when
perceptual grouping conditions are unfavorable. Recent work has suggested
that poor perceptual grouping conditions can be overcome with selective atten-
tion to relevant stimuli (Baker et al., 2004; Pacton & Perruchet, 2008). However,
the type and range of perceptual grouping in these studies has been limited, and
investigations have not extended beyond the visual modality. It is unknown
whether selective attention can overcome poor grouping conditions in the au-
ditory modality and whether attention is always sufficient to overcome even
extreme disruptions in perceptual grouping.
Given the large variations in temporal rate in the current studies, we predict
that selective attention will not be sufficient to compensate for the poor percep-
tual conditions induced by these changes in presentation rate. Thus, we expect
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to see that the modality-specific effect of temporal rate (i.e., poor at fast rates
for visual and poor at slow rates for auditory) will persist even if participants
selectively attend to these modalities. An interaction of rate and modality un-
der conditions of selective attention would be evidence that selective attention
is not always sufficient to compensate for poor perceptual conditions.
3.2 Experiment 1: Interleaved, fast presentation (375-ms SOA)
To examine the modality-specific effects of temporal perceptual grouping (rate
of presentation), we interleaved two familiarization streams governed by statis-
tical information in the visual and auditory modalities. The current experiment
presented streams at a rate similar to that in previous ISL studies (SOA less than
500ms). As with this previous work, we predict an auditory superiority effect in
ISL at these relatively fast rates of presentation (Conway & Christiansen, 2005,
2009; Saffran, 2002).
Two familiarization streams (auditory and visual) were interleaved to create
a single stream; this was done by sampling one to six elements at a time from a
single stream consecutively (see Figure 3.1B). Interleaving streams resulted in a
predictable set of transitional probabilities that was roughly equal across exper-
imental groups (Table 3.1). Transitional probabilities are higher for successive
elements within triplets than for those spanning triplets, providing a cue for
learning (e.g., see Fiser & Aslin, 2001; Saffran et al., 1996; Turk-Browne et al.,
2005).
As with Turk-Browne et al. (2005), selective attention was manipulated be-
tween streams. While some research has indicated that explicit attention to stim-
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Figure 3.1: (A) A sample of separate visual and auditory familiarization
streams prior to interleaving. Stimuli are presented sequentially with order of
presentation from left to right. A triplet is underlined in each stream (visual:
grey; auditory: black). (B) In Experiments 1 and 2, visual and auditory streams
were interleaved such that stimuli from both modalities were presented
sequentially with presentation pseudorandomly switching between streams
with no more than six consecutive elements from a single modality. (C) In
Experiment 3, interleaved streams were presented with the same timing of
presentation for a stream from an attended modality but with unattended
stimuli from the other modality removed.
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uli is not required for ISL (Saffran et al., 1997), other research has demonstrated
that selective attention aids in ISL in both the visual (Turk-Browne et al., 2005),
and the auditory (Toro et al., 2005) modalities. Thus, we do not expect to see
evidence of learning in unattended streams regardless of rate of presentation.
3.2.1 Methods
Participants
Thirty-two participants were recruited from psychology classes at Cornell Uni-
versity, earning extra credit or $10/hour. All participants reported normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and no serious auditory deficits or neurological
problems.
Materials
Auditory and visual stimuli were presented at a rate similar to that in previous
statistical learning studies (e.g., Conway & Christiansen, 2005; Saffran et al.,
1996, 1997): Visual and auditory stimuli are presented for 225 ms with an inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) of 150 ms, resulting in an SOA of 375 ms. All stimuli were
presented using E-prime stimuli presentation software (Version 1, Psychology
Software Tools).
Visual stimuli. Fifteen novel abstract shapes were drawn using MS Paint for
Windows 98 Second Edition (see Appendix A). The stimuli were designed to be
perceptually distinct and not easily labelled verbally. During central presenta-
tion, shapes measured 4 cm by 6 cm on a 17- inch Samsung SyncMaster 955DF.
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Participants were seated 65 cm from the screen.
Auditory stimuli. Fifteen monosyllabic nonwords, recorded by a female, native
English speaker, were chosen to obey the phonological rules of English and be
easily distinguishable from each other but as unique and unfamiliar as possible
(see Appendix B). All nonwords were edited using Audacity for OSX (Version
1.2.2, Free Software Foundation, Boston, MA; Audacity Team, 2005).
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: two experimental
groups, visual attention or auditory attention (24 participants), or nonfamiliarized
controls. Participants in the two experimental groups had identical procedures
except for the inclusion in the instructions that participants preferentially attend
to a single modality. 2 Immediately following familiarization, experimental par-
ticipants were tested for evidence of learning in both the visual and the auditory
modalities. Participants in the nonfamiliarized control group were given the same
testing procedure as those in the experimental condition but without receiving
familiarization.
Familiarization. Stimuli were grouped offline into single-modality triplets re-
sulting in five auditory and five visual triplets. In order to ameliorate any ef-
2Before familiarization, participants were instructed to attend to a single modality (auditory
or visual) depending on their assigned group. They were instructed that stimuli in the other
modality were meant to provide distraction. Participants were told to respond to the repeated
elements in their assigned modality only. If participants were in the auditory attention group,
theywere specifically instructed to still look at themonitor but to just direct their attention to the
auditory stimuli. Due to a data collection error, repeat responses were not collected. However,
the replication of these results in Experiment 3 without unattended stimuli indicates (a) that
participants are in fact attending to the assigned sensory modality and (b) that attention to a
particular modality was analogous to attention during exposure without unattended stimuli
(i.e., there was no interference).
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fects of triplet grouping, multiple groupings were used across participants with
each triplet grouping employed in all conditions. Thirty presentations of each
triplet were randomly ordered such that no triplet or pairs of triplets were im-
mediately repeated (e.g., ABCABC or ABCDEFABCDEF). A cover task was em-
ployed: Participants were asked to detect repeated elements in the familiariza-
tion stream using a button box, and no feedback was given. The first and third
elements of each triplet were repeated two times during familiarization (e.g.,
ABCCDEFGGHI; Turk-Browne et al., 2005).
Auditory and visual familiarization streams were pseudorandomly inter-
leaved by sampling each stream in order andwithout replacement with nomore
than 6 elements from one stream sampled consecutively (see Figure 3.1B). Criti-
cally, the process of interleaving did not highlight the triplet structure of the fa-
miliarization streams, with streams often switching between modalities within
triplets. This resulted in a familiarization stream of 940 elements: 470 from
each modality. Participants were given a self-timed break halfway through fa-
miliarization. The sequence of interleaving was counterbalanced such that the
interleaved order of the visual elements for one group of participants was that
of the auditory elements for another group of participants; attention was coun-
terbalanced across modality and interleaved order.
Testing. Test trials were constructed for each modality separately comparing
triplets from familiarization to foils (Figure 3.1A). Then test trials from both vi-
sual and auditory test trials were presented in random order in a multimodal
testing block. Within each modality, the testing phase consisted of a forced-
choice task pairing the five triplets constructed for each participant with five
foils and counterbalanced for order of presentation, resulting in 50 test trials
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per modality (5 triplets x 5 foils x 2 order). The same foils were paired with all
triplets during test; thus there were the same number of foils and triplets used
at test to equate exposure. Foils were constructed from the same shapes and
nonwords, designed to violate the triplet structure but not absolute element po-
sition (e.g., triplet: ABC, DEF, GHI; foil: ABF, DEI, GHC). All of these stimuli
were presented in the samemanner andwith the same timing as the familiariza-
tion stream. Foils and triplets were separated by 1,000 ms of silence. Following
the methodology of Conway and Christiansen (2005) and Saffran (2002), par-
ticipants were instructed to report which triplet seemed “more familiar or right
based on [their] previous task, if applicable”. They were instructed not to re-
spond based on the familiarity of the individual elements. After presentation
of a pair of test items, participants were prompted to press Key 1 (of a 4-key
response pad) if they felt that the first item was more “familiar” or “right” and
to press Key 4 for the second item. The response screen was self-timed and par-
ticipants received no feedback on their responses. Participants were instructed
that there was no order to the modality of successive test trials. The dependent
measure was accuracy in discriminating triplets from foils across 50 test trials.
3.2.2 Results
Results are collapsed across both interleaved pattern and triplet groupings with
analysis occurring only along dimensions of experimental groups (auditory vs.
visual attention) and experimental versus nonfamiliarized controls.
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Nonfamiliarized Controls
Performance of participants in the control group was evaluated against chance
performance (25 out of 50, or 50%). Control participants performed at 49% ac-
curacy for both modalities, and neither was significantly different from chance
performance: visual, t(7) = 0.36, p = .73; auditory, t(7) = 0.80, p = .45.
Experimental groups
Participants who attended to auditory stimuli correctly responded to 63% of
auditory test trials and 54% of visual test trials. Those who attended to visual
stimuli correctly responded to 57% of visual test trials and 47% of auditory test
trials (see Figure 3.2). Comparing experimental performance to corresponding
control performance, only the attended auditory condition differed significantly
from nonfamiliarized controls, t(18) = 5.95, p < .001; auditory unattended, t(18)
= 0.420, p > .5; visual attended: t(18) = 1.73, p = .10; visual unattended: t(18) =
1.336, p = .20.
Effects of attention. To specifically investigate the effects of selective attention
in the interleaved-multimodal design, planned t tests were performed to com-
pare performance for a single modality in attended and unattended condi-
tions, across experimental groups. This comparison of attended and unattended
streams yielded a significant difference in the auditory modality only: auditory
attended versus unattended, t(22) = 4.16, p < .01; visual attended versus unat-
tended, t(22) = 0.90, p = .38.
Modality effects. Experimental data were submitted to a two-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA; visual vs. auditory attention, within-subject factor: visual
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Figure 3.2: Mean test performance (percentage correct out of 50) from
Experiment 1. Visual and auditory ISL (implicit statistical learning)
performance is presented for control, auditory and visual attention conditions
at fast presentation rate (375-ms stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA).
vs. auditory presentation). While there is no main effect of modality, F(1, 22)
1= 0.056, p > .5, there is a significant modality by attention interaction, F(1, 22)
= 16.21, p = .001. That is, modality effects were obtained specifically when par-
ticipants were devoting attention to a given input stream. While direct tests of
attended performance across modalities do not reveal a significant difference,
t(22) = 1.573, p > .1, the interaction of modality and attention indicates that
modality of presentation is not uniformly affecting learning across attentional
conditions. Together with the results presented earlier (specifically, a signifi-
cant effect of attention in the auditory modality only and significant learning
is restricted to the attended auditory stream), this interaction indicates that au-
ditory ISL is superior to visual ISL at this rate of presentation when selective
attention is deployed. Increased ISL in the auditory modality is consistent with
previous findings using similarly timed rates of presentation (e.g., Conway &
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Christiansen, 2005).
3.2.3 Discussion
Here we used a multimodal interleaved design to investigate auditory and vi-
sual ISL. This experimental design is a novel combination and extension of that
used by Conway and Christiansen (2006) and Turk-Browne et al. (2005). Our re-
sults corroborate previous cross-modal ISL findings. First, using similar rates of
presentation in the current study, auditory ISL appears to have superior perfor-
mance to visual ISL (Conway & Christiansen, 2005; Robinson & Sloutsky, 2007;
Saffran, 2002). Second, concerning the effect of attention, our results are again
consistent with previous studies showing that attention can improve learning
(Toro et al., 2005; Turk-Browne et al., 2005). However, we found a significant in-
teraction that, together with follow up t-tests, indicated that selective attention
improved auditory learning more than visual learning. Thus, at this relatively
fast presentation rate, only auditory learning occurred, even when selective at-
tention was available. Under the same presentation conditions, we do not find
evidence of visual learning even with the aid of selective attention. This is likely
because, while individual stimuli are easily perceived at the current rate of pre-
sentation, visual processing has relatively poor temporal resolution in the cur-
rent task. See the introduction for a more in-depth discussion.
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3.3 Experiment 2: Interleaved, slow presentation (750-ms SOA)
The results from Experiment 1 are consistent with those from previous studies
demonstrating superior auditory learning at fast presentation rates (when the
input is attended). In the current experiment, we move beyond the temporal
distances previously explored in the ISL literature by increasing the distance
between successive elements from 375-ms SOA to 750-ms SOA, effectively in-
creasing the amount of time between successive elements in the presentation
stream. In fact, given the interleaved design and the increased rate of pre-
sentation, the average amount of time between successive visual-to-visual or
auditory-to-auditory elements is 2.25 s.3 Thus, this rate of presentation pro-
vides input conditions that are beyond the perceptual grouping tolerance of the
auditory system (Mates et al., 1994). See Figure 3.3 for an illustration of the
relative length of pauses for a single element (average is three elements) in Ex-
periment 1 (top panel) and Experiment 2 (centre panel) relative to the length of
pause necessary to produce significant temporal grouping disruption (bottom
panel).
As addressed above, this slower rate should have opposite effects on visual
and auditory ISL. Given that weak spatial perceptual grouping can reduce vi-
sual ISL (Baker et al., 2004), we predict a similarly negative effect for weak tem-
poral perceptual grouping on auditory ISL. Thus, we predict that a slow rate of
presentation will have a negative effect on auditory ISL. However, given that
the visual system has relatively poor temporal processing in the current task
3In the current experimental methods, there were between one and six stimuli from a single
familiarization stream presented consecutively. The mean number of consecutive stimuli was
three, which, at the rate of presentation employed in Experiment 2, has a duration of 2.25 s.
Thus, the average length of pause in an attended familiarization stream, caused by presentation
of the unattended familiarization stream, was 2.25 s.
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the temporal separation created by the interleaving of
a single unattended element at the fast (375-ms stimulus onset asynchrony,
SOA) and slow (750-ms SOA) presentation speeds in relation to the limits of
auditory temporal perceptual grouping (1.8 – 2 s). On average, three
unattended elements were presented consecutively.
(see Footnote 1), a decreased rate of presentation should have a positive effect
on visual ISL because it places less of a demand on the visual system than does
the fast presentation rate used in Experiment 1.
3.3.1 Methods
All methods, materials, and procedures were identical to those in Experiment 1
with the exception of presentation rate: Both visual and auditory stimuli were
present for 450 ms with a 300-ms ISI (750-ms SOA). To accommodate a slower
rate while maintaining natural production, a largely overlapping set of mono-
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syllabic nonwords were recorded by a female, native-English speaker (see Ap-
pendix B) and were edited to 750-ms SOA.
Another 32 participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: two
experimental groups (visual attention or auditory attention), or nonfamiliarized con-
trols.
3.3.2 Results
Nonfamiliarized controls responded correctly to 43% of the visual test trials and
46% of the auditory test trials; neither result was significantly different from
control performance at 50%: visual, t(7) = 1.27, p = .25; auditory, t(7) = 1.42,
p = .20. Participants who attended to the visual modality correctly responded
to 65% of visual test trials and 48% of auditory test trials. Those who attended
to the auditory modality correctly responded to 55% of auditory test trials and
52% of visual test trials (Figure 3.4). In contrast to the results from Experiment
1 (see Figure 3.2), only performance on the attended visual stream was signifi-
cantly different from control performance: attended visual, t(18) = 3.67, p = .002;
unattended visual learning, t(18) = 1.73, p = .10; attended auditory, t(18) = 1.81,
p = .087; unattended auditory, t(18) = 0.85, p = .85.
Effects of attention
Planned comparison of attended versus unattended performancewithinmodal-
ity yielded a significant difference in the visual modality only: attended versus
unattended visual, t(22) = 3.44, p = .002; auditory, t(22) = 1.65, p = .105.
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Figure 3.4: Mean test performance (percentage correct out of 50) from
Experiment 2. Visual and auditory ISL (implicit statistical learning)
performance is presented for control, auditory and visual attention conditions
at fast presentation rate (750-ms stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA).
Modality effects at slower rates of presentation
As with the results in Experiment 1, data from the experimental groups were
submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA. We find a main effect of modality,
F(1, 22) = 4.32, p = .050. This main effect is supported by greater performance in
the visual modality overall. However, as reported above, there is no evidence
of unattended learning in the visual modality suggesting that the main effect is
driven by attended visual performance.
As in Experiment 1, we found a significant modality by attention interaction,
F(1, 22) = 8.98, p = .0066. Direct t-tests of attended results across modalities re-
vealed only a marginally significant difference, t(22) = 2.0, p = .058. However,
taken with the t-tests comparing experimental performance to controls, the in-
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teraction of modality and attention indicates that modality of presentation is not
uniformly affecting learning across attentional conditions.
Unlike Experiment 1, direct t-tests indicate an opposite pattern of results of
attention and learning: We find a significant effect of attention in the visual
modality only and that significant learning is restricted to the attended visual
stream. These results suggest that at the slower rate of presentation, visual ISL
performed more robustly than auditory ISL. This is in contrast to the auditory
superiority in ISL at fast presentation rates using the samematerials and relative
temporal dynamics as those in Experiment 1.
Comparing across rates of presentation
A direct comparison of results from Experiments 1 and 2 was conducted by sub-
mitting all experimental data to a three-way repeated measures ANOVA using
between-subject factors of attended modality (auditory vs. visual) and rate (fast
vs. slow) and within-subject factor of modality (auditory vs. visual). This anal-
ysis revealed a marginally significant main effect of modality, F(1, 44) = 3.35, p
= .074, driven by slightly better performance across attended and unattended
streams in the visual modality. In addition, we find a significant interaction
of modality by attended modality, F(1, 44) = 22.84, p < .002. This interaction
confirms that attention to a particular modality affects performance in the cor-
responding modality for both the visual and the auditory modalities. We also
find a significant interaction between attended modality and rate of presenta-
tion, F(1, 44) = 5.58, p = .023. This result shows that the effect of rate is dependent
on which modality is being attended. We do not obtain a rate by modality in-
teraction, F(1, 44) = 2.414, p = .127, nor a modality by rate by attended modality
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interaction, F(1, 44) = 0.010, p = .922, which indicates that the rate manipula-
tion does not affect one modality preferentially over the other (except when the
modality is attended).
Taken together, the interactions of attended modality with rate and with
modality of presentation provide support for our hypothesis that modality of
presentation mediates differential performance across rates of presentation but
this only occurs in the attended streams. This view is supported by the pattern
of significant learning (i.e., greater performance than that of controls) in Exper-
iments 1 and 2.
These results are broadly consistent with previous work that attention mod-
ulates ISL. However, they reveal a more complex relationship between attention
and learning: Attending to a specific modality does in fact have an effect on ISL
only in that modality–moreover, this modality-specific effect of attention inter-
acts with rate of presentation. This pattern of results suggests that attention is
not sufficient to overcome the modality-specific effects of rate.
Given the broad and complex effects of attention in the current task and our
specific predictions that rate will interact with learning in the attended streams
(see the introduction), we conducted separate analyses for attended and unat-
tended performance to examine the effects of modality and rate within atten-
tional condition. This analysis allows us to verify that the interactions discussed
above are in fact driven by attended performance and not patterns of unat-
tended learning. For each group (attended and unattended), we submitted the
data to a repeated measures ANOVA (rate of presentation and within-subject
factor: modality). For the unattended conditions, we found a main effect of
modality, F(1, 44) = 4.80, p = .034, but no effects of rate or interaction of rate
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and modality. Examination of the mean unattended performance across condi-
tions reveals that visual unattended learning is superior to auditory unattended
learning. These results confirm that there is no effect of rate in unattended per-
formance.
The same analysis of attended performance revealed a markedly different
pattern of results. We find no main effect of modality or rate (Fs < 1) but a
significant modality by rate interaction: F(1, 44) = 6.47, p = .015. These results
confirm our predictions that modality and rate interact with learning but only
when attention is deployed. These results also confirm that selective attention
is not sufficient to overcome modality-specific differences in learning.
3.3.3 Discussion
The perceptual literature predicts that decreasing rate of presentation will have
opposite effects on auditory and visual processing: A decrease in rate will dis-
rupt auditory perceptual grouping while simultaneously easing the temporal
processing in the visual modality. We find this differential pattern of perfor-
mance in ISL, indicating that perceptual conditions significantly impact implicit
statistical learning ability. In the current experiment, rate of presentation is
slowed to half the rate of Experiment 1. While auditory superiority is observed
at the “fast-rate”, we fail to observe any significant learning in the auditory
modality at the current “slow-rate” of presentation. Instead, we observe a visual
superiority effect. This switch of ISL across perceptual modalities is particularly
striking given that no other methodological changes were made.
Consistent with previous research (Toro et al., 2005; Turk-Browne et al.,
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2005), we find that attention aids ISL. Additionally, we find that timing and at-
tention interact. This finding runs counter to recent research that has suggested
that attention is sufficient to overcome poor perceptual grouping conditions in
the visual modality (Baker et al., 2004; Pacton & Perruchet, 2008). Instead, we
find evidence that attention is not sufficient to overcome adverse perceptual
grouping conditions. The next experiment further controls for the presence of
unattended stimuli and any effects of cross-modal presentation in Experiment
2, in addition to providing a replication of the rate by modality interaction.
3.4 Experiment 3: Interleaved, blank stream
Finally, Experiment 3 addresses the possibility that the cross-modal interleaved
design employed in Experiments 1 and 2 introduced cross-modal interference
or decrements of selective attention due to the presentation of unattended stim-
uli from another modality (Spence & Driver, 1997). To this end, Experiments
3A (375-ms SOA) and 3B (750-ms SOA) use the same timings of the attended
streams as those in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, but, instead of presenting
unattended stimuli from the second input stream, pauses of equivalent length
were presented. For example, if three unattended elements at 375-ms SOAwere
presented in Experiment 1, a pause of 1,125 ms (375 ms x 3) was presented in
place of these unattended elements, as illustrated in Figure 3.1C. This manipu-
lation preserved the temporal structure of the familiarization stream while re-
moving any potential cross-modal interference and cost of dual- modality pre-
sentation. In addition, this experiment is meant to ameliorate any effects of
the attentional manipulations employed in Experiments 1 and 2 and increases
transitional probabilities of the familiarization stream. Without the unattended
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elements, transitional probabilities are equivalent to presenting the stream in
isolation (see Table 3.1).
3.4.1 Methods
The attended streams from Experiments 1 and 2 were used in the current exper-
iment with the unattended elements removed and replaced with equal-length
pauses in stimulus presentation. Thus the timing, materials, and methods were
preserved from the previous two experiments with the exception of the removal
of the unattended, cross-modal stream.
Participants
Another 32 participants (16 each for Experiments 3A and 3B) were recruited
from introductory psychology classes at Cornell University to participate in ex-
change for course credit or $10/hour.
Procedure
For each experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of two con-
ditions: nonfamiliarized controls or experimental groups. After being familiar-
ized with the stimuli from one modality (with the other one “blanked out”),
participants were tested in that same modality with test trials for that modality
only presented in random order. Then, participants went on to the familiariza-
tion, as described above, and testing trials for the othermodality. Test trials were
constructed using the same procedure as that in Experiments 1 and 2. Modal-
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ity order was counterbalanced across participants. The same number of triplet
groupings and interleaved sequencewere employed. Because a single unimodal
familiarization stream was presented during familiarization, there was no ma-
nipulation of selective attention.
3.4.2 Results and Discussion
Experiment 3A
Participants in the nonfamiliarized control group responded correctly to 52% of
visual and 51% of auditory test trials and did not perform significantly better
than chance in either modality: visual, t(7) = 0.97, p > .36; auditory, t(7) = 0.10,
p > .92. Participants in the experimental group responded correctly to 51% of
the visual test trials and 64% of the auditory test trials. Only performance in the
auditory modality was significantly better than that of nonfamiliarized controls:
visual, t(14) = 0.84, p = .41; auditory, t(14) = 2.33, p = .035 (see Figure 3.5). We
find a significant difference in mean performance across modalities, t(15) = 4.79,
p < .001.
To verify that there were no effects of our within-subject design, we investi-
gated possible order effects. Comparison of performance dependent on order of
presentation revealed no effect of presentation order in either modality: visual,
t(6) = 0.131, p >.90; auditory, t(6) = 1.59, p = .16.
Inspection of the left panel of Figure 3.5 readily reveals the replication of
attended performance in Experiment 1 (see Figure 3.2). Statistical comparison
between current experimental results and performance in attended conditions
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from Experiment 1 revealed no significant difference in either modality: visual,
t(14) = 0.83, p = .42; auditory, t(14) = 0.18, p = .86. Thus, current results repli-
cate attended performance in Experiment 1, demonstrating that the presence of
unattended cross-modal stimuli has no effects on ISL performance in either the
visual or the auditory modalities.
Figure 3.5: Mean test performance for Experiment 3. Auditory and visual
streams are presented with identical timing to that in Experiments 1 and 2 but
without the unattended stimuli. Both modalities are attended and presented in
counterbalanced order within participants. Left: Experiment 3A using the fast
rate of presentation from Experiment 1. Right: Experiment 3B using the slow
rate of presentation from Experiment 2.
Together, the results from Experiments 1 and 3A demonstrate that auditory
presentation yields greater learning performance than visual presentation at fast
rates. This finding is consistent with previous studies, all of which have em-
ployed similarly fast rates of presentation (Conway & Christiansen, 2005, 2009;
Robinson & Sloutsky, 2007; Saffran, 2002).
These results also suggest that auditory ISL is robust to short pauses in pre-
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sentation. The interleaved experimental design entails that a single stream is
temporally interrupted either by unattended visual stimuli in Experiment 1or
pauses of equivalent length in Experiment 3A. At the fast presentation rate,
these pauses average 1.13 s in length. Even with these short pauses, there is
significant learning in the attended auditory stream . Learning remains intact
likely because the length of pauses is on average within the perceptual grouping
tolerance of the auditory modality (Mates et al., 1994; see introduction).
Experiment 3B
Nonfamiliarized controls responded correctly to 51% of visual and auditory test
trials and did not perform significantly better than chance in either modality:
visual, t(7) = 0.39, p = .71; auditory, t(7) = 0.56, p = .59. Participants in the ex-
perimental group responded correctly to 68% of the visual test trials and 58% of
the auditory test trials. In contrast to results from Experiment 3A, only perfor-
mance in the visual modality differed significantly from that of nonfamiliarized
controls: visual, t(14) = 2.30, p = .037; auditory, t(14) = 1.66, p = .12 (see Fig-
ure 3.5). We do not, however, find a significant difference in learning across
modalities, t < 1.
As in Experiment 3A, we tested for possible order effects by comparing per-
formance in each modality dependent on presentation order. We found no ev-
idence of order effects for either modality: visual, t(6) = 0.82, p = .45; auditory,
t(6) = 0.62, p = .56.
Since the purpose of the current experiment was to replicate the results from
Experiment 2 (see Figure 3.4), performance in the attended streams from Experi-
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ment 2 was compared to the current experimental group. This analysis revealed
no significant difference in either modality: visual, t(14) = 0.738, p = .47; audi-
tory, t(14) = 0.54, p = .6 (see Figure 3.5). Thus, along with Experiment 3A, we
find no effect of the presence of unattended cross-modal stimuli on ISL across
presentation rates.
Analyses comparing attended performance in Experiments 1 and 2 suggest
that timing and modality interaction in ISL. To test for this pattern of results
in the within-subject design of Experiments 3A and 3B, data from experimental
groups were submitted to a repeated measures ANOVA (auditory and visual
ISL; timing). This analysis revealed no main effect of modality, F(1, 14) = 0.097,
p = .76. Crucially, we find a significant modality by timing interaction, F(1, 14) =
6.36, p = .024. These results confirm the earlier result that presentation rate has a
differential effect on ISL across visual and auditory modalities in two different
experimental paradigms. 4
3.5 General Discussion
In three experiments, participants were presented with auditory and visual sta-
tistical regularities under different timing conditions. While statistical infor-
mation remained the same, performance was not equivalent across perceptual
modalities at different rates of presentation. In attended modalities, percep-
tual modality and rate of presentation interact to affect learning: At fast rates
of presentation, similar to previous studies, auditory ISL performed better than
4While the significant interactions of modality and timing or rate of presentation in Experi-
ments 3A and 3B replicate the effects found in Experiments 1 and 2, in both of these experiments
the interaction of rate and modality is found across participants and without random sampling
across these experimental groups (i.e., there is only random sampling within Experiment 1).
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visual; however, at a slower presentation rate, auditory ISL was reduced, and
visual ISL became superior. This effect is replicated in Experiment 3, in which
the timing conditions are kept constant but streams are presented without unat-
tended stimuli. Thus, the current experiments have uncovered a new phe-
nomenon in ISL where timing changes result in differential effects on ISL across
visual and auditory modalities.
These learning results are consistent with well-known perceptual differences
across visual and auditory modalities. As reviewed in the introduction, visual
and auditory modalities appear to process time and space differently. Specif-
ically, perceptual performance across modalities can be characterized by the
visual:spatial::auditory:temporal analogy, where the visual modality preferen-
tially processes spatially arrayed information while the auditory modality pro-
cesses temporal information more robustly than the visual modality. While it is
clear that under some circumstances this characterization does not apply (e.g.,
Potter, 1976), in the current type of perceptual task, these modality-differences
are well established. While this perceptual effect does not limit the ability to rec-
ognize single objects, spatial or temporal presentation of multiple stimuli does
affect processing across visual and auditory sensory modalities.
Our learning results parallel this well-known effect in the perceptual litera-
ture: Visual learning is increased with a slower rate while auditory processing is
decreased. This novel phenomenon along with previous studies (e.g., Conway
& Christiansen, 2005, 2006; Robinson & Sloutsky, 2007; Saffran, 2002) have es-
tablished that ISL is not equivalent in the visual and auditory sensory modali-
ties, even though the same statistical information is presented.
We also investigated the effect of attention to a sensory modality across both
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timing conditions. While it is generally accepted that attention is a significant
modulatory factor aiding in both visual and auditory ISL (visual: Turk-Browne
et al., 2005 auditory: Toro et al., 2005), it is unclear whether attention is necessary
for learning to take place (e.g., Saffran et al., 1997). We do not find any evidence
for unattended learning (in Experiments 1 and 2). Therefore, we corroborate
previous research showing that attention significantly boosts ISL in both visual
and auditory sensory modalities and may be necessary for learning.
Turning to results for attended modalities, previous research on perceptual
grouping effects in ISL has emphasized the relationship between perceptual
conditions and attention. Baker et al. (2004) point to the “automatic spread-
ing of attention induced by perceptual-grouping” (p. 465) as the mechanism by
which perceptual grouping aids ISL. Under unfavourable grouping conditions,
it has been argued that ISL can occur if the relevant stimuli are attended (Baker
et al., 2004; Pacton & Perruchet, 2008). This approach emphasizes perceptual
grouping as a factor that modulates attention, which in turn facilitates ISL, as
opposed to treating perceptual grouping as a separate modality-specific factor
affecting learning from statistical regularities.
If it were the case that attention is sufficient to compensate for poor percep-
tual conditions, we should observe equivalent learning in all attended streams
regardless of modality and rate of presentation. The current results do not sup-
port this view: We observed a modality-specific decrement in ISL under dis-
ruptive perceptual grouping conditions even when there are no competing de-
mands for attention. Thus, we find evidence that attention cannot always com-
pensate for poor perceptual conditions.
Thus, our results suggest that favourable perceptual conditions and selective
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attention to a particular modality may both be required in order for participants
to learn from statistical regularities in the environment. In the current learn-
ing paradigm, attention appears to be a prerequisite for learning: There is no
learning in any unattended stream regardless of perceptual modality or timing
condition. However, selective attention to a particular modality is not sufficient
for learning. In fact, even with attention, perceptual grouping conditions and
modality of presentation interact to determinewhether or not participants learn.
Thus, we find that attention and perceptual conditions amenable to a particular
modality are both necessary for ISL.
It is important to consider that each sense has unique sets of sensori-motor
constraints that might affect learning and relevant for the current chapter, could
affect learning in differently dependent on timing of sensory input. For exam-
ple, eyes require foveation of relevant stimuli for the conveyance of detailed sen-
sory input while ears do not have an apparent equivalent to a fovea. SImilarly,
visual input is interrupted by the sensorimotor requirement of blinking and is
interrupted during saccades (Burr, Morrone, & Ross, 1994), while, again, there
is not obvious acoustic equivalent. During fast presentation of sensory input, it
is possible that these sensori-motor constraints could reduce visual processing
selectively in a way that is not dependent upon perceptual processing. There is
some evidence that the decreased visual statistical learning at faster rates of pre-
sentation is not due to these sensori-motor constraints on the visual system. A
control study was conducted to examine whether there were masking effects in
the visualmodality at faster rates of presentation. Amasking effect would be ev-
idenced by a selective decrease in discriminability of individual shapes at faster
rates suggesting that the visual system is receiving reduced or compromised
sensory input possibly as a result of these sensori-motor constraints. We find no
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evidence of decreased discriminability in general at faster rates of presentation
and no selective decrease in discriminability in the visual modality; the details
of this experiment are presented in Appendix C. However, Turk-Browne et al.
(2005) found that cover task performance was reduced in the visual modality at
faster rates of presentation. Future research is needed to determine if a similar
effect is found in the auditory modality. If there is an unequal reduction in cover
task performance across perceptual modalities at fast rates of presentation, this
could indicate that sensori-motor constraints rather than differences in percep-
tual processing, could be the source of the modality-specific effect of timing on
statistical learning.
Overall, these results are consistent with ISL being mediated by mechanisms
that are sensitive to the perceptual nature of the input in addition to its statistical
structure (e.g., transitional probabilities and frequencies). Recent neuroimag-
ing evidence has supported just such a scenario: Turk-Browne, Scholl, Chun,
and Johnson (2009) report increased visual cortex activity during the observa-
tion of learnable visual sequences demonstrating that sensory cortices are likely
involved in learning the underlying structure from visual statistics. Thus, both
behavioural and neuroimaging results have suggested that ISL is sensitive to
perceptual processes.
Given these modality-specific learning effects, any mechanisms for ISL must
be able to account for differences in learning across sensory modalities. Fi-
nally, we consider three types of mechanisms for their ability to accommo-
date modality-specific differences as well as the domain-generality of ISL. In
Figure 3.6, we present a simplified characterization of these possible architec-
tures. Throughout the paper, we have been referring to ISL as a behavioural
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phenomenon in which exposure to statistical regularities affects subsequent be-
haviour. By contrast, these candidate characterizations present types of possible
mechanisms that could underlie this behaviour: Specifically, we consider differ-
ent ways in which perceptual systems, responsible for the recognition and un-
derstanding of sensory information, and learning mechanisms, the acquisition
of knowledge as a result of experience, could contribute to ISL ability.
As asserted in the introduction, it is difficult for the standard view of the
mechanisms underlying ISL to account for these modality-specific patterns of
learning. According to this view, ISL involves a single undifferentiated mech-
anism for which the nature of the input beyond its statistical characteristics is
irrelevant (e.g., Perruchet & Pacton, 2006; Reber, 1989; Shanks et al., 1997). In
other words, visual and auditory perception are separate unimodal processes
that feed into a single learningmechanism. Consistent with this type of architec-
ture, many prominent models make an “equivalence assumption” that the same
statistical information presented across modalities should result in equivalent
learning. Thus, while knowledge gained from ISL may be specific to the input
stimuli (i.e., learning has limited or no transfer to other stimuli), the learning
mechanism is not affected by the perceptual nature of the input (e.g., auditory
stimuli are learned equivalently to visual stimuli). This standard architecture is
consistent with domain-general nature of ISL given that there is a single learn-
ing mechanism that receives input from both perceptual systems. However, in
our view, it is unclear how a learning mechanism that focuses on statistical in-
formation to the exclusion of the perceptual nature of the input would be able to
accommodate the differential learning effects we report. One possibility is that
the unimodal perceptual systems are tasked with detecting perceptual “units”,
while the singular learning mechanism can determine and track the statistical
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regularities of these units, and differences in timing or other perceptual condi-
tions make resolution of “units” in a stream of stimuli more difficult. However,
the most obvious definition of a perceptual unit is a single object. In this case,
in the current study and previous work, the perception of individual perceptual
objects is the same across modalities.
We present two alternative types of architecture that, we believe, more easily
accommodate the modality-specific patterns of learning observed in the current
ISL paradigm. The first is a modality- specific architecture consisting of separate
but computationally similar learning mechanisms for both visual and auditory
perception, thus allowing perception and learning to remain distinct processes.
The multiple, modality-specific learning mechanisms, which characterize this
type of architecture, make it possible for differences in learning across sensory
modalities to emerge in the learning mechanisms themselves (e.g., by detecting
types of patterns similar to previous experience, spatial patterns in the visual
system), as well as accounting for the modality- and domain-general nature of
ISL. Two disadvantages to this architecture are that it is unparsimonious as it in-
cludes an additional, if computationally similar, learning mechanism and does
not explain cross-modal learning effects (e.g., Robinson & Sloutsky, 2007).
In an embodied architecture, perception and learning are not distinct pro-
cesses but the learning mechanism is a part of, or embodied in, perceptual
processing. Recent work has suggested that perception is a prediction-based
process (e.g., Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008) where
the likelihood of a given stimulus affects perceptual processing. In this view of
perception, sensitivity to statistical information is already a property of visual
and auditory perception. Thus, changes in perception as a result of statistical in-
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Figure 3.6: Simplified characterization of three possible architectures for
perception and ISL (implicit statistical learning)
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formation (e.g., identification of multiple objects as a single triplet) might only
be a modification from the usual perceptual process. Like both the modality-
specific and standard architectures, the embodied view is able to accommodate
the modality- and domain-general nature of ISL. An embodied architecture pro-
vides a clear way to accommodate the modality-specific learning effects based
upon perceptual conditions such as perceptual grouping: Because learning is
embodied in perceptual processing, perceptual biases that are seen in percep-
tual tasks will robustly transfer to the process of acquiring knowledge through
exposure to statistical regularities. Unlike a modality-specific architecture, an
embodied mechanism is more parsimonious; it may also better accommodate
cross-modal effects in ISL (e.g., learning based on cross-modal statistical regu-
larities could be embodied in multisensory perceptual systems).
It is important to note that there are computational models of learning that
are influenced by the relative timing of sensory input. One is spike-timing-
dependent plasticity, an experimentally observed form of long-term neural plas-
ticity that depends on the relative timing of pre- and post-synaptic action po-
tentials in a process that is computationally similar to Hebbian learning (Song,
Miller, & Abbott, 2000). In this learning mechanism, it is possible that the win-
dow of integration for pre- and post-synaptic activity could be modified across
auditory and visual modalities to affect the optimal timing of learned input. An-
other computational learning mechanism that is affected by timing of sensory
events is temporal difference learning, developed to model the reinforcement
or reward learning behaviors. Different models have been proposed to mod-
ify the effect of timing on learning (e.g. Daw, Courville, & Touretzky, 2002,
2006). Thus, it is possible the implement different variants of temporal differ-
ence reinforcement learning models with different learning outcomes based on
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timing of sensory input. In this way, a single learning mechanism, spike-timing-
dependent plasticity or temporal-difference reinforcement learning, could be
model different optimal timing for learning as we observe across auditory and
visual modalities in the current study. This proposal is not entirely capture by
any one of the three candidate mechanisms presented in Figure 3.6 but could
considered as a combination of an Embodied and Standard Views of statistical
learning mechanisms. If the different timing parameters of the learning mecha-
nism would setwithin each modality, the bulk of the learning mechanism could
be shared between perceptual modalities and would be similar to the Standard
View where there are shared learning resources across modalities. However,
the setting of the parameter is an important aspect of the learning mechanism
and thus, there is some degree of embodiment of learning, as is captured by the
Embodied Learning Mechanism.
In sum, the aim of the current paper is not to conclusively support one type
of ISL mechanism but to further elucidate the importance of perceptual pro-
cessing in learning from statistical regularities. We have highlighted the ways
in which these three types of architecture could accommodate modality-specific
patterns of learning as reported in the current paper while maintaining domain-
general learning abilities. However, we assert that both the modality-specific
and the embodied viewmore readily support differential learning across the vi-
sual and auditory modalities. Considering established computational learning
mechanisms, it is possible that different aspects of these three types of learning
mechanisms are necessary to fully capture the pattern of learning seen across
modalities.
A further important question is to understand the origins of these modality-
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specific learning differences. For instance, are the perceptual constraints ob-
served here true for all categories of sound stimuli or just for speech sounds?
Similarly, is it possible that auditory ISL is more temporally tuned because of
language-specific experience? Alternatively, is hearing temporally biased due
to generic sensory and/or perceptual factors apart from experience with spo-
ken language?
Our understanding of ISL as an important mechanism in cognition and de-
velopment has progressed from it being characterized as language-specific, to
domain-general and abstract, to current thinking emphasizing the effects of per-
ceptual, attentional, and modality-specific constraints. The evidence appears to
disconfirm the idealized conception of ISL as a single, undifferentiated mech-
anism that operates apart from other perceptual and cognitive constraints. By
recognizing and further discovering the complexities governing and affecting
the operation of this ubiquitous learningmechanism, wemay better understand
fundamental processes of language, development, and cognition.
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CHAPTER 4
HOWABSTRACT IS STATISTICAL LEARNING? COMPARING
LEARNING ACROSS VISUAL AND AUDITORY PERCEPTUAL
MODALITIES IN INFANCY
The empirical content of this chapter was developed in collaboration with Drs.
Michael Goldstein, Jen Schwade, & Morten Christiansen and Jennifer Misyak,
see Emberson, Misyak, Schwade, Christiansen, and Goldstein (in preparation).
This chapter examines visual- and auditory-SL aged 8-10 months in
order to evaluate: 1) whether SL has the same developmental trajec-
tory across perceptual modalities; 2) how learning outcomes compare
across vision and audition and to previous research with adult learn-
ers. Learning was evidenced in both conditions with opposite direc-
tions of preference: Infants in the auditory condition displayed a nov-
elty preference, while infants in the visual condition showed a famil-
iarity preference. Next, we found equal magnitudes of learning across
modalities. Finally, we found evidence of different developmental tra-
jectories across modalities. Themagnitude of auditory-SL changedwith
age. Using a median split, older infants exhibited a novelty preference
while younger infants showed no systematic preference. A compara-
ble group of younger infants showed visual-SL. Thus, we find evidence
for earlier availability of SL in the visual modality. This is the opposite
pattern from adults where auditory-SL tends to be more robust than
visual-SL, suggesting that SL development could be supported by per-
ceptual changes. Overall, these findings suggest that SL is not amodal
but permeable to perception.
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4.1 Introduction
The human brain has the remarkable ability to use knowledge of underlying
structure to shape perception. While this perceptual ability could be the result
of innate knowledge, there is increasing evidence that perception can be shaped
through experience. Environmental structure is available to the learner through
statistical regularities in sensory input; statistical learning is the process of de-
tecting these regularities after incidental exposure. With demonstrations that in-
fants can engage in statistical learning after only a brief exposure (Saffran et al.,
1996; neonates in the auditory modality: Teinonen, Fellman, Na¨a¨ta¨nen, Alku, &
Huotilainen, 2009; 2-month-olds in the visual modality; Kirkham et al., 2002),
the last decade of research in developmental psychology has focused on the role
of statistics in shaping perception and cognition. Specifically, it is believed that
prior experience with statistical regularities can support development across a
number of domains such as language learning (Romberg & Saffran, 2010), object
and scene perception (Fiser & Aslin, 2002), and music perception (McMullen &
Saffran, 2004). There is also evidence that infants as young as 8 months make
inferences based on statistical information (Xu &Garcia, 2008) which can in turn
support development in additional cognitive domains such as causal reasoning
(Gopnik & Tenenbaum, 2007).
Despite the importance of statistical learning to perceptual and cognitive de-
velopment, very little is known about the nature and the development of the
mechanisms underlying statistical learning (SL): Is SL developmentally invari-
ant or is there a discernible developmental trajectory? Are the underlyingmech-
anisms amodal and abstract, and thus sensitive only to the statistical regularities
present in sensory input, or is learning modulated by non-statistical perceptual
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differences (e.g. whether the statistics are presented as part of auditory vs. vi-
sual stimuli)? For clarity, the paper will refer to these factors as “statistical in-
formation” and “perceptual information,” respectively.
Recent research in adult learners has demonstrated that SL can differ across
auditory and visual perceptual modalities even if the statistical information is
held constant (e.g., Conway & Christiansen, 2005; Saffran, 2002). Moreover,
a number of studies have suggested that auditory SL is superior to visual SL
in adults (Conway & Christiansen, 2005; Emberson et al., 2011; Robinson &
Sloutsky, 2007).
While this work suggests that SL is not an amodal, abstract learning mecha-
nism, it is unknown how infant SL compares across perceptual modalities. Sep-
arate studies have found that infants can learn using both visual and auditory
stimuli (e.g., Fiser & Aslin, 2002; Kirkham et al., 2002; Saffran et al., 1999). How-
ever, studies examining auditory and visual SL employ different methodologies
making it difficult to compare learning outcomes and, to date, no single study
has used the same methodology to examine differences of visual and auditory
SL with infant learners.
If SL is also sensitive to perceptual information, in addition to statistical in-
formation, in infancy, it is unknown whether or how the interaction of percep-
tion and SL develops. Previous studies have suggested that SL abilities are in-
variant across developmental time. Saffran et al. (1997)compared auditory SL
between adults and children and Kirkham et al. (2002) examined visual SL in 2
to 8-months-old infants; both studies found no difference in learning outcomes
across age groups. However, there has been some recent evidence suggesting
that SL abilities can develop. (Thiessen et al., 2005) suggested that increased
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age (as well as increased exposure) can make a learning task easier in infancy.
Arciuli and Simpson (2011) directly examined visual SL in children 5- to 12-
years-of-age and found that their ability to differentiate familiar and novel items
at test increased across childhood. Recent work by McNealy, Mazziotta, and
Dapretto (in press) found differences in the neural activation associated with
auditory SL between 6 and 10-year-old learners, suggesting changes in auditory
SL across childhood. Thus, while studies suggesting developmental invariance
of SL are compelling, they are sparse (visual SL in 2-8 months: Kirkham et al.,
2002; auditory SL in children and adults: Saffran et al., 1997) and recent evi-
dence has emerged suggesting SL abilities may increase across developmental
time.
If SL is developmentally invariant, one would predict the same pattern of
modality-specificity in infancy as is seen in adulthood (i.e. better auditory than
visual SL in the canonical SL paradigm, in which learners use transitional prob-
abilities to segment items in a stream as presented in Saffran et al., 1996). How-
ever, if SL ismodulated by the type of perceptual information and develops over
time, one might expect developmental trajectories to differ across perceptual
modalities. Such differences in development could be supported by changes in
perceptual processing across visual and auditory sensory modalities and would
likely not be the result of changes in an abstract learning mechanism.
The current study compared auditory and visual SL in infants 8- to 10-
months-old to examine 1) how learning outcomes compare across vision and
audition and to previous research with adult learners, and 2) whether SL has
the same developmental trajectory across perceptual modalities. To gain a clear
view of differences in learning outcomes, we strove to equate learning condi-
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tions across modalities. First, we employed virtually identical methodologies
for visual and auditory learning paradigms. Previous visual SL studies have
typically employed infant-controlled habituation (Fiser & Aslin, 2002; Kirkham
et al., 2002) while auditory SL studies have employed fixed familiarization to
sounds (e.g., Saffran et al., 1996). Some studies have presented fixed famil-
iarization with infants engaging in other tasks such as watching a cartoon or
playing with their caregivers (e.g., Graf Estes et al., 2007). This difference in
methodology stems from basic differences across vision and audition (input of
visual information requires the eyes to be pointed at the relevant stimuli while
one can hear ambient auditory stimuli without any overt orienting) and also
the assumption that auditory SL can occur without selective or focused atten-
tion (Saffran et al., 1997). To equate methodologies across modalities and to be
able to compare amount of exposure to statistical information, we employed an
infant-controlled habituation paradigm in both visual and auditory conditions.
Second, we aimed to equate thetype of stimuli: previous visual SL studies
have employed geometric shapes (Fiser & Aslin, 2002; Kirkham et al., 2002)
while auditory SL studies have typically used speech sounds (Saffran et al.,
1996; however see studies with tones, Creel, Newport, & Aslin, 2004; Saffran
et al., 1999). Later in their first year of life, infants have had considerable expo-
sure to speech soundsmaking themmore familiar than geometric shapes; more-
over, speech sounds are more perceptually complex and infants are beginning
to develop specialized processing for speech (e.g., Kuhl et al., 1992). Thus, we
compared SL using speech sounds (auditory condition) and faces (visual condi-
tion) as both of these stimuli are familiar, perceptually-complex, and the subject
to specialized processing for infants in our age range (Nelson, 2010; Pascalis et
al., 2005).
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Finally, visual and auditory SL studies with infants have often employed
different rates of stimulus presentation. Visual SL stimuli have often been
presented at a slower rate than auditory SL stimuli (e.g. visual SL: 1 stimu-
lus/second; Kirkham et al., 2002; auditory SL: 4-5 stimuli/second; Saffran et
al., 1996; Pelucchi, Hay, & Saffran, 2009). Increased rates of presentation have
been shown to decrease visual SL in children (Arciuli & Simpson, 2011) and
adults (Turk-Browne et al., 2005). Research in adults has suggested the oppo-
site effect with auditory SL: decreased learning at slower rates of presentation
(Emberson et al., 2011). These results suggest that different modalities require
different rates of presentation to support SL. The relationship between rate, SL,
and perceptualmodality has not been directly tested in infant learners; however,
there is circumstantial evidence that such a relationship exists. Specifically, prior
studies finding evidence for visual SL tend to have slower rates of presentation
than studies finding evidence for auditory SL, as noted above. Thus, we choose
rates which balanced the constraints of achieving similarity across modalities
and with the rate of presentation likely required by that perceptual system (vi-
sual rate of presentation: 1 stimulus/second the same as Kirkham et al., 2002;
auditory rate of presentation: 2 stimuli/second similar to Thiessen et al., 2005).
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Participants
Fifty-nine infants between the ages of 8- and 10-months were recruited for the
current study. Twenty-six infants were recruited for the Auditory condition and
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33 infants were recruited for the Visual condition. Within each condition, infants
were counterbalanced for sex, two sets of bigrams orders, and test trial order.
Nineteen additional infants were tested but excluded because of excessive fussi-
ness (11: auditory; 6 visual), preterm birth (1:auditory) or parental interference
(1: visual). Infants were recruited at experiment locations in Ithaca (n = 50) and
Syracuse (14 in the visual condition only).
Visual examination of infants looking to the test trials revealed significant
outliers in each Perceptual Condition (e.g. one infant looked longer at the
Novel test trials for an average of 48 seconds; the mean difference was close
to 2 seconds). Thus, infants with looking scores during test (Difference Score =
Mean Looking to Novel Familiar Test Trial) of greater than two standard devi-
ations (SD) from the mean were excluded from further analyses.1 Means and
SDs were calculated separately for each Perceptual Condition and habituation
group. This resulted in the exclusion of five additional infants (Habituated in-
fants: 2 auditory; 1 visual; Non-Habituated infants: 1 auditory, 1 visual).
Of the 59 infants included in the subsequent analyses, 32 were female, 26
were assigned to the Auditory condition, and the mean age was 9.08 months
(SD = 0.64, range = 7.9 to 10.0 months).
4.2.2 Stimuli and Statistical Sequences
The current study employed equivalent sets of visual and auditory stimuli. Six
smiling, Caucasian, female faces were selected from the NimStim database (Fig-
1This criterion for excluding outliers has been previously applied in a number of related
studies on infant learning (e.g. Haan & Nelson, 1997; Maye, Weiss, & Aslin, 2008) and SL (e.g.,
Conway, Bauernschmidt, Huang, & Pisoni, 2010).
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Figure 4.1: All six face stimuli used in the current experiment in a sample
bigram order.
ure 4.1; Tottenham et al., 2009). Faces were presented individually at a rate
of 1 stimulus / second (1 second SOA). Six monosyllabic nonwords (e.g., vot)
were recorded with equal lexical stress and flat prosody (adult-directed or AD
speech) from a female native English speaker. The length of each utterance was
edited to have a uniform duration of 600 ms and stimuli were presented at a
rate of 2 stimuli/second (500ms SOA). Nonwords were played acoustically and
accompanied by the projected image of a checkerboard (4 x 4 black and white,
with gray surround) to direct the infants attentional focus. Both face stimuli
and the checkerboard used for the auditory condition subtended 14.6◦ of visual
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Figure 4.2: Depiction of habituation, including transitional probabilities, and
test sequences (familiar and novel) for the visual and the auditory perceptual
conditions (left and right). Each stimulus was presented individually with the
order to stimuli presented along the diagonal in the figure.
angle (Kirkham et al., 2002). Auditory stimuli were presented at 58 dB.
For each condition (visual or auditory), the six stimuli (faces or nonwords)
were grouped into two mutually exclusive sets of “bigrams” or pairs (see Fig-
ure 4.1 for sample face bigram set). Each infant was only exposed to one bigram
set. This procedure allowed us to examine whether learning outcomes were
affected by the particular grouping of the stimuli.
Habituation sequences were constructed by concatenating three bigrams of
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a given set in random order with nomore than four consecutive presentations of
a single bigram (Figure 4.2). All bigrams were presented with equal frequency.
The only cue to bigram structure was the statistical information in the stream:
Both co-occurrence frequencies and transitional probabilities could support bi-
gram segmentation (Aslin et al., 1998). Transitional probabilities between suc-
cessive stimuli were higher within pairs (1.0) than between pairs (0.33). These
transitional probabilities have been shown to be learnable by infants in the
tested age range (Kirkham et al., 2002; Saffran et al., 1996). Twelve different
habituation sequences were constructed for each bigram order for each condi-
tion.
There were two types of test trial sequences: familiar and novel. The only
difference between test trial types was the statistical information of the presen-
tation streams. This ensured that any looking time differences were due to in-
fants’ sensitivity to the statistical structure of the sequences. Familiar trials were
constructed using identical methods as the habituation sequences. Novel trials
were constructed by using a random order of all stimuli (i.e. no consistent bi-
gram pairings and no reliable statistical information), with the constraint that
a single stimulus could not be presented consecutively more than four times.
Three novel and three familiar test trials were constructed for each bigram or-
dering and for each condition.
Individual stimuli (and bigrams) were presented at equal frequencies for all
sequence types. Both habituation and test trial sequences were 60 seconds long,
thus visual sequences contained 60 stimuli while auditory sequences contained
120 stimuli.
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Figure 4.3: Depiction of the experimental set up. Infants sat on their caregivers
lap in the chair while stimuli were presented. All visual stimuli (a
checkerboard during the auditory condition, faces in the visual condition, and
the attention getter, used in both conditions) were presented centrally.
Auditory stimuli (speech tokens or the sound for the attention getter) were
presented from a speaker placed in front of the infants and below the visual
stimuli.
4.2.3 Procedure
Infants were tested individually, seated in a caregiver’s lap in a darkened room.
Their caregivers were instructed to keep their infants on their laps facing for-
ward, if possible, but not to interfere with their looking or behavior. To further
prevent any unconscious cueing or interference, each caregiver wore sound at-
tenuating headphones with music playing and either a hat or a visor that pre-
vented visual access to the stimuli. Images were presented centrally onto the
wall or a screen in front of the infant. Sounds were presented centrally directly
below the visual stimuli (Figure 4.3).
Stimulus presentation was controlled by Habit 2000 (Cohen, Atkinson, &
Chaput, 2000) operating on a Macintosh computer running OS 9. Directly be-
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low the projected images, but above the speaker, a camera was mounted to
record infant eye gaze (Figure 4.3). An observer in a different room, blind to
the sequences and trial types, recorded looks towards and away from the visual
stimuli (i.e. faces for the visual condition and the checkerboard for the auditory
condition).
Infants were presented with an attention-getting animation of a rotating and
looming blue and white disc with sound in between trials. This attention-getter
would play until the infants looked centrally at which point a sequence was pre-
sented. If the infant did not look at the beginning of the sequence for at least two
seconds, this was not counted as a completed trial; the attention-getter played
again and once the infant looked centrally, the same sequence was repeated.
If the infant looked for two seconds or longer, the sequence would play un-
til infants looked away for two consecutive seconds or the sequence ended (60
seconds; Kirkham et al., 2002; Saffran et al., 1996).
Habituation sequences were presented in random order until infants either
reached the habituation criterion or all 12 habituation sequences had been pre-
sented. The habituation criterion was defined as a decline of looking time by
more than 50% for four consecutive trials, using a sliding window, compared to
the first four habituation trials. Infants were then presented with six test trials
in alternating order by test trial type (familiar and novel) with the order of alter-
nation (i.e. novel first or familiar first) counterbalanced across infants (Kirkham
et al., 2002).
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Habituation and Viewing Time
Visual Condition.
Eighteen infants met the habituation criterion, Habituated infants, with a mean
of 8.1 habituation trials (SD = 2.3) and a viewing time during habituation of
105.4 seconds (SD = 68.3). The 15 infants who did not reach habituation crite-
rion, Non-Habituated infants, had a mean viewing time of 130.2 seconds (SD
= 48.6). There was no difference in viewing time during habituation between
these groups, t(31) = 1.18 p = 0.25, d = -0.42.
Auditory Condition.
Seventeen infants met the habituation criterion with a mean of 8.7 trials (SD
= 2.2) and viewing time of 75.0 seconds (SD = 37.9). The nine infants who did
not reach habituation criterion had amean viewing time of 118.36 seconds (SD =
39.8). Habituated infants looked for significantly less time thanNon-Habituated
infants, t(24) = -2.72, p = 0.012, d = -1.12.
Considering differences in habituation across perceptual modalities, we
found no significant difference in viewing time for Non-Habituated infants
across perceptual modalities, t(22) = 0.624, p = 0.54, d = 0.27, or for Habitu-
ated infants, t(32) = -1.61, p = 0.12, d = -0.55. We also investigated whether
there is a difference in the distribution of Habituated vs. Non-Habituated in-
fants across perceptual modalities (Chi-squared test with factors of Habituation
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group and Perceptual Modality). We failed to reject the null hypothesis, χ2 (1,
n = 59) = 0.708, p = 0.40, supporting the view that there is no difference in the
distribution of habituated to non-habituated infants across perceptual modali-
ties. For subsequent analyses, unless noted otherwise, infants were compared
within Habituation group.
4.3.2 Evidence of Learning
In the current task and consistent with previous literature (e.g., Jusczyk &Aslin,
1995; Saffran & Thiessen, 2003; Thiessen et al., 2005), we define evidence of
learning as a significant difference in looking between test trial types (Novel vs.
Familiar).
Visual Condition.
We investigated whether looking to test trial types (Novel vs. Familiar) was uni-
form across Habituation groups. A mixed ANOVA (within subject factor: test
trial type, between subject factor: Habituation group) revealed no main effects
of either test trial or habituation group, ps > 0.5, but a significant interaction
of test trial type and habituation group, F(1, 31) = 12.86, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.293,
suggesting that infants do not look uniformly to test trial types and this differ-
ence is mediated by whether they reached the habituation criterion. Following
up this interaction, we investigated the pattern of looking for separately across
habituation groups.
Habituated infants in the Visual condition show evidence of learning; they
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looked at the Novel test trials for a mean of 6.11 seconds (SD = 2.6) and to the
Familiar trials for 8.24 seconds (SD = 3.8; Figure 4.4). Paired t-tests revealed a
significant difference in looking between trial types (t(17) = -3.46, p = 0.003, d =
-0.896). This difference was confirmed in non-parametric paired tests (15 of the
18 infants showed a bias toward looking to the familiar trials, Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, Z = -2.72, p = 0.006). Thus, habituated infants in the visual condition
showed a significant familiarity preference.
While Non-Habituated infants looked longer at Novel test trials (Novel: M =
8.8 seconds, SD = 4.4; Familiar: M = 6.85, SD = 3.92), this difference only reached
marginal significance in a paired parametric test (t(14) = 1.94, p = 0.073, d = 0.51).
Therewas no difference across trial types in a non-parametric test (9 of 15 infants
showed bias towards the Novel trials, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, Z = -1.1, p =
0.26). Therefore, we found robust evidence of learning in Habituated infants
only in the Visual condition: Habituated infants exhibit a significant familiarity
preference during test.
Auditory Condition.
A mixed ANOVA (within subject: test trial type; between subject: habituation
group) again revealed a significant interaction between habituation and looking
across trial types, F(1, 24) = 11.03, p = 0.003 , η2 = 0.31. We also find a main effect
of habituation group, F(1,24) = 4.88, p = 0.037, η2 = 0.169, which is supported
by significantly longer looking by Non-Habituated infants overall during test,
t(24) = -2.72, p = 0.012, d = -1.11. There is no effect of test trial type, F(1, 25)
= 0.083, p = 0.78, η2 = 0.002. To follow up the interaction of test trial type and
habituation group, we investigated looking across trial types within Habituated
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Figure 4.4: Learning outcomes for the visual statistical learning condition.
and Non-Habituated infants.
We also found evidence for learning for Habituated infants in the Auditory
condition: they looked at the Novel trials for a mean of 5.16 seconds (SD = 1.6)
and to the Familiar test trials for 3.92 seconds (SD = 1.4; Figure 4.5). Paired t-tests
revealed a significant difference in looking time across these trial types, t(17) =
3.126, p = 0.006, d = 0.74. Non-parametric tests confirm this difference, (13 out of
18 infants showed bias towards the Novel trials, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, Z =
-2.68, p = 0.007). Thus, Habituated infants in the auditory modality also showed
evidence of learning with a significant novelty preference.
Examining Non-Habituated infants, we again found amarginally significant
difference in looking across test trials with an opposite direction of preference to
theHabituated infants: they looked at theNovel trials for amean of 5.88 seconds
(SD = 3.4) and at the Familiar trials for 6.93 seconds (SD = 3.0). A paired t-test
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Figure 4.5: Learning outcomes for the auditory statistical learning condition.
revealed a marginally significant difference between the two trial types, t(8) =
-2.20, p = 0.059, d = -0.33. Non-parametric tests also indicated a marginally sig-
nificant difference (8 out of 9 infants showed a Familiarity preference, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, Z = -1.96, p = 0.051). Thus, we find evidence for a significant
Novelty preference for Habituated infants in the Auditory condition and some
indication that Non-Habituated infants exhibit a familiarity preference.
4.3.3 Comparing Learning Across Perceptual Modalities
The goal of the current study is to compare SL across the visual and auditory
perceptual modalities in infancy. First, we aimed to directly investigate whether
learning in different perceptual modalities exhibits a similar pattern of prefer-
ence at test. To this end, mean looking times of Habituated infants were sub-
147
mitted to a mixed ANOVA (within subjects factor: novel vs. familiar test trials;
between subjects factor of perceptual modality: visual vs. auditory). This anal-
ysis revealed a main effect of Perceptual Modality, F(1, 33) = 11.68, p = 0.002, η2
= 0.26, and an interaction of Perceptual Modality and Test Trial Type, F(1, 33)
= 19.71, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.37 (Figure 4.6). Follow up independent sample t-tests
revealed that the main effect of modality is driven by longer looking, in general,
in the visual condition (M = 14.4 sec, SD = 5.9) than infants hearing auditory
sequences (M = 9.08 sec, SD = 2.4), equal variances not assumed, t(22.8) = -3.49,
p = 0.002, d = -1.18. This effect could be the result of the slower rate of presenta-
tion of the visual sequences. However, we only find marginally longer looking
at visual sequences during habituation. The interaction of perceptual modal-
ity and test trial type is likely driven by the opposite preferences at test across
perceptual modalities, with infants in the Visual modality showing a significant
familiarity preference and infants in the Auditory modality showing a signifi-
cant novelty preference. While this result suggests that infants do not respond
uniformly to statistical information across perceptual modalities, as evidenced
by the interaction of modality and test trial type, the significantly longer looking
at test by infants in the visual condition makes it difficult to use the raw looking
data to directly compare learning outcomes across modalities.
In order to control for the generally longer looking in the Visual modality, we
examined looking to Novel and Familiar test trials calculated as a proportion of
the total mean looking to both test trial types (Figure 4.7). Thus, any difference
in the proportion of looking to one trial type or another will not result from gen-
eral differences in the magnitude of looking across perceptual modalities. To
compare proportionate looking to Novel vs. Familiar test trials across modal-
ities, we again submitted the data for Habituated infants to a mixed ANOVA
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Figure 4.6: Looking to Novel and Familiar test trials for Habituated infants
perceiving visual and auditory sequences.
(within subject factor: trial type; between subjects: perceptual modality). We
found no significant main effect of PerceptualModality confirming that we have
controlled for the main effect of modality on looking time. However, we still
found a significant interaction of test trial type and perceptual modality, F(1, 33)
= 14.70, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.31 Follow up t-tests again confirmed that these results
are due to opposite, but significant, directions of preference at test (Visual: t(17)
= -2.70, p = 0.015, d = 1.28; Auditory: t(17) = 2.84, p = 0.011, d = 1.32). In sum,
we established that there are differences in preference at test across perceptual
modalities and differences at test do not stem from general differences in look-
ing at test across perceptual modalities.
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Figure 4.7: Proportion of looking time to novel and familiar test trials across
modalities. This analysis controlled for the general differences in looking time
between perceptual modalities and still revealed a significant modality by test
trial type interaction.
4.3.4 Magnitude of Learning Across Perceptual Modalities
Next, we aimed to consider whether themagnitude of learning is different when
infants receive auditory or visual statistical information. While SL studies typi-
cally discuss learning outcomes as a binary measure of learnability (yes vs. no),
the magnitude of learning, a continuous measure, could be considered as the
difference in looking between novel and familiar test trials. The assumption of
this measure is that better learning would result in greater differences in look-
ing across novel and familiar test trials and vice versa. Visual inspection of Fig-
ure 4.7 reveals a striking symmetry in difference in the distribution of looking
between test trial types. However, as established above, infants in the auditory
150
and visual modalities exhibit different directions of preference at test. Thus, we
cannot include directionality in a measure of the magnitude of learning. To this
end, we calculated a Difference Score (mean duration of looking to the Novel
- Familiar test trials) and a Proportionate Difference Score (mean proportion of
looking to the Novel -Familiar test trials) for each infant. We then took the ab-
solute value of these measures and used independent sample t-tests to compare
differences in looking across perceptual modalities in Habituated infants. We
found a marginally significant difference in the magnitude of learning for the
Absolute Difference Scores (visual: M = 2.79 seconds, SD = 1.9; auditory: M =
1.84, SD = 1.1 seconds; t(33) = -1.81, p = 0.08, d = 0.61). However, this measure
does not control for generally longer looking to visual test trials. We do not find
evidence for a difference inmagnitude of learning in the Absolute Proportionate
Difference Scores (visual: M = 0.201, SD = 0.12; auditory: M = 0.21, SD = 0.12;
t(33) = .221, p = 0.83, d = 0.074) suggesting that the generally longer looking to
Visual test trials could drive the marginal difference in the Absolute Difference
Score. Overall, these analyses suggest that there is no difference in the magni-
tude of learning across perceptual modalities when the direction of preference
is not taken into account and when generally longer looking to visual sequences
is accounted for.
4.3.5 Considering Learning Outcomes in Relation to Rate of
Presentation
One difficulty in comparing themagnitude of learning is the difference in rate of
presentation employed for visual (1 token/second) and auditory stimuli (2 to-
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kens/second). The rate of visual SL is consistent with previous studies in both
infants (Kirkham et al., 2002) and adults (Turk-Browne et al., 2005). An equiv-
alent rate of presentation for the auditory SL would be much slower than rates
previously reported in the literature (see Table 4.1). Moreover, recent results
with adult learners have suggested that auditory SL decreases with decreased
rate of presentation while the opposite is true for visual SL (Emberson et al.,
2011).
We sought to confirm that, in order to elicit SL, auditory and visual modali-
ties require presentations at different rates. To this end, we conducted a control
study using identical methods that presented the auditory SL stimuli at a rate
of 1 token/second, the equivalent rate to the visual condition. Fourteen infants
were included in the final sample with a mean age = 9.3 months (SD = 0.53).
Habituated infants (n = 9) looked at the Novel test trials forM = 6.1 seconds, SD
= 2.8 and at the Familiar trials for M = 5.9 seconds, SD = 1.1. Non-habituated
infants looked at the Novel test trials for M = 4.6 seconds, SD = 1.9, and at the
Familiar for M = 4.4 seconds, SD = 1.1. There was no evidence of learning for
habituated nor non-habituated infants in either parametric or non-parametric
tests (Habituated: 5 of 9 infants exhibited aNovelty preference,Wilcoxon signed
rank test, Z = -0.06, p > 0.9; t(8) = 0.2, p > 0.8, d = .14; Non-Habituated: 2 of 5
infants exhibited a Novelty preference, Wilcoxon Signed rank test, Z = -0.4, p
> 0.6; t(4) = 0.2, p > 0.8, d = 0.2). Thus, we find that there is no evidence of
learning for infants who receive auditory familiarization at the same rate of pre-
sentation as the visual familiarization (1 token/second). These results establish
the necessity to present auditory tokens at a faster rate of presentation than the
visual tokens in the current study.
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Next, we considered learning outcomes while controlling for differences in
rate of presentation by considering looking times in terms of the number of
stimuli perceived rather than amount of time. Because auditory and visual stim-
uli were presented at different rates (2 stimuli/second and 1 stimulus/second,
respectively) in order to elicit SL, infants in the Auditory condition perceived
double the number of tokens during the same amount of viewing time as an
infant in the Visual condition. In order to consider viewing time during habit-
uation in terms of number of tokens perceived, looking times for infants in the
Auditory condition were multiplied by two while the looking times remained
the same for the Visual condition.
Considering the number of tokens perceived during habituation, Habituated
infants in the Auditory condition perceived 150 tokens (75 bigrams, SD = 76
tokens) while infants in the Visual condition perceived 105 tokens (52.5 bigrams,
SD = 68 tokens). The difference in number of tokens perceived across perceptual
modalities was marginally significant (t(33) = 1.83, p = 0.076, d = 0.62). Non-
Habituated infants viewed significantly more tokens in the auditory than the
visual condition (Visual: M = 130 tokens, SD = 48; Auditory: M = 237 tokens,
SD = 80, unequal variances not assumed, t(11.5) = -3.6, p = 0.004, d = 1.62).
Next, we submitted number of tokens perceived during test by Habituated
infants to a mixed ANOVA with test trial type (novel vs. familiar) as a within
subject factor and modality as a between subject factor (Figure 4.8). This anal-
ysis revealed a main effect of modality, F(1, 33) = 4.32, p = 0.045, η2 = 0.12. In
contrast to the results based on looking times, this main effect is a result of in-
fants hearing more stimuli in the Auditory condition during test. We also find
a significant interaction of test trial type and modality F(1, 33) = 19.3, p < 0.001,
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Figure 4.8: Comparisons of looking times at test in terms of number of tokens
or stimuli perceived. This analysis is meant to control for differences in rate of
presentation.
η2 = 0.37. As before, this result is likely driven by differences in the direction of
preference across perceptual modalities at test.
Having controlled for the rate of presentation, we return to the question of
differences in magnitude of learning across modalities. Comparison of the ab-
solute value of the Difference in Tokens Perceived (mean tokens perceived for
the Novel - Familiar test trials) again revealed no difference in the magnitude
of learning, t(33) = 1.29, p = 0.21, d = 0.43. Thus, even while accounting for
differences in the number of tokens perceived during an equivalent amount of
looking time, we find no differences in the magnitude of learning across modal-
ities.
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4.3.6 Influence of Viewing Time during Habituation on Learn-
ing
Previous research has suggested that longer passive exposure to statistical reg-
ularities results in better learning (Gebhart, Aslin, & Newport, 2009; Thiessen
et al., 2005). As noted above, Non-Habituated infants viewed habituation stim-
uli for a longer period of time than Habituated infants and yet we found no
consistent evidence of SL in this group. We examined whether viewing time
influences SL in Habituated infants by correlating viewing time with Difference
scores–mean looking to novel – familiar test trials. While we found no signif-
icant influence of viewing time on learning for infants in the Visual condition
(n = 18, p > 0.5), we did find a significant positive correlation for infants in the
Auditory condition (r = 0.49, n = 17, p = 0.046, Figure 4.9). There is no relation-
ship between viewing time and Difference score for Non-Habituated infants nor
when pooling infants across Habituation groups. Thus, infants who look longer
during habituation tend towards a stronger novelty preference but only when
they heard statistical information in auditory sequences.
4.3.7 Influence of Age on Learning
We also examined whether age influenced learning outcomes in Habituated in-
fants. Again, we found no significant correlation between age and Difference
Score for infants in the Visual condition (r = 0.35, n = 18, p = 0.16) but there was
a marginally significant correlation of age with Difference Score, r = 0.58, n = 17,
p = 0.015, for infants in the Auditory condition with older infants exhibiting a
stronger Novelty preference (Figure 4.10). Examining infants in each modality
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Figure 4.9: Habituated infants in the auditory condition show a significant
correlation between viewing time during habituation (seconds) and Difference
Score with infants with longer looking times showing a stronger novelty
preference.
regardless of habituation status, we find a significant correlation of age and Dif-
ference score in the Auditory modality, r = 0.56, n = 26, p = 0.003, but again not
in the Visual modality, r = 0.03, p = 0.68.
Given that infants that have viewing time and age are both predictors of
learning outcomes in the Auditory condition, we tested whether there is a cor-
relation between age and viewing time. We find no significant correlation (r =
.30, n = 17, p = 0.24). Thus, we find that age and viewing time both positively
correlate with Difference Score, however, the lack of significant correlation be-
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Figure 4.10: Habituated infants in the auditory condition have a significant
correlation between Difference Score and their age with older infants exhibited
a significant Novelty preference and younger infants exhibiting no significant
learning.
tween these two factors suggests that the effect of age is not attributable to an
effect of age on viewing time.
To further investigate the relationship between age and learning, we per-
formed amedian split of the group of Habituated infants in the Auditorymodal-
ity. Infants in this group have a median age of 9.3 months. Thus, younger infants
are 9.3 months and younger, and older infants, older than 9.3 months. We then
tested whether these groups show evidence of learning (significant difference
in looking in seconds to novel and familiar test trials). Younger infants show no
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evidence of learning in parametric (t(8) = 0.88, p = 0.41, d = 0.39) and nonpara-
metric tests (5 of the 9 infants exhibited a novely bias, Z = -0.77, p = 0.44). Older
infants did show evidence of learning in both types of tests (all 8 infants have a
novelty bias, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, Z = -2.5, p = 0.012; t(7) = 4.9, p = 0.002,
d = 1.37; Figure 4.11). Thus, we found that auditory SL younger infants in our
sample do not learn under current conditions while older infants do.
To compare these results to younger infants in the Visual condition, we cre-
ated a group of younger infants using the same measures as for the Auditory
modality. We found that in the Visual condition, infants aged 9.3 months and
younger are able to learn as measured by both parametric and non-parametric
tests (t(11) = -3.89, p = 0.003, d = -0.98; 11 of 12 infants showed a familiarity
preference, Z = -2.82, p = 0.005; Figure 4.11). We found no significant differ-
ence in viewing time across modalities at this age, in seconds (t(19) = -1.11, p
= 0.28, d = -0.51) or in number of tokens perceived (t(19) = 1.10, p = 0.29, d =
0.48. Thus, we found evidence that younger infants, from the current sample,
are able to learn in the visual but not the auditory modalities under the same
learning conditions. Additional analyses revealed no differences in Difference
scores by Experimental location, Gender, Bigram order or Test Trial order in
either modality condition.
4.4 Discussion
We compared statistical learning of auditory and visual stimuli in infants aged
8- to 10-months. To our knowledge, this is the first comparison of statistical
learning across perceptual modalities in infancy. There are three main findings:
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Figure 4.11: Examination of statistical learning of infants 9.3 months and
younger across perceptual modalities.
1) overall, the magnitude of statistical learning is equivalent across perceptual
modalities; 2) however, we find evidence for an earlier availability of statistical
learning in the visual modality; and 3) althoughwe find evidence for learning in
both modalities, infants exhibit different directions of preference at test depend-
ing on modality of exposure. Taken together, these findings suggest that while
the mechanisms supporting statistical learning are domain-general, they are not
amodal and abstract, instead, they are sensitive to perceptual identification of
statistical information. In addition, there is evidence that statistical learning is
not developmentally invariant. Specifically, we find auditory SL changes with
age and some evidence for earlier availability in the visual modality for the cur-
rent paradigm. However, we find no evidence for changes in visual SL for the
age range investigated. Thus, these results suggest differences in developmental
trajectories of SL across perceptual modalities. Here, we discuss these findings
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in more detail.
4.4.1 Evidence for Statistical Learning with Faces
To compare SL across auditory and visual modalities, we employed perceptu-
ally complex, biologically-relevant, and familiar stimuli: faces and speech, re-
spectively. While previous studies have found auditory SL using speech stimuli
(e.g., Saffran et al., 1996), the current results are the first evidence of SL in a
stream of faces. This is an impressive ability given the complexity as well as
the perceptual similarity of these stimuli: all faces were novel, smiling, Cau-
casian female faces (Figure 4.1). Moreover, after the first half of the first post-
natal year, infants have developed specialized processing for faces (vs. other
objects: De Haan & Nelson, 1999; vs. other race faces: Kelly et al., 2007). Thus,
we find that despite having specialized perceptual processing of faces, infants
are still sensitive to the statistical information across face presentations. 2
4.4.2 Comparing Auditory and Visual SL
Current results indicate both similarities and differences in statistical learning
from auditory and visual stimuli. In general, we find evidence that the magni-
2The current study employed all Caucasian faces, and while the majority of infants were
also Caucasian, infants were recruited from multiple races. Despite evidence for perceptual
narrowing for “other race” faces for infants in our age range, we have no evidence that this had
an impact on our results. Exposure to non-native faces preserves discrimination abilities to 9
months (Pascalis et al., 2005). Infants were recruited from Ithaca and surrounding areas and
from the outlying areas of Syracuse. The 2006 Census Bureau (2007a, 2007b) reported that all of
these areas have a high proportion of Caucasian residents. Thus, infants will have had sufficient
perceptual experiencewith Caucasian faces suggesting that perceptual narrowingwould not yet
have occurred.
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tude of learning does not differ across perceptual modalities. This result holds
even after controlling for generally longer looking at visual stimuli at test and
for differences in the rate of stimulus presentation required to elicit learning in
auditory vs. visual modalities. Thus, overall, it does not appear as if infants
show a stronger ability to differentiate novel and familiar test trials in one per-
ceptual modality over another. This is a notably different result from studies
with adult learners where we find that auditory SL tends to be greater than vi-
sual SL given similar experimental conditions (Conway & Christiansen, 2005;
Emberson et al., 2011; Saffran, 2002). Thus, we find evidence for a different
pattern of SL across perceptual modalities for infants and adults. This suggests
changes in the mechanisms of SL with development and a possible interrela-
tionship between perceptual experience and SL.
4.4.3 Superiority of visual SL in younger infants
We found a significant correlation between age and learning in auditory SL.
Specifically, we find that infants younger than 9.3 months show no evidence of
learning in the auditory modality but show robust learning in the visual modal-
ity. There was no difference in viewing time across modality conditions, in
either seconds or tokens, for younger infants. These results suggests greater
efficacy of visual SL prior to 9.3 months.
Thus, we find that the youngest infants, tested in the current study, have the
opposite pattern of learning ability across visual and auditory modalities than
what has been established in adults. Why we find evidence that visual SL is
superior to auditory SL at this stage of development is an important question
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for future investigation. One possibility has to do with differences in visual in-
put across development. The differences in auditory and visual processing have
been conceptualized using an auditory:visual::temporal:spatial analogy where
auditory information is preferentially processed in relation to temporal impor-
tant and visual information is preferentially processed in relation to spatial in-
formation. There is evidence that this analogy applies to auditory and visual SL.
Saffran (2002) and Conway and Christiansen (2009) found that including spatial
information in visual input increased visual SL. This effect is intuitive as visual
input is often spatially arrayed and suggests some correspondence between the
nature of perceptual input and statistical learning abilities. Many studies have
found auditory superiority in learning when SL streams are presented sequen-
tially in both modalities (see Emberson et al., 2011, for an in-depth discussion
on the relationship between spatial and temporal processing in auditory and
visual SL). However, recent work has shown that the pattern of visual input is
markedly different for infants. Smith et al. (2011) placed head-mounted cameras
on infants aged 17 to 19 months and their caregivers while they played with a
number of objects (see Figure 4.12). Relevant to the current work, they found
that the infants field of viewwas often dominated by single objects in succession
while the adults field of view often contained visual information from a num-
ber of objects. Thus, compared to adults, the infants everyday visual input may
be similar to the visual sequences presented in the current study: sequential
presentations of single objects. One possibility is that visual SL abilities in the
current type of paradigm shift as visual input shifts from infant to adult views.
The visual SL superiority effect in younger infants is supported by the lack of
learning in the auditory modality (see Figure 4.11). Previous studies have found
statistical learning in the auditory modality at ages younger than 9 months (e.g.,
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measure of how the child’s own activity selects visual
information. These, then, are the principal dependent
measures in the following analyses.
Figure 2 shows the frame-by-frame changes in the
head camera image sizes of the three objects for one dyad
for one trial. For this figure, size for each object is cal-
culated in terms of the proportion of pixels in the image
that belong to each of the three toys. Also shown is the
proportion of the image taken up by body parts (faces
and hands of both participants in aggregate as these are
not discriminated in the automatic coding). The pattern
shown in the figure is characteristic of all dyads on all
trials and is the main result. The toddler view is one in
which, at any one moment, one toy is much larger than
the other toys in the image and the largest object in the
image changes often. In contrast, the parent view is
broad, stably containing all three objects, with each
taking up a fairly constant and small portion of the head
camera field.
Statistics of the sizes of objects calculated over all
dyads show the same pattern. Over all head camera
frames, the toys took up three times as much area in the
child’s head camera image as in the parent’s head camera
image (M = .15 versus .05, t(18) = 8.78, p < .001) which
means that the toys were closer to the toddlers’ heads
and eyes than to the parents’ heads and eyes. Moreover,
the two sitting arrangements for parents did not differ
(t(8) = 0.711; p > .491) on this (or any other) measure.
Finally, the average proportion of the head camera image
occupied by body parts (faces and hands) was small (.05)
and was the same for both parents and children.
Dominating objects
A visual world in which one object is often closer to the
sensors than others is a form of selection, potentially
reducing competition among scene objects for attention
and processing. Accordingly, our first measures of
selectivity asked whether there was a ‘dominating object’
in the child and parent views, with the dominating object
defined in terms of its relative size, that is, as being the
largest – and thus closest to the sensors – compared to
the other in-view objects. More specifically, each frame
was defined as having a single dominating object if the
size of one object was at least twice the combined size of
all other objects (or object fragments). Only .08 of the
frames from the parent view but .30 of the frames from
the child view had a single dominating object; thus,
substantially more toddler views were dominated by a
single object than were parent views, both when parents
sat on chairs (t(8) = 5.48, p < .001) and when parents sat
on the floor (t(8) = 4.86, p < .005). These differences
were calculated in terms of proportions of all frames;
however, sometimes children were ‘off-task’ – not playing
with the toys and not looking at the table top but rather
looking at the ceiling camera, the door, the floor, or the
parent’s face. Specifically, for .21 of the frames there was
no object in the child’s view, compared with .07 of the
adult view frames. If we exclude all the no-object frames
from consideration, then the difference between the child
and parent head camera images in terms of a dominating
object is even larger (.38 of children’s head camera
frames are characterized by one dominating object
whereas only .09 of parent head camera frames are). In
sum, the adult view includes and is equal distance from
all of the objects on the table top; but in marked con-
trast, the child’s view often contains one dominating
object that is closer to the head and eye and thus often
blocks the view of the other objects.
Figure 3 provides converging evidence for these con-
clusions. Here we define the dominating object as sim-
ply the largest of the three objects (that is, as having a
head camera size that is greater than .33 of the total
size of all three objects combined). Figure 3 shows a
histogram of the proportion of all frames with objects
in view in which the dominating object dominates the
other objects by varying degrees (beginning at .33 when
three objects are all in view and roughly the same size).
Several aspects of these results are noteworthy. First, a
dominating object constitutes 100% of the size of the
Figure 2 Time series of the changing dominance of the objects in the head camera images from child and parent dyad. The figures
show proportion of the head camera field (size of object in terms of pixels relative to the size of the whole head camera image) taken
up by each of the three toy objects and by hands in the images from the child camera and the parent camera. The changing frame-by-
frame sizes of the three toy objects (red, green and blue) are indicated by the corresponding colored lines. The yellow line indicates
the proportion of the field that is images of exposed body parts (combined mother and child hands and faces). The text provides
aggregate statistics across all participating dyads.
12 Linda B. Smith et al.
! 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Figure 4.12: Top Panel: A child’s (left) and their caregiver’s (right) point of
view for the same event. Pictures from Chen Yu, Indiana University. Bottom
Panel: A time series of the visual input for a child-caregiver dyad (left and
right, respectively). The proportion of the field of view occupied by individual
objects (green, red, blue) and body parts (yellow) is shown for each time point.
From Smith et al. (2011).
.
Saffra et al., 1996; Aslin et al., 1998; Thiessen t al., 2005). Infants who abitu-
ated in the Auditory condition heard, on average, 150 syllables (SD = 76 tokens).
This is equivalent to 75 bigrams, or 25 presentations of each bigram. Comparing
this am unt of exposure to prev ous studies in this age range, we find that stud-
ies eliciting evidence for auditory SL employed a greater repetition of stimuli
(Saffran et al., 1996; Pelucchi et al., 2009, Table 4.1). These studies also presented
auditory stimuli at a faster rate of presentation. Either of these factors could
explain why we fail to find auditory SL in younger infants. Notably, Thiessen
et al. (2005) employed a similar rate of presentation and amount of exposure
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and they found no evidence of learning. Thus, given a comparison with previ-
ous studies, it is not surprising that auditory SL was not successful for younger
infants.
It is notable that older infants can learn in the auditory modality given the
same experimental conditions under which younger infants cannot. These re-
sults strongly suggest that auditory SL is not developmentally invariant. A
developmental shift in auditory SL of speech stimuli around 9 months is sig-
nificant given the important changes in language processing occurring at this
age (e.g., Bates, Bretherton, & Snyder, 1998). Thus, SL abilities as pertaining
to speech stimuli may be inter-related to current language processing abilities:
with SL supporting new language abilities and previous language knowledge
further supporting increased SL abilities. Knowledge that speech tends to be
structured by relevant and reliable statistical information might support greater
engagement of learning mechanisms (for examples for this concept in the word
learning literature see Smith, 2000). It is important for future research to exam-
ine whether a similar developmental shift is found in non-speech stimuli and
whether this shift is related to individual developmental trajectories of language
abilities.
4.4.4 Opposite Direction of Preference for Auditory and Visual
SL
Another notable difference between visual and auditory SL is the direction of
preference for test stimuli: infants receiving visual tokens exhibited a signif-
3Exposure was calculated per unit of structure (i.e. each word as in Saffran et al., 1996; each
bigram in the current study; each bigram or trigram in Thiessen et al., 2005)
164
Ta
bl
e
4.
1:
C
om
pa
ri
so
n
of
R
at
e
an
d
Ex
po
su
re
ac
ro
ss
A
ud
ito
ry
SL
st
ud
ie
s
St
ud
y
A
ge
(m
on
th
s)
R
at
e
(m
s)
Ex
po
su
re
3
O
ut
co
m
e
C
ur
re
nt
9.
1
50
0
25
Le
ar
ni
ng
gr
ea
te
rt
ha
n
9.
4
m
on
th
s
Th
ie
ss
en
,H
ill
&
Sa
ff
ra
n,
20
05
8
40
0
24
N
o
le
ar
ni
ng
fo
r
A
D
sp
ee
ch
Sa
ff
ra
n,
A
sl
in
&
N
ew
po
rt
,1
99
6
8
22
2
45
Le
ar
ni
ng
Pe
lu
cc
hi
,H
ay
&
Sa
ff
ra
n,
20
09
8.
5
16
7
45
Le
ar
ni
ng
165
icant familiarity preference while those receiving auditory tokens exhibited a
significant novelty preference. While novelty preferences are more common,
familiarity preferences have been reported in previous SL and related studies
(auditory SL: Saffran & Thiessen, 2003; Thiessen et al., 2005; auditory word
segmentation: Jusczyk & Aslin, 1995). Studies reporting a familiarity prefer-
ence have argued that a systematic preference, rather than a particular direction
of preference, is the essential evidence for learning (Saffran & Thiessen, 2003;
Thiessen et al., 2005). Thus, we interpret both the visual familiarity preference
and the auditory novelty preference as evidence of SL.
However, opposite directions of preference emerging from largely similar
experimental methodologies does suggest differences in auditory and visual SL.
Moreover, the few previous investigations of visual SL in infancy have consis-
tently reported novelty preferences (Kirkham et al., 2002; Fiser & Aslin, 2002).
We examine three possible explanations for this result and their implications for
the underlying mechanisms of this learning ability: 1) visual SL is more difficult
than auditory SL; 2) there is an inherent familiarity preference to faces for this
age range; 3) distinct cognitive mechanisms support SL across modalities.
The most common interpretation of direction of preference is based on
Hunter and Ames (1988) where a familiarity preference precedes a novelty pref-
erence during stimulus encoding. According to this model, the same cognitive
mechanism can give rise to different directions of preference based on the diffi-
culty of the task. There is evidence that this model might explain directions of
preference in SL tasks: Thiessen et al. (2005) found a familiarity preference in
an auditory SL experiment (Exp.1), but elicited a novelty effect by making the
task easier through increasing both the age of their sample and the amount of
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exposure they received (Exp.2).
An explanation for the current results based on the Hunter and Ames model
would imply that visual SL was harder than auditory SL because we found a
familiarity effect for the visual condition and a novelty effect for the auditory
condition. Thus, if a single mechanisms underlies both visual and auditory SL,
this mechanism would have to have decreased efficacy for visual SL compared
to auditory SL to result in different directions of preference.
However, examination of the magnitude of learning suggests a different pic-
ture: we found that the magnitude of learning is equivalent across modalities
even after accounting for differences in rate of presentation suggesting no dif-
ferences in the efficacy of learning. Thus, the application of the Hunter and
Ames model to explain the different directions of preference is difficult to rec-
oncile with results suggesting a similar magnitude of learning across perceptual
modalities. 4
A second possibility is that specialized processing of faces at this age drives
a familiarity preference. We employed auditory and visual stimuli that are both
subject to substantial developmental changes in the first post-natal year facili-
tated by perceptual experience (speech and faces). It is possible that SL is af-
fected by the specialized processing of these stimuli resulted in differences in
learning mechanisms. The present study is the first to investigate SL with faces.
Studies of similar age ranges suggest that a novelty preference is more com-
mon for face processing after the first half of the first post-natal year. However,
4It is important to note that the number of stimuli perceived during habituation was greater
for infants in the auditory modality. The Hunter and Ames model also assumes that greater
exposure results in deeper encoding and thus an increased likelihood of a novelty preference.
However, this explanation is still inconsistent with the magnitude of learning results as the
magnitude of learning is not different even when considering looking times in terms of the
number of stimuli perceived.
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Lewis (1969) found that infants at 9 months of age show a familiarity preference
for typical faces as opposed to scrambled or Cyclops faces. The visual schema of
a face could be viewed as a learned structure supported by the visual statistics
of face components and thus infants preferred stimuli that conform to familiar
statistics rather than novel face-like stimuli that violate this structure. Thus a
possible explanation for the visual (face) SL familiarity preference is that infants
prefer familiar sequential statistics of faces in the same way that infants prefer
the structural statistics of typical faces. Future studies would be needed to fur-
ther investigate whether infants have a preference for familiar statistics for face
stimuli in general.
A third possibility is that visual and auditory SL are supported by distinct
mechanisms. This is an important area of future study as very little is known
about the mechanisms underlying SL across perceptual modalities. Since previ-
ous research has not established that visual and auditory SL are supported by
the same neural mechanisms, many alternative possibilities exist. However,
a number of studies suggest the possibility is that visual SL is more reliant
on the hippocampus to bind across successive visual experiences while audi-
tory SL does not depend upon this learning system. Familiarity preferences
are consistently reported in studies examining relational memory for complex
visual stimuli. For example, Richmond and Nelson (2009) showed 9-month-
olds faces paired with scenes. During test, infants saw the same scenes paired
with three faces: the one previously paired with this scene and two were fa-
miliar but not previously paired with this scene. Infants preferentially looked
at the face previously paired with the scene (see also Rose, Gottfried, Melloy-
Carminar, & Bridger, 1982). A similar familiarity preference is also reported
in adults. Moreover, a lack of familiarity preference in MTL amnesiacs sug-
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gests that this task is supported by the hippocampus (Hannula, Ryan, Tranel, &
Cohen, 2007). Relatedly, neuroimaging studies in adults have established that
visual SL is supported in part by activity in the hippocampus (Turk-Browne et
al., 2009, 2010) consistent with the role of this learning system in binding across
experiences to support integrated memory (Amso, Davidson, Johnson, Glover,
& Casey, 2005; Shohamy & Wagner, 2008). While the hippocampus has been
implicated in some areas of language learning (e.g. word-meaning mappings;
Rodrı´guez-Fornells, Cunillera, Mestres-Misse´, & Diego-Balaguer, 2009), it has
not been implicated in auditory SL even in participants as young as 6 years of
age. Instead, auditory SL appears to be supported by regions in the temporal,
frontal and dorsal parietal cortices with changes over development (McNealy,
Mazziotta, & Dapretto, 2006, 2010; McNealy et al., in press). Thus, support of
visual and auditory SL by different neural mechanisms could explain the differ-
ent directions of preference at test and differences in developmental trajectory.
Moreover, if visual SL with complex stimuli is more reliant on the hippocam-
pus, as outlined here, the familiarity preference in visual SL is more consistent
with relational memory tasks which also rely on the hippocampus.
4.4.5 Exposure vs. Attention during Habituation
To our knowledge, this is the first study of auditory SL to use infant controlled-
habituation. Previous studies have used fixed habituation: a methodology that
allows for all infants to receive the same amount of exposure to the statistical
regularities regardless of directed attention or an infants habituation status and
preferences. Having used infant-controlled methodologies in both modalities,
we were able to examine the inter-relation of amount of exposure to statistical
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regularities or viewing time during habituation, the reaching of the habituation
criterion and SL across perceptual modalities. We found that Non-Habituated
infants show only marginal evidence of learning in both modalities (and again
with different directions of preference). This result is notable because infants
who did not habituate looked significantly longer during habituation and thus
received greater exposure to the statistical information than Habituated infants.
This finding suggests that statistical learning may not simply be driven by cu-
mulative, passive exposure (i.e. greater exposure to statistical information re-
sults in more SL). Instead, directed attention and, relatedly, habituation play an
important role in infants SL abilities. This result is consistent with an emerging
view that overt looking, measured in amount of time looking, is not a direct
measure of attention in infancy (see M. Johnson, Posner, & Rothbart, 1994, for
a dissociation of eye gaze and attention in 4-month-old infants). Moreover, this
finding parallels emerging evidence that adult learners benefit and perhaps re-
quire attention to stimuli endowed with statistical information in order to learn
(Emberson et al., 2011; Toro et al., 2005; Turk-Browne et al., 2005; however, see
Saffran et al., 1997).
We also found a correlation between viewing time during habituation and
difference scores–infants who looked longer tended to have a stronger novelty
preference–only for Habituated infants and only for those receiving auditory
experience. This result also suggests that habituation, rather than amount of
exposure, supports SL in infants. However, it is surprising to find no parallel
relationship in the visual modality. Future research is required to more clearly
investigate the relationship between directed attention and learning across per-
ceptual modalities.
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Modality-Specific Effects of Rate of Presentation on SL. We found that when
auditory and visual streams are presented at the same rate (1 stimulus/second),
there is evidence of visual learning only. However, when auditory stimuli are
presented at double the rate (2 stimuli/second), we find clear evidence for au-
ditory learning. The same interrelationship between rate and auditory SL has
been reported in adult learners (Emberson et al., 2011). Moreover, Arciuli and
Simpson (2011) a constant effect of rate in visual SL with age in children. In
other words, they find that the effect of rate does not interact with effects of age.
While more systematic studies are required, these findings suggest that the in-
teraction of perceptual modality with presentation rate and subsequently SL are
conserved throughout development. If learning across perceptual modalities
were indeed constrained to different rates of informational input, this would
provide a modality-specific bias on the patterns that can be learned given a
given type of perceptual input (e.g. faces vs. speech).
In sum, previous research has suggested that SL is mediated by an abstract,
amodal, developmentally-invariant mechanism. Such a view would predict
that statistical learning would be equivalent both across perceptual modalities
and over developmental time. We report the first evidence that auditory and vi-
sual SL outcomes are not identical even in the same learning paradigm: there are
differences in the direction of preference across modalities and the relationship
between viewing time and learning outcomes. Moreover, results suggest the
presence of different developmental trajectories in SL across modalities: first,
visual SL is more robust than auditory SL before 9.3 months; second, only audi-
tory SL shows a positive correlation with age. Finally, the relationship between
learning outcomes across vision and audition consistently differs from the pat-
tern observed in adults. Future research needs to establish what experience or
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maturational changes support shifts in the pattern of learning, however, there
is some suggestion that changes in learning could mirror concurrent changes in
cognitive development (i.e. changes in auditory SL at 9 months) and perceptual
input (i.e. differences in visual input from infancy to adulthood). Overall, the
current study presents a novel view on the mechanisms that support the ability
to learn from structure in the environment: incidental statistical learning abil-
ities in infancy are intertwined with perception, attention, and other cognitive
abilities.
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CHAPTER 5
INVARIANCE FROM VARIABILITY: THE MEDIAL TEMPORAL LOBE
SUPPORTS CHANGES IN OBJECT PERCEPTION
The content of this chapter is currently under review and was written with Dr.
Dima Amso at Brown University. See Emberson and Amso (in preparation).
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Weused a combined fMRI/eye-tracking approach to examine themech-
anisms involved in learning from visual experience to segment a novel,
occluded object in a scene. Previous research has suggested a role
for effective visual sampling and prior experience in the development
of mature object perception. However, it remains unknown how the
naı¨ve system integrates across variable experiences to induce percep-
tual change. We generated a Target Scene in which a novel occluded
Target Object could be perceived as either disconnected or completed.
We presented one group of participants with this image in concert with
variable but regular visual experience: three Paired Scenes consisting of
the same Target Object in variable locations, orientations, and states of
occlusion. A control group was presented with similar Paired Scenes
that did not incorporate the Target Object. We found that, relative to
the control group, participants in the Training condition were signifi-
cantly more likely to change their percept from “disconnected” to “com-
pleted”, as indexed by pre- and post-test performance. In addition, gaze
patterns during Target Scene inspection differed as a function of regu-
lar, variable object exposure. Our neuroimaging findings provide com-
pelling evidence that the hippocampus, together with the ventral visual
pathway, is involved in binding across variable visual experiences to ul-
timately engage effective sampling and perceptual change. We propose
a role of these mechanisms in catalyzing perceptual development
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5.1 Introduction
The mechanisms of object perception and recognition have received consider-
able scientific attention. Discovery in this domain holds substantial promise for
informing one of the most important questions in cognitive and brain sciences:
How do we construct and act on an enduring representation of the external
environment? There are a variety of research avenues and levels of analysis
appropriate for addressing this question; they span everything from the size of
receptive fields along visual pathways to philosophical discussions about the
origins of object concepts. Here we focus on mechanisms of information ac-
quisition. Research into the development of object perception suggests a role
for both effective sampling and prior experience in mature object perception.
This work exposes the mechanistic nature of the interaction between sampling
and integrating across variable experiences during learning to segment a novel
object.
A hallmark of visual object processing is perceptual completion: the percep-
tion of an occluded object as a complete whole despite visual evidence to the
contrary. A series of studies have determined a role for developing sampling,
via selective attention, mechanisms in the emergence of this skill (Amso & John-
son, 2006; Schlesinger, Amso, & Johnson, 2007). Sampling may serve to support
the extraction of object feature correlations in the service of efficient percep-
tion and recognition (Bhatt & Quinn, 2011). Previous research has found that
3-month-olds who indicated perceptual completion of an occluded object also
targeted scans and fixations to the object parts in an otherwise cluttered scene
(S. Johnson, Slemmer, & Amso, 2004). Similarly, infants gaze patterns to faces
are related to their ability to discriminate facial emotions (Amso, Fitzgerald,
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Davidow, Gilhooly, & Tottenham, 2010). While it is possible that an active per-
cept drives sampling in these studies, it has been demonstrated that infants who
provide evidence of perceiving occluded object unity also showed evidence for
visual search behavior indicative of attention-guided eye movements (Amso &
Johnson, 2006). This was taken as evidence that sampling may precede unity
perception. Moreover, neuronal firing in the frontal eye fields, central to visual
sampling, has been shown to precede firing in regions that contribute to object
recognition, namely inferotemporal cortex (Monosov, Sheinberg, & Thompson,
2010). In spite of this evidence, the findings from the naı¨ve infant system re-
main correlational and a question key to the development of object perception
and recognition remains open. How does the visual system learn what to sam-
ple in variable and cluttered scenes?
Clues are offered from literatures that suggest that visual experience also
plays an essential role in the development of object perception (E. J. Gibson,
1969; Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004). Infants as young as 4.5 months can
use variable visual experience with an object to segment a novel visual scene
(Needham, Dueker, & Lockhead, 2005; Needham & Modi, 1999). Similarly, the
adult visual system can develop sophisticated visual processing of a novel class
of complex objects with a short training period both behaviorally (Gauthier &
Tarr, 1997) and neurally (Gauthier et al., 1999). Hence, visual experience ar-
guably supports successive object perception starting early in development and
continuing across the lifespan.
The efficacy of learning from experience must in part rely on a mechanism
that integrates across multiple, variable experiences of an object or class of ob-
jects. Hypothetically, such an integration process would require memory of pre-
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vious episodes related to the current experience, as well as a process of binding
these related instances to form a lasting knowledge structure. Previous research
has found that both the basal ganglia and the hippocampus are involved in
learning across successive visual experiences (Amso et al., 2005; Turk-Browne
et al., 2009). While there is extensive work suggesting that the hippocampus is
involved in creating discrete memories (e.g., Atallah et al., 2004; McNaughton
& Nadel, 1989), there is also evidence suggesting that the hippocampus is in-
volved in integrating across memories or experiences with overlapping input at
the point of encoding (e.g. Shohamy & Wagner, 2008). Such integration and
binding could support learning from successive, variable experience to change
object perception.
An important consideration is how similar two learning episodes must be
to be bound by a learning mechanism. Invariance is an important property
of the visual system whereby objects are recognized as the same, independent
of changes in perceptual information such as scale, location, and orientation
(Deco & Rolls, 2004; Desimone, 1991; Rolls, 1992, 2000). This is a well-studied
phenomenon that involves the entire ventral visual pathway (V1, V2, V4, and
inferotemporal cortex or IT). Along this pathway, IT neuronal firing has been
found to most highly correlate with conscious perception (Blake & Logothetis,
2002; Leopold & Logothetis, 1999) and to show various degrees of invariance
to image transformations (Hasselmo, Rolls, Baylis, & Nalwa, 1989; Ito, Tamura,
Fujita, & Tanaka, 1995; Kobatake & Tanaka, 1994; Op De Beeck & Vogels, 2000;
Tovee, Rolls, & Azzopardi, 1994; Booth & Rolls, 1998).
Inferotemporal cortex is highly connected to medial temporal lobe (MTL) re-
gions, including the hippocampus and parahippocampal cortex. Indeed, it has
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recently been proposed that the MTL is involved in visual perception (Baxter,
2009; Ison & Quiroga, 2008; also see Suzuki, 2009). For example, research has
suggested that the MTL has a role in the encoding of object identity (Quiroga,
Reddy, Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 2005). Moreover, single cell recordings from
epilepsy patients have shown that there are category-specific neurons in the
MTL (Fried, MacDonald, & Wilson, 1997; Kreiman, Koch, & Fried, 2000). That
is, they respond to visual stimuli from categories of animals or places, for ex-
ample. Such invariant representations may be linked to the process of forming
associations between variable views of the same object. Alternatively, these cat-
egories may be a by-product of the binding process. Support for the latter comes
from modeling work by Deco and Rolls (2004).
Using the principle of trace learning, a version of Hebbian learning, they
showed that different views of an object that occur close together in time are
associated or bound. Trace learning generated invariant neuronal responses to
different transforms of an object.
We used a training paradigm with combined functional neuroimaging
(fMRI)/eye-tracking methods in adults to provide insight into the mechanisms
of successful online sampling and integration across variable visual experiences.
In an effort to mimic the naı¨ve visual experience, we tested adults on whether
variable but regular exposure to a novel visually occluded object, embedded in
varying scenes, would support change from perceiving the object as two discon-
nected parts to perceiving it as one occluded whole (i.e. the Training condition).
In the Control condition, the same Target Scene is paired with equally complex
images that did not include the varying exposure to the novel object (see Figure
5.1).
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Target Scene 
Training Condition 
Paired Scenes provide 
Variable Exposure 
Control Condition 
Paired Scenes without  
Additional Exposure 
Figure 5.1: Visual Stimuli Employed in this Study. While the same Target Scene
was employed across conditions, the Paired Scenes varied across condition. In
the Training condition, the Paired Scenes included the Target Object in varying
positions, orientations etc. (left panel), while the Control condition included
Paired Scenes that were equally complex but did not include the Target Object
(right panel).
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This study examines the role of sampling and experiential integration in per-
ceptual change. Based on previous research, we predict that efficient sampling,
supported by fronto-parietal circuitry, will support change in object perception,
perhaps through the extraction of feature correlations. Furthermore, we fur-
ther predict that this sampling will be driven by effective use of regular variable
exposure, as indicated by involvement of the ventral visual pathway and the
MTL.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Behavioral Efficacy of Training
A total of 61 participants composed the final sample. Behavioral participants
were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (Training condition N = 20,
Control condition N = 20) during passive viewing. Scanner subjects partici-
pated only in the Training condition (an additional N = 21). Both conditions
provided equal presentation of the identical Target Scene. In the Training con-
dition, however, the Target Object was repeated in each of the three additional,
Paired Scenes, in various locations, orientations, and states of occlusion (see
Figure 5.1).
Each participant’s percept of the Target image was tested before and after
exposure training. All participants were asked to indicate their perception by
coloring the black and white scenes. This task allowed participants to report
their exact perception without time constraints or ambiguity in their verbal re-
sponses. All participants included in the analyses reported an initial “discon-
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!"#
B) 
Perceiver 
Non-Perceiver 
Figure 5.2: Two Sample Percepts of the Target Scene. Scenes were colored by
participants such that the same object in the scene is colored the same color.
The scene in panel A) depicts what would be classified as a disconnected
percept, specifically, where the two surfaces that comprise the novel object are
colored two separate colors. B) This scene would be classified as a connected
percept because both surfaces that comprise the novel object are colored the
same color depicts the object as completed behind the occluder (colored in blue
in this scene).
nected” percept where the two surfaces of the novel object are colored as two
separate objects and not as a single, occluded whole. We used two separate
indices of post-exposure performance, a verbal and coloring task, to reliably
group participants either into Perceiver or Non-Perceiver groups. Perceivers
identified the Target Object during both tasks as complete–a change from their
initial “disconnected” percept–while Non-Perceivers persisted in their initial
disconnected percept (Figure 5.2).
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Training with variable regular exposure to the Target Object is an effective means
of driving perceptual change; that is participants in the Training condition were more
likely to be Perceivers than those in the Control condition. In the Training condi-
tion, 65% were Perceivers while 35%were Non-Perceivers. In contrast, the Con-
trol condition yielded only 20% Perceivers while 80% remained Non-Perceivers
(Figure 5.3). A Pearson chi-squared test with two factors (Condition: Train-
ing vs. Control) and (Group: Perceiver vs. Non-Perceiver) established a non-
uniform distribution across Conditions: χ2(1, N = 40) = 8.29, p < 0.005. Thus,
we can conclude that our training was successful. Repeated viewing of the Tar-
get Object, in variable orientations, locations, and states of occlusion, resulted
in successful change in perception of the occluded Target Object from broken
to complete. Moreover, it suggests that repeating the same Target Scene in iso-
lation, as in the Control condition, is not sufficient to power such a perceptual
shift. Repeating this analysis with neuroimaging participants included does not
change the rejection of the null hypothesis, χ2(1, N = 59) = 7.11, p < 0.01. An
additional chi-squared test, including factors of Group and Location, revealed
no differences in the distribution of Perceivers vs. Non-Perceivers inside vs.
outside the scanner, χ2 (1, N = 39) 1.232, p = 0.267.
5.2.2 Eye Movement Patterns
Regularity in the Training condition biases looking to the object parts. We parsed
the Target Scene into four areas of interest (AOIs) and considered patterns of
looking to those AOIs (Figure 5.4) as a function of exposure condition. The
Control condition was only tested behaviorally in the lab. In order to meet the
assumptions of equal Ns per condition, we included only data collected in the
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Figure 5.3: Percentage of Perceivers to Non-Perceivers in the Training and
Control Conditions. Perceivers identified the Target Object during both tasks
as complete, while Non-Perceivers identified it as disconnected. Chi squared
statistics support a difference in the distribution of Perceivers and
Non-Perceivers across these conditions.
lab for this comparison. Table 5.1 presents the proportion of looking for each
AOI for all participants. We conducted a proportion of fixation duration (see
Eye Tracking Preprocessing section below) per Target Scene AOI 4 (Object-1,
Object-2, Occluder, and Background, Figure 5.4) x Exposure Interval 6 (data
binned across task to index change over exposure) x Condition 2 (Training x
Control) x Post-Test Group 2 (Perceiver x Non-Perceiver) analysis of variance
on the behavioral data (N = 40). We found a main effect of Condition, F(1, 36) =
9.78, p < 0.005. However, this subtle effect (difference in proportion of looking
duration = 0.004) did not interact with Group. The analysis also yielded a main
effect of AOI, F(1.3, 108) = 98.7, p < 0.001, and an AOI x Condition interaction
F(1.3, 108) = 16.9, p < 0.001. Follow-up tests show that there is a greater pro-
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Figure 5.4: Areas of Interest (AOIs) for the Target Scene. The Target Scene was
segmented into four AOIs: two separate AOIs for the two surfaces of the target
novel object (Object-1 and Object-2), the occluding object separating the two
object AOIs (Occluder) and finally, all surfaces of the background were treated
as a single AOI (Background). All fixations during Target Scene exposure were
localized to one of these AOIs. Fixations outside these AOIs were not included
in subsequent analyses.
portion of looking allocated to the Object parts in the Training condition and a
greater proportion allocated to the Occluder and the Background in the Control
condition (see Figure 5.5, all ts > |3.6|, ps ≤ 0.001, Bonferroni-corrected alpha set
to .05/4). We include Figure 5.6 to specifically illustrate the striking difference
in sampling betweenNon-Perceivers in the Training and the Control conditions.
Regular but variable exposure in the Training condition powers efficient sam-
pling even when the subject does not ultimately connect the object parts.
Sampling differences between Perceivers and Non-Perceivers in the Training condi-
tion are modest. An ANOVA of the Training condition (N = 39; Figure 5.7) across
AOI, Training Interval, Post-test Group (N = 22 Perceivers, 17 Non-Perceivers)
and Location (lab vs. scanner) revealed a main effect of AOI, F(1.95, 105) = 54.5,
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Table 5.1: Proportion of looking to areas of interest in the Target Scene.
Area of Interest Group Proportion of Looking SD
Object-1 Structured: Perceivers 0.174 0.077
Structured: Non-Perceivers 0.262 0.156
Unstructured: All Participants 0.025 0.019
Object-2 Structured: Perceivers 0.130 0.071
Structured: Non-Perceivers 0.089 0.065
Unstructured: All Participants 0.018 0.014
Occluder Structured: Perceivers 0.515 0.132
Structured: Non-Perceivers 0.439 0.153
Unstructured: All Participants 0.665 0.169
Background Structured: Perceivers 0.181 0.088
Structured: Non-Perceivers 0.211 0.118
Unstructured: All Participants 0.290 0.147
p < 0.001. Participants in the Training condition looked most at the Occluder
and they look least at the Object-2 surface (all tests with Occluder and Object-2,
ts(38) > |3.6|, ps ≤ 0.001, Bonferroni-corrected alpha p = .008). This was quali-
fied by a marginally significant AOI by Group interaction, F(1.92, 105) = 2.70,
p = 0.08. We used planned comparisons to examine informative differences in
looking distributions within each Group and found them to be remarkably sim-
ilar across Groups (Figure 5.7). One notable difference is that Perceivers show
a more even distribution of looking between the Object surfaces, while Non-
Perceivers show a significant difference in looking between the two Object sur-
faces, t(16) = 3.9, p = 0.001. Specifically, Non-Perceivers look more at Object-1,
t(37) = -2.25, p = 0.031 than at Object-2, which contributed to the main effect of
AOI described above. A more even distribution, exhibited by Perceivers, might
be related to extracting feature correlations across object parts and Training im-
ages. We also find that Non-Perceivers look more at Object-1 than Perceivers,
t(37) = -2.25, p = 0.031 and Perceivers look marginally more at Object-2, t(37) =
1.86, p = 0.071.
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Figure 5.5: Proportion of Fixations to the Target Scene in the Control and
Training Conditions. Looking is presented separated in each of the four AOIs
used in the eye tracking analyses. Participants in the Training condition look
more to the two Object parts and less to the Occluder and Background
demonstrating that variable exposure to a novel object results in different
distributions of fixations to the Target Scene.
We found no main effects associated with Training Interval or Testing Lo-
cation in the Training condition. There was a significant Training Interval by
Group by Location interaction, F(2.6, 175) = 3.5, p = 0.02. Follow-up analyses
reveal a significant Training Interval by Group interaction in the scanner, F(2.0,
85) = 4.34, p = 0.02, but not outside of the scanner, p > 0.7. This subtle effect is
likely the result of the differences in timing across Locations. However, these
differences do not seem to meaningfully or systematically reflect in the AOI dis-
tributions.
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Figure 5.6: Pattern of Looking for Non-Perceivers across Exposure Conditions.
Top Panel: Proportion of fixations to the Target Scene for Non-Perceivers in the
Control and Training conditions. Bottom Panel: Differences in fixation patterns
for two representative Non-Perceivers from the Training and Control
conditions. Hotter colors are longer average duration of fixations.
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Figure 5.7: Proportion of Fixations to the Target Scene in the Training
Condition by Group. Looking is presented separated in each of the four AOIs
used in the eye tracking analyses. We find significant differences across Groups
for Object-1 AOI only.
Looking duration proportions that are corrected for AOI size confirm these patterns.
AOIs in the current task vary in their surface area and shape. If fixations were
randomly distributed, the proportion of fixations to each AOI would be equiv-
alent to their proportionate size. We examined looking patterns while control-
ling for differences in surface area. To this end, we calculated the proportion
of fixations expected per AOI–the proportion pixels for each AOI relative to
total scene size–subtracted from the proportion of fixations observed and arc-
sine transformed. We compared this difference score value to zero (the value
at which subjects looked at AOIs exactly as would be predicted by area alone).
For the Control condition, we find that participants look significantly more at
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Figure 5.8: Corrected Proportion of Fixations to the Target Scene in the Control
Condition. In general, participants look most at the occluder and least at the
Object-1 surface. There are no differences in looking between Perceivers and
Non-Perceivers in the Control condition.
the Occluder than would be expected by area size and significantly less to all
other surfaces, ts(19) = |7.8|, ps < 0.01, see Figure 5.8. This is perhaps because it
is centrally located in the Target Scene. We found a markedly different pattern
for the Training condition (see Figure 5.9). Participants looked at the Occluder
and both Object surfaces more than would be expected by chance, and look less
at the Background, ts(38) = |2.6|, ps < 0.01. Perceivers in the Training condition
show significantly more looking for the Object-2 surface, t(21) = 3.7, p = 0.001,
than would be expected as a function of area size, while Non-Perceivers show
greater than expected looking to the Object-1 surface, t(16) = 2.6, p = 0.02. These
results suggest that Groups allocate their attention differently across Object sur-
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Figure 5.9: Corrected Proportion of Fixations to the Target Scene in the Training
Condition by Group. Non-Perceivers look more at the Object-1 surface while
Perceivers look more at the Object-2 surface.
faces.
Finally, we submitted these corrected data to the ANOVAs reported for the
raw data. This resulted in virtually identical pattern of effects, confirming that
these analyses are not confounded by surface area differences. The exception
is an additional main effect of Training Interval for analysis comparing looking
for behavioral subjects across Conditions and Groups, F(5, 275) = 2.51, p = 0.03.
This effect does not interact with Group or Condition variables and does not
appear to meaningfully influence with the broader pattern of results.
Taken together, variable exposure is relevant for sampling. However, differ-
ences between Perceivers and Non-Perceivers are modest, with the exception
of a bias for a more even distribution of looking to the object surfaces in Per-
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ceivers relative to Non-Perceivers. That is, there is not convincing evidence that
sampling alone is sufficient to catalyze the shift in object perception between
Perceivers and Non-Perceivers. Indeed, sampling differences in the Training
relative to the Control condition in Non-Perceivers are obvious in Figure 5.6,
even as the participants in the Training condition do not make the perceptual
shift. We turn to imaging data to expose other relevant processing differences
between groups.
5.2.3 Neuroimaging Results
FMRI data indicate important differences in learning systems and the ventral visual
stream between Perceivers and Non-Perceivers. We collected fMRI data in the Train-
ing condition only and conducted a whole brain analysis for Group (Perceivers
and Non-Perceivers) by scene type (Target Scene relative to the Paired Scenes –
the three scenes with variable views of the Target Object; Figure 5.1 left panel).
We hypothesized that the neural systems involved in relating information from
Paired Scenes to the Target Scene will be modulated by Group. Regions rel-
evant to this interaction of scene type and Group are listed in Table 5.2. We
found differences in temporal lobe regions spanning portions of the fusiform
gyrus (FFG), the inferior temporal gyrus (ITG) and the hippocampus. Follow-
up analyses in the hippocampal ROI (see analysis details in Methods below;
Figure 5.10A) revealed a significant difference between the Target and Paired
Scenes in the Perceivers only (PSC: t(8) = -2.46, p = 0.039; betas: t(8) = -2.3, p =
0.05; Figure 5.10B left). Non-Perceivers showed no difference in hippocampal
sensitivity to this contrast (Figure 5.10B right). This pattern in the current study
points to the involvement of the hippocampus in integrating across variable
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Table 5.2: Regions of activity in the interaction of scene type and Group.
Tailarach
Region Voxels x y z
R Middle Frontal 454 -41 19 48
R Middle Frontal 201 41 16 26
R Caudate and Putamen 136 15 12 11
L Middle Temporal Gyrus 126 -52 -9 -8
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 97 45 -7 -30
L Superior Frontal Gyrus 93 54 37 93
L Anterior Cingulate 89 -7 39 2
L Caudate 71 -12 11 15
R-L Thalamus 64 11 -13 10
R Hippocampus 6 -32 22 -11
exposures in the Paired Scenes to support perceptual change and is consistent
with recent findings that the hippocampus is involved in integrating overlap-
ping memories during encoding (Shohamy &Wagner, 2008).
Activity in the ITG and fusiform ROI exhibited the same pattern as the hip-
pocampus: the interaction of scene type by Group was powered by increased
activity when Perceivers viewed Paired relative to Target Scenes (PSC: t(8) =
-2.10, p = 0.07; betas: t(8) = -2.72, p = 0.026) and no response for either scene
in the Non-Perceivers. Both the ITG and the FFG have been implicated in ob-
ject perception in humans and non-human primates (ITG: Haxby et al., 2001;
Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996; FFG responds preferentially to faces: Kanwisher,
McDermott, & Chun, 1997; non-face expert objects: Gauthier et al., 1999). Our
behavioral results established that variable exposure to the novel object in the
Paired Scenes catalyzes perceptual change. Differential activity of these ventral
visual regions, along with the hippocampus, to the Paired Scenes in Perceivers
suggests that perceptual change is supported by the combination of the sophis-
ticated object-processing and a learning system binding across individual and
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Figure 5.10: Response of the Right Hippocampus to the Interaction scene type
and Group. Panel A presents the defined region of interest (ROI), calculated as
a subset of a larger ROI encompassing the right middle temporal lobe.
Specifics about this region are presented in Table 5.2. Panel B presents the time
course of PSC change for presentation of scene type for Perceivers (left) and
Non-Perceivers (right). The PSC time course supports the results of the mean
PSC that the hippocampus responds to contextual scene presentation in the
Perceivers only with no response to either scene type in the Non-Perceivers.
variable experiences.
Two regions of activation localized to the left and right caudate (Fig-
ure 5.11B) exhibited a similar pattern of response. Again, the interaction is sup-
ported by differences between Target and Paired Scenes for the Perceivers (PSC,
Right: t(8) = -7.33, p < 0.001; Left: t(8) = -2.48, p = 0.038; betas, Right: t(8) =
-4.06, p = 0.004; Left: t(8) = -3.21, p = 0.012; Figure 5.11A for right caudate) with
no corresponding differences across scene types in Non-Perceivers. However,
the differential response in Perceivers is driven by both a significant increase in
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Figure 5.11: Bilateral Response of the Basal Ganglia Learning and Memory
System to the Interaction of scene type and Group. Bilateral regions of
activation (Panel B) localized to the caudate show the same direction
differential responses to Target vs. Paired scenes by Group: differentiatal
activity to Scene-type in Perceivers only. The time-course of PSC for Perceivers
shows the differentiation of activity. Panel A shows PSC response plotted from
the Right Caudate.
activity when viewing the Paired Scene (compared to zero: t(8) = 9.41, p < 0.01;
betas: t(8) = 2.56, p = 0.034) and a significant decrease when viewing the Target
Scenes (PSC: t(8) = -5.36, p = 0.01). Any significant deviation from zero in PSC is
a change from baseline activity, thus a significant decrease in PSC is an indica-
tion of preferential response to the Target Scene. Activity in the basal ganglia is
often considered in relation to the frequency or predictability of events (Amso
et al., 2005; Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999; Dommett et al., 2005; Schultz et
al., 1997). Considering the pattern of activation in relation to frequency of scene
occurrence, the Target Scene is a presented at greater frequency than the indi-
vidual Paired Scenes with decreased and increased activity of the caudate re-
spectively. Thus, Perceivers may be tracking the frequency of individual scenes.
However, Non-Perceivers caudate activity does not differentiate between scene
types suggesting a lack of sensitivity to the frequency of presentation in the vi-
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Table 5.3: Regions of activity in the contrast of scene type. Activity for Paired
Scenes is greater than for the Target Scene.
Tailarach
Region Voxels x y z
L Occipital and Posterior Parietal Network 1663 -14 -81 3
L Superior Parietal Gyrus 146 -19 -69 57
R Middle Occipital Gyrus 119 41 -68 -9
L Lingual Gyrus 100 -21 -96 -14
R Inferior Temporal Gyrus 92 61 -49 11
sual input.
This caudate activation is echoed in the main effect of scene type, specifically
the left caudate. Also present is activation in the parahippocampus and bilat-
eral portions of the middle occipital cortex spanning the fusiform (Table 5.3).
These regions were more active for Paired relative to Target Scenes. Previous
studies have linked the parahippocampal cortices to binding across surfaces in
Cubist paintings (Wiesmann & Ishai, 2010) and supporting contextual process-
ing of objects even when the context is absent (Bar & Aminoff, 2003). Consistent
with these findings, this region may support perception of the Target Object
across different views in both groups, while additional activity in the ventral vi-
sual stream and hippocampus, seen for Perceivers only, is necessary to change
perception in the Target Scene.
Again, it is important to note that there is unequal presentation of individual
scenes across scene types. Thus, we investigated whether the regions sensitive
to a main effect of scene type only could reflect greater repetition suppression
(RS) for Target Scenes. To this end, activity was examined over the course of
exposure (7 blocks of 6 presentations). If these effects are simply being driven
by unequal RS effects, one would expect a greater negative slope of activation
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for the Target Scenes compared to the Paired Scenes. We did not find evidence
for such an effect. We also investigated whether differential activity in the IFG,
hippocampus and the right caudate are driven by Perceivers sensitivity to RS.
Again, we find no evidence to suggest for RS. These results are consistent with
previous studies showing that RS in object-selective regions, shown to be in-
volved in the current task, reaches a plateau after 7 or 8 presentations (Grill-
Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006).
There is more activation in parietal regions in Perceivers relative to Non-Perceivers.
The temporal regions discussed above, specifically, the bilateral middle and
left superior temporal, ITG are also apparent in the main effect of Group (Fig-
ure 5.12, Table 5.4) and have been qualified above. Unique to the main effect of
Group are activations in portions of the parietal lobe. These are specifically the
precentral and postcentral gyri and the inferior parietal lobule (IPL). These re-
gions exhibited greater activation in Perceivers than Non-Perceivers. This pari-
etal activation is not sufficiently dorsal and posterior to suggest differences in
visual selective attention across Groups; this is consistent with the finding of
only subtle differences in eye movements across Groups. Instead these regions
have been associated with novel exploration (postcentral gyrus: Binkofski et
al., 1999), orientation coding (postcentral gyrus: Sakata & Kusunoki, 1992; IPL:
Sakata et al., 1999; Shikata et al., 2001 and visuo-spatial transformation of objects
(IPL: Harris, Benito, Ruzzoli, &Miniussi, 2008). These findings suggest that Per-
ceivers more strongly engaged processes that help perception of an object across
variable views. Additionally, activity in the IPL, part of the ventral parietal cor-
tex, suggests a role of attentional-guided memory-retrieval in the current task.
In accord with the “attention to memory” (AtoM) model (Cabeza, Ciaramelli,
Olson, & Moscovitch, 2008; Cabeza et al., 2011), the IPL responds to stimuli
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Figure 5.12: Main Effect of Group (Perceiver vs. Non-Perceivers) reveals a
distributed temporal and anterior-parietal network (upper panel) including the
Inferior Temporal Gyrus (lower panel). Regions in this network show greater
activation for Perceivers during the task than Non-Perceivers.
that share perceptual features with a “target” both in sensory processing and
memory-retrieval. Given the necessity to relate integrated representations of
the Target Object to future perceptual experiences, greater attentionally-guided
memory retrieval may help Perceivers to change their perception.
General differences in eye movements do not contribute to parietal activations across
Groups. We examined whether general differences in looking could account for
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Table 5.4: Regions of activity in the contrast of Group. Activity is greater for
Perceivers than Non-Perceivers.
Tailarach
Region Voxels x y z
R Temporal and Anterior Parietal Network 1678 44 -31 5
L Postcentral, Precentral and Inferior Parietal Gyri 597 -50 -20 32
L Middle Frontal Gyrus 199 -34 31 40
R-L Anterior Cingulate 195 -9 -7 41
R Middle Frontal 184 39 17 33
L Superior Temporal 94 -60 -37 14
R Medial Frontal Gyrus 73 11 44 29
R Middle Temporal and Occipital Gyri 66 56 -61 -2
some of our findings of different neural engagement, notably of the parietal cor-
tex, across Groups. First, we confirmed that there are no significant differences
in general looking behavior (e.g., fixation count, total duration of fixation) across
Groups for scanner participants. In order to determine whether regions related
to general eye movements overlap with regions reported in the analyses above,
a separate analysis consideredwhich regions correlated with changes in fixation
count and total duration of fixation (see Methods; Tables 5.5 and 5.6). Notably,
for fixation count, we find activation in a number of parietal regions includ-
ing the precuneus and the precentral and postcentral gyri (Figure 5.13A). While
we also find Group differences in activation for precentral and postcentral gyri,
the direction of the effects is opposite (Non-Perceivers> Perceivers) suggesting
that fixation count does not account for differences in parietal activation ob-
served across Groups in previous analyses. For total fixation duration, we find
greater activation in the superior and middle frontal gyri (Figure 5.13B) and the
precuneus for Perceivers than Non-Perceivers. In sum, we find that regions typ-
ically associated with volitional eye movements support general differences in
eye movements in the current task. These regions are distinct anatomically or
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A) B) 
Figure 5.13: Analysis examining the regions accounting for variations in
general scanning behavior. A) Differences fixation count are correlated with
activity in the post- and pre-central gryi. B) Differences in total fixation
duration are correlated with activity in the middle frontal gryus.
Table 5.5: Regions of activity in the analysis of fixation count. Activity is
greater for Non-Perceivers than Perceivers.
Tailarach
Region Voxels x y z
L Post- and Pre-Central Gyrus 201 -41 -16 38
L Superior Temporal Gyrus 96 -61 -28 8
R Precentral Gyrus 58 51 -13 41
L Precuneus 51 -10 -37 47
L Posterior Cingulate 33 -4 -49 14
R Superior Temporal Gyrus 31 68 -19 8
in direction of preference from regions that differ across Perceivers and Non-
Perceivers in Scene viewing. This finding confirms that differences in neural
activation across Groups is not driven by general differences in scanning be-
havior but rather is related to sensitivity to environmental regularities in the
Training condition and perceptual change.
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Table 5.6: Regions of activity in the analysis of total fixation duration.
Tailarach
Region Voxels Direction of Effect x y z
R Middle Frontal Gyrus 93 P greater than NP 47 38 -4
L Lingual Gyrus 59 P greater than NP -19 -95 -14
R Superior Frontal Gyrus 36 P greater than NP 20 56 35
L Anterior Cingulate 29 NP greater than P -8 50 -1
R Precuneus 23 P greater than NP 40 -72 36
5.3 Discussion
Using a combined eye tracking/fMRI methods approach, we examined how
sampling and integration across variable experience supports changes in the
domain of object perception. Adult participants were presented with a novel,
occluded object in a Target Scene. Before exposure, all participants perceived
this object as two disconnected parts rather than a single occluded object. We
found that exposure to variable views of the object in the Training condition cat-
alyzes perceptual change; more participants were able to perceptually complete
the object after exposure in the Training condition than in the Control condition.
This result establishes that, despite never seeing the novel object in its entirety,
participants were able to integrate across variable and locally ambiguous expe-
riences to arrive at a globally unambiguous percept.
We aimed to elucidate the neural and behavioral mechanisms that support
the translation of variable experience into perceptual change. We found that
the biggest predictor of eye movement distribution in the Target Scene was type
of exposure not the presence of perceptual change: Both Perceivers and Non-
Perceivers in the Training condition looked at the Object parts more than would
be expected by chance while participants in the Control condition looked less
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than predicted by chance-levels. We find only modest differences in eye move-
ments between Perceivers and Non-Perceivers in the Training condition, with
Perceivers looking more evenly at both Object parts which may support feature
correlation (Bhatt & Quinn, 2011). Moreover, Perceivers in the Control con-
dition did not exhibit sampling patterns like participants in the Training con-
dition. These results indicate that sampling is sensitive to variable exposure,
a catalyst for perceptual change, but appears not to directly reflect perceptual
change itself in the current task. Therefore, while eye movements may serve
an important function in translating environmental experience into changes in
object perception, additional systems must be involved.
Considering this result in relation to early post-natal development, it is pos-
sible that regularity of experience could also drive effective sampling in infancy;
this is an important area for future investigation. However, unlike in adults, in-
fant sampling is constrained by the development of VSA (Amso & Johnson,
2006). Thus, there is a cognitive constraint on the efficacy of this mechanism in
supporting early object perception.
The finding that eye movements are influenced by variable yet regular ex-
perience in the Experimental condition dovetail with recent results relating pre-
dictability with eyemovements, on one hand, and an effect of eyemovements on
perceptual and cognitive processing. Starting with the latter, numerous studies
have found that eyemovements relate to differences in perceptual and cognitive
behavior (e.g. perceptual completion in infancy Amso & Johnson, 2006; S. John-
son et al., 2004). While it has been proposed that eye movements are a window
into the unfolding of cognitive processes, there is evidence that eye movements
do not simply reflect but influence perceptual and cognitive processing. Grant
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and Spivey (2003) found that eye movements predicted participant’s arrival at
a solution to a classic insight problem and, moreover, biasing participants’ eye
movements towards this pattern facilitated participant’s ability to find the solu-
tion. (Pomplun, Ritter, & Velichkovsky, 1996) examined eye movements during
perception of canonical ambiguous figures (e.g. the Necker cube) and found dif-
ferences in the distribution of fixation between percepts. When the ambiguous
images were modified based on these patterns of distribution (i.e. changes in
contrast based on distribution of fixations), naı¨ve participants’ perception was
correspondingly influenced. 1 Similarly, the current experiments provide ev-
idence that variable yet regular exposure to a novel object can affect both the
proportion of participants who change their visual object perception and the
pattern of eye movements suggesting an influence of eye movements on down-
stream perceptual and cognitive processing.
Turning to the relation of predictability and eye movements, predictability
has been found to affect fixation duration to objects in visual scenes (e.g. Wang,
Hwang, & Pomplun, 2010) and also affect fixation of words during reading (for
a review see Rayner, 1998). In both of these domains, increased predictability
results in a decrease in fixation which might reflect greater perceptual efficiency.
Indeed, increased efficiency of eye movements, such as sampling distribution,
increased fixation of relevant regions and amplitude of saccades, has been found
as a result of greater familiarity with visual stimuli (e.g. faces, Heisz & Shore,
2008) and with increased expertise (e.g. chess experts Charness, Reingold, Pom-
plun, & Stampe, 2001). These findings have suggested that eye movements can
1The Target Scene in the current study could be considered a type of ambiguous figure in
that there easily are multiple interpretations. However, unlike figures employed by Pomplun et
al. (1996) and classically called “ambiguous,” we do not find that the perception of the Target
Scene switches back and forth between a disconnected and a completed percept, as determined
by debriefing. Instead, there appears to be a single switch in perception over the course of the
experiment with many participants unaware that their perception changed.
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reflect internal representations. Interestingly, we find an increased fixation dura-
tion to the Target Object during exposure with greater predictability (i.e. during
the Experimental condition). Considering the current results in relation to this
previous research, increased fixations of the Target Object could be evidence for
greater focus on the relevant regions of the visual scene similar to the increased
and earlier fixation of relevant chess pieces by chess experts (Charness et al.,
2001). According to this explanation, exposure in the Experimental condition
might also increase eye movement efficiency. However, one might expect dif-
ferences in eye movement efficiency between Perceivers and Non-Perceivers,
and we only find modest differences between these groups. Alternatively, in-
creased fixation duration in this study might reflect and/or support a process
of internal representational change necessary for the successful completion of
the Target Object. According to this explanation, increased fixation of the Target
Object might not reflect increased efficiency but be providing sensory input nec-
essary for changes in object perception similar to the findings from Grant and
Spivey (2003). While future research is needed to distinguish between these
explanations, the current results broadly find that predictability can affect eye
movements and that changes in exposure (in the identify of the Paired Scenes
in the current study or highlighting a crucial part of a visual scene in Grant &
Spivey, 2003) can affect eyemovements and in turn affect downstream cognitive
processes such as object perception and insight problem solving, respectively.
Neuroimaging results shed light on the additional systems supporting per-
ceptual change. Broadly, we found evidence for that learning and memory sys-
tems, specifically theMTL, work in tandemwith perceptual and attentional sys-
tems to support changes in perception. The hippocampus responded preferen-
tially to Paired Scenes in Perceivers but does not respond to either scene in Non-
203
Perceivers suggesting that this learning system is involved in binding across the
variable experiences with the novel object. These findings are consistent with an
emerging view of the computational function of the hippocampus as integrat-
ing overlapping and related experiences at the point of encoding (Shohamy &
Wagner, 2008). In the domain of object processing, computational models have
pointed to a role of integrative encoding in the MTL in the production of invari-
ant object representations (Deco & Rolls, 2004). Current results lend some sup-
port to this view: specifically that invariant object representations might be the
result of hippocampal binding across variable views of an object. More broadly,
these findings support the theoretical view that MTL systems are involved in
visual perception and specifically, in leveraging experience to support veridical
perception.
We also found evidence for the involvement of object perception, indicated
by preferential activity in the fusiform and ITG. Interestingly, we do not find that
these regions are preferentially active during presentation of the Target Scene,
where overt changes in object perception take place, but during the Paired
Scenes which provide the experiential scaffolding for perceptual change. This
result suggests that these regions have a role in buttressing perceptual change.
Moreover, the parallel pattern activity of these ventral visual regions and the
hippocampus suggest that they work in tandem to this end.
Finally, we found that Perceivers preferentially engage regions of the parietal
cortex throughout the task. Previous studies have implicated some of these re-
gions in cognitive processes involved in relating visual experience across chang-
ing views (changes in orientation, mental rotation etc.) suggesting that percep-
tual processes, in addition to activity of learning systems, are essential to trans-
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late experience into changes in internal representations.
It is important to consider whether the current findings are simply a result of
general differences scanning behavior across participants. To this end, a number
of measures of scanning behavior were examined (e.g. number of fixations, du-
ration of fixations). We do not find consistent differences in general scanning be-
havior between Groups or across Conditions. We also considered which neural
regions are related to Group differences in scanning behavior. This analysis re-
vealed a set of regions that is mutually exclusive from those relating perceptual
change to effective sampling. Thus, current findings are not clearly attributable
to general differences in scanning behavior but more likely reflect differences in
information gathering.
Recent work in developmental psychology has focused on the role of en-
vironmental regularity or statistics in shaping perception and cognition (e.g.,
Romberg & Saffran, 2010; Fiser & Aslin, 2002). Specifically, it is believed that
prior experience with statistical information can support effective categoriza-
tion and segmentation of perceptual input. Our results suggest one mechanism
by which this process can proceed: The integration of variable yet regular ex-
periences creates robust and invariant internal representations of sensory input
that can shape future perception. Current findings suggest that this process
is dependent on the hippocampus and effective sampling. These systems are
both available to infants early in post-natal development: Behavioral research
has established that the hippocampus is available for memory formation early
in infancy (e.g. Little, Lipsitt, & Rovee-Collier, 1984); as reviewed in the intro-
duction, sampling develops during the first months of post-natal development.
Thus, the mechanism elucidated in the current study could help support per-
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ceptual and cognitive development early in post-natal development as well as
across the lifespan.
5.4 Materials and Methods
Participants.
Sixty-one healthy volunteers (37 female, M age = 21.39 years, SD = 2.8, Ethnic-
ity: 6 Hispanic, 55 Non-Hispanic, Race: 38 white, 16 Asian, 2 African-American,
3 mixed race, 1 Hispanic, 1 other: Mestizo) completed this study. We acquired
behavioral and fMRI data in 21 participants (14 female,M age= 21.5 years, SD =
2.6, all right handed). Participants had no history of neurological or psychiatric
disorders, were born full-term with no major birth complications, and had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were recruited using flyers and
the departmental undergraduate subject pool and were compensated for their
time and travel with course credit or money. Written informed consent, in accor-
dance with the policies of the Institutional Review Board at Brown University,
was obtained from all volunteers prior to participation in the study.
Eye Tracking Apparatus and Pre-Processing.
Eye position was tracked using an SMI system (Sensorimotor Instruments
Needham, MA) sampling at 60Hz and native iView software. For behavioral
subjects, an SMI RED system was used with a 5-point calibration, 4-point vali-
dation routine. Average error was 0.47◦ and 0.50◦ in the x and y co-ordinates, re-
spectively. For neuroimaging participants, an SMI iView XMRI-LR infrared eye
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tracker was used with a 9-point calibration, 4-point validation routine. Average
error for participants in the scanner was 1.04◦ and 1.72◦ in x and y co-ordinates,
respectively.
Scenes were presented using SMI Experiment Center (2.5, 3.0) on a white
screen measuring 24.5◦ x 12.5◦ of visual angle. For behavioral participants,
stimuli were presented on a 22￿￿ monitor. Tracking distance for the SMI sys-
tem was approximately 70 cm. Inside the scanner, stimuli were presented by
rear-projection onto a screen viewed through a mirror box mounted above the
head-coil. Visual angle was calculated from the screen to the position of mirror
within the magnet.
We used software specific to the SMI (BeGaze 3.0) to identify and extract
fixations the four AOIs for the Target Scene. Fixations were defined with a max-
imum dispersion of 100 pixels and a minimum duration of 80 ms (native set-
tings). We calculated proportion of fixation durations for each AOI per trial as
the total duration of all fixations per AOI / the total duration of fixations for all
AOIs. To consider eye movements as a function of exposure, data were binned
across every seven presentations of the Target Scene, equaling six Training In-
tervals.
Stimuli and Design.
Stimuli were two-dimensional, black and white line drawings depicting visual
scenes (Figure 5.1) with five to seven surfaces. In the Target Scene, the Target
Object was occluded in such a way that it is unclear whether it is two sepa-
rate objects (disconnected) or a single object behind another object (completed;
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Figure 5.2). Exposure conditions provided equal experience with the same Tar-
get Scene but were differentiated by the identity of the Paired Scenes. In the
Training condition, Paired Scenes included additional but varying views of the
Target Object. Even though the object continued to be occluded, there was no
ambiguity as to whether there is a single object or two separate objects as in
the Target Scene. In the Control condition (tested only behaviorally), the Paired
Scenes had the same number of objects or surfaces but did not include the Target
Object (Figure 5.1, left and right panels respectively).
5.4.1 Procedure
Pre- and Post-Training Tests.
For the pre-training test, all participants colored the Target Scene and Paired
Scenes from both conditions (8). The experimenter colored an example scene,
which was not subsequently used in the study, and explained that the purpose
of the study was to understand the participants visual perception. Participants
were told that the scenes were intentionally designed to be unfamiliar and ab-
stract and to color surfaces that comprised the same object the same color. Only
participants who colored the object as disconnected in the pre-test were enrolled
into the experiment. An additional 25 participants were found to have a com-
pleted percept of the Target Object and were subsequently excluded.
In order to ensure their appropriateness for the study before scheduling a
scan, the pre-test for neuroimaging participants was conducted in a separate
session. The scanning session was scheduled as soon as possible (M difference
= 9.62, SD = 7.53 days). Fourteen additional participants were found to have a
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completed percept during pre-test coloring andwere not enrolled in this study’s
imaging session but completed another study in the lab. Two enrolled partic-
ipants were found to have a completed percept at the beginning of the scan,
as indicated by their online behavioral responses before the first block of expo-
sure (see Task Procedure). Their data were excluded from subsequent analyses.
For the post-test, participants colored only the visual scenes for their exposure
condition (4).
Task Procedure.
Participants received three blocks of passive exposure to the visual scenes. Dur-
ing each block, participants were presented with sequential alternating Target
and Paired Scenes. Each scene type was presented 14 times per block; Paired
Scene order was randomly determined with equal frequency. In the lab, scenes
were presented for three seconds with a three second inter-stimulus interval
(ISI) during which a blank, white screen was presented. In the scanner, this
ISI lasted 12 seconds in order to accommodate the time course of the BOLD
response.
We gathered two measures of perceptual change over the course of the task,
in addition to the eye movements. Before and after each exposure block, partic-
ipants were asked to report the number of objects in each scene, without time
limit, as an indirect index of whether they perceive the Target Object as complete
or disconnected. Participants in the lab indicated the number of objects using
the keyboard and to pressed ‘SPACE’ to proceed to the next scene. Participants
inside the scanner verbalized their response to the experimenter. This measure,
in additional to verbal debriefing, was used to identify two neuroimaging par-
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ticipants who changed their percept from pre-test (disconnected) to completed
prior to the first exposure block.
After the final training block, participants viewed visual scenes with num-
bers on each surface and were asked to use the numbers to describe how they
viewed the scene (e.g. 1 and 2 are part of the same object which is behind 3,
and 4 is the background). The purpose of this task was to test correspondence
between verbal report of perception during the experiment with participants
post-exposure coloring.
5.4.2 fMRI Data Acquisition
Images were acquired using a 3 Tesla Siemens Trio MRI scanner (Siemens, Er-
langen, Germany). A 3D localizer was run (AAScout) to position the slices for
the remainder of the sequences. This localizer was rotated to ensure whole brain
coverage. All other images were collected in the same oblique angle. A high res-
olution anatomical image (MultiEcho MPRAGE: 1.20 mm isotropic voxel size,
TR = 2200 ms, TI = 1100 ms, Flip angle = 7 ◦, 4× acceleration, 144 slices, Band-
width = 651 Hz/Px) was collected for 3D localization and morphometric analy-
ses.
A slow event-related design was used for functional imaging runs allowing
for a direct mapping of the hemodynamic response onto each visual presenta-
tion. Echoplanar imaging (EPI) was used to measure the BOLD signal as an
indication of cerebral brain activation during three blocks of exposure. EPI im-
ages were aligned to the whole brain MPRAGE anatomical image (TR = 3000
ms, TE = 28 ms, flip angle = 90◦). Forty-two oblique-slices were collected of 3
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mm thickness and 0 mm gap (64 × 64 mm in-plane resolution) were collected
for 168 repetitions (including 2 discarded acquisitions at the onset of each of the
three runs). Two participants had fewer than the 508 total repetitions collected.
Due to an accidental squeezing of the emergency squeeze ball, one participant
had the last 53 repetitions from the 2nd run not collected. Due to a scanner error,
another participant had only 102 repetitions from the final run collected. How-
ever, both participants received the same stimulus exposure, and eye tracking
measures continued to be collected.
After EPI sequences, we acquired anatomical T2-SPACE images (high reso-
lution turbo-spin-echo with high sampling efficiency, 1.20 mm isotropic voxel
size, TR = 2800 s, TE = 327 ms, 144 slices, Bandwidth = 651 Hz/Px) at locations
identical to the functional image for localization purposes. Finally, functional
images (T2* BOLD) were collected while participants were in a resting-state (3.0
mm isotropic voxel size, TR = 3.0 s, TE = 30 ms, Flip angle = 85◦, 47 transverse
slices aligned approximately to the AC-PC plane, no skip, no dummy scans, fat
saturation on). All lights were turned off. Participants were instructed to simply
let their minds wander and rest but to keep their eyes open and to stay awake
during the scan.
Image Processing and Analysis.
Functional imaging data were processed and analyzed with the Analysis
of Functional NeuroImages (AFNI) software package (Cox, 1996). EPI and
anatomical images were deobliqued. Images then underwent (1) registration
to the first image volume, (2) alignment to the high-resolution anatomical data
set (MP-RAGE), and (3) smoothing with an isotropic 6.0 mm Gaussian kernel.
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Two types of models were fit for each subject. The first model included re-
gressors for the Target and Paired Scenes (collapsing across the three Paired
Scenes). A second amplitude-modulated (AM) model was included to examine
the effects of differences in eye movements on the BOLD response. The model
was run twice: Separate regressors convolved the Target Scene event amplitude
with 1) total duration of fixation and 2) fixation count. Both measures of eye
movements were considered per trial and normalized to the average values for
each subject.
Time series were normalized to percent signal change (PSC) by dividing sig-
nal intensity at each time point by the mean intensity for that voxel for that
run and multiplying the result by 100. General linear modeling (GLM) was per-
formed to fit the PSC time courses to each regressor. Linear and quadratic trends
were modeled in each voxel to control for correlated drift. Motion regressors,
calculated during preprocessing in three dimensions (roll, pitch and yaw) were
also included.
Two separate group level analyses were run for the two model types. A
linear mixed effects (LME) model included factors for subject (random effect),
scene type (Target vs. Paired) and Group (Perceiver vs. Non-Perceiver) and was
run within AFNI using functions from the R software package (http://www.R-
project.com, Vienna, Austria, 2005). Correction for multiple comparisons was
applied at the cluster level following Monte Carlo simulations conducted in the
AlphaSimwithin AFNI. This calculation determines the probability of obtaining
a false positive for the 3D image using individual voxel probability threshold in
combination with a cluster size threshold. Spatial correlation between voxels
was assumed. For the prescription used (64 x 64 voxel matrix, 42 slices, 3.0 mm3
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voxels) and preprocessing techniques (Gaussian filter applied of 6.0 mm), a 1000
iteration Monte Carlo simulation was run. The simulation revealed that when
probability threshold is set at p = 0.05, 63 contiguous voxels are required to cor-
rect for false positives to p < 0.05. Follow-up tests determined the direction of
results for LME interaction using beta weights for the region from the GLM and
mean PSC (averaged across the 12.5 seconds subsequent to Target Scene presen-
tation). For the interaction of scene type and Group, the region encompassing
the right middle temporal lobe also spanned the right hippocampus. In order
to consider the individual contributions of hippocampus in isolation, a separate
mask was created to cover the right hippocampus only. This mask was a sphere
with its origin at co-ordinates -32, 22, -11 with a radius of 3.5 mm (Figure 5.10A).
The second group analysis was a t-test (3dTtest) contrasting regions of ac-
tivity correlated with the two measures of general eye movements in the Target
Scene by Group. AlphaSim was run, as described above, but including only the
voxels of the standard brain used in all analyses, supplied by AFNI (TT N27),
revealing that 23 contiguous voxels must reach p = 0.05 to correct for multiple
comparisons at a level of p < 0.05.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
In recent history, there have been pronounced fluctuations in the empha-
sis on behavioral change or learning in the study of perception and cognition.
These swings in the interest are no better illustrated than in the first words of E.J.
Gibson’s seminal work, Principals of Perceptual Learning and Development. This
book was written in 1969 and begins by examining the orientation of the field.
If anyone acquainted with the psychological literature of the last
fifty years were asked what problem was of most absorbing inter-
est to American psychologists.. he would surely answer “Learning”
(E. J. Gibson, 1969, p. 1).
If the same question were asked today, the answer would certainly not be learn-
ing. Indeed, the answers that we find in contemporary analogues to E. J. Gib-
son’s book are “the organization of the mind” or “the nature of mental repre-
sentation” (Fodor, 1983; Spivey, 2007, respectively).
Psychology’s interest shifted away from interest in learning or behavioral
change to the internal processes of the mind began with during the Cognitive
Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. This revolution rejected the tenets of Be-
haviorism which asserted that the mind is best studied exclusively in its behav-
ioral instantiation and eschewed the study of internal physiological processes
in their contribution to mental processes. Behaviorists focused on change in be-
havior based on learning paradigms such as classical or Pavlovian conditioning
and viewed mental function as highly malleable. Indeed, as the quote by E. J.
Gibson exemplifies, behavioral change or learning was viewed as the most im-
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portant aspect of mental life to study prior to the Cognitive Revolution. The
Cognitive Revolution rejected the notion that the internal mind was a “black
box” and focused on the internal structure of mental processes (e.g., Broadbent,
1958; Chomsky, 1959; G. Miller, 1956; Neisser, 1967). The rejection of Behavior-
ism led to a de-emphasis on everything connected to the paradigm, including
learning. After the Cognitive Revolution, the study of the mind sought to carve
cognition at its joints, and the processes that support experience-based change
(e.g., long-term memory) were conceptualized as separate from other cognitive
functions such as perception. Additionally, behavioral change has been viewed
as distinct across stages of development: short- and long-termmemory in adults
and the process of cognitive development in infancy and childhood. Some ar-
eas of Cognitive Science have even asserted that aspects of cognition rely upon
built-in or innate structures (e.g. language, Chomsky, 1967; Pinker, 1995). The
view that cognition is supported by innately supplied structure or knowledge
will be referred to as a nativist approach or nativism.
This dissertation is part of an alternate view of the mechanisms of behav-
ioral change, a view that merges the Behaviorist emphasis on the malleability
of behavior through experience and the Cognitivist emphasis on internal cogni-
tive processes based on representations. This hybrid approach is found in many
contemporary theories of development including Connectionism (e.g. Elman et
al., 1996; Thelen & Bates, 2003), Bayesian inference (e.g. Gopnik & Tenenbaum,
2007; Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011), Neuroconstructivism
(Mareschal et al., 2007) andNeo-Constructivism (S. Johnson, 2010). These empir-
ical approaches postulate that cognitive development is supported in large part
by experience and not on innate cognitive structures and thus can be consid-
ered in opposition to nativism. Consistent with these contemporary empirical
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approaches to cognitive development, the current work emphasizes the impor-
tance of experience with environmental structure in the development of internal
cognitive processes and the representations upon which they act.
Specifically, this dissertation proposes that experience-based behavioral
change can arise through an interaction of perceptual (auditory/visual) and
learning and memory processes during experience with novel statistical regu-
larities in sensory input. Cognitive approaches have postulated that the pro-
cesses supporting experience-based change, such as long-term memory and
cognitive development, are separate from other cognitive functions like percep-
tion. Consistent with this view, statistical learning has been conceptualized as
a domain-general, amodal mechanism, as reviewed in Section 1.5.1. However,
the research presented in Chapters 2 and 3 argues that perceptual processes
can both support and constrain what is learned from statistical regularities, and
structure present in sensory input can shape perception, as demonstrated in
Chapter 5. Thus, perceptual and learning and memory systems appear to mu-
tually influence each other as a result of experiences with novel statistical regu-
larity.
This dissertation also argues that perceptual and learning and memory pro-
cesses can support experience-based change throughout the lifespan. In addi-
tion to conceptualizing the processes that support experience-based change as
separate from perception, these processes have also been viewed to be distinct
across stages of development: short- and long-term memory in adults and the
process of cognitive development in infancy and childhood. As reviewed in
Sections 1.3.1 and 1.5.1, statistical learning has been demonstrated in both in-
fants and adults. Indeed, previous studies have argued for invariance in the
216
mechanisms of statistical learning (Kirkham et al., 2002; Saffran et al., 1997).
This dissertation builds on the view that statistical learning mechanisms are
continuously available but argues that at all stages of development, this mech-
anism operates through a dynamic interaction of perceptual and learning and
memory systems. Such a dynamic interaction will result in changes in learn-
ing based on perceptual processes. Chapters 3 and 4 present evidence for this
view: Experiments in these chapters examine learning across auditory and vi-
sual modalities in adult and infant learners, respectively. Consistent with previ-
ous studies, results in Chapter 3 find that adults tend to have superior statistical
segmentation abilities in the auditory modality (without temporal disruptions
and at a fast rate of presentation as investigated in Section 3.2). Extending this
work with adult learners, Chapter 4 presents the first comparison of statistical
learning across perceptual modalities in infant learners. We find no evidence
for auditory superiority in infant learners. In fact, we find evidence for an ear-
lier availability of visual SL in infancy. Comparisons of learning across percep-
tual modalities in infancy suggests that 1) statistical learning is also affected by
perceptual processes across the lifespan, and 2) there is a different influence of
perceptual processing in infancy than in adulthood.
In addition to finding that learning from statistical regularities is influ-
enced by perceptual processes in both infants and adults, this dissertation also
presents evidence that activity of learning and memory systems, in response to
experience with regularities in sensory input, can influence perception suggest-
ing a dynamic interrelationship between these systems. Chapter 5 examines
how variable yet regular experience with a novel object affects perception of
that object. This study used a combined eye-tracking/fMRI methods approach
to examine the nature of changes in object perception as a result of this expe-
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rience. Neural activity in the medial temporal lobe and specifically the hip-
pocampus was found to correlate with changes in object perception as a result
of experience. While this dissertation does not present empirical findings that
experience with structure in perceptual input directly affects perception in in-
fancy, Section 5.3 argues that themechanisms found to support changes in object
perception as a result of structured experience could be operational in the first
post-natal year. While future research is necessary to directly test these findings
in infant learners, the work presented in this dissertation suggests that a dy-
namic interrelationship between learning and memory systems and perceptual
systems can support experience-based changes across the lifespan.
This final chapter discusses the findings presented in this dissertation in re-
lation to the broader goal of Cognitive Science: to understand the human mind.
Two separate sections discuss the implications for the role of perception in learn-
ing from statistical regularities and the implications of learning and memory
and statistical regularities influencing perception. Finally, specific implications
are discussed for the fields of Developmental Psychology, Cognitive Science and
Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience.
6.1 Statistical Learning Is Influenced by Perceptual Processing
This dissertation presents evidence that perceptual processing affects statistical
learning. These findings are particularly relevant because: 1) it contributes to
an understanding of the cognitive and neural mechanisms supporting statisti-
cal learning, and 2) it addresses the question of how statistical learning unfolds
outside of the laboratory or in the wild. This section discusses how a perceptual-
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influence on SL can provide insight into both of these open questions. Sec-
tion 6.1.1 expands this discussion to the effect of perceptual variability on sta-
tistical learning.
Following from the first point, a standard view of the mechanisms of statis-
tical learning, as reviewed in Section 1.5.1, asserts that learning is affected by
relevant statistical information in sensory input (e.g., transitional probabilities).
It follows from this view that sensory input with different perceptual character
but identical statistical information would result in the same learning outcomes.
This view of statistical learning suggests that the underlying mechanisms are
singular and amodal or abstract and that statistical learning operates based on
unitized perceptual output (e.g. object identity, phonemes, or syllables).
However, if statistical learning is affected by additional perceptual informa-
tion, this challenges the standard view of the mechanisms of statistical learning.
As outlined in Section 4.1, sensory input can be conceived of as containing both
relevant statistical information and additional non-statistical perceptual infor-
mation. Perceptual information could be considered differences in modality,
whether statistical information is presented as part of auditory vs. visual stim-
uli as in Chapter 41 but can also be the type of stimulus within a perceptual
modality such as whether visual stimuli are geometric shapes or faces. These
factors have been referred to as “statistical information” and “perceptual infor-
1In this case, it is important to differentiate the contributions of different sensory transduc-
tion processes from differences in perceptual processes. Sensory processes are largely affected
by the sensori-motor nature of the particular sensory system; for example, visual sensory pro-
cesses are constrained by the organization of the retina and thus operate based on a retinotopic
organization. However, some character of the sensory organization is inherited by perceptual
processes even though the sensori-motor constraints typically weaker in perceptual processes.
(see Cleland, 2010, for an insightful discussion on this topic) Thus, it is difficult to dissociate
relative contributions of sensory transduction and perceptual processes when comparing across
sensory modalities. The approach taken in the current work is to control for basic differences in
discriminability across sensory modalities. See Chapter 4 for a deeper discussion on this point.
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mation,” respectively.
There is evidence that statistical learning is sensitive to non-statistical in-
formation. Chapter 3 found evidence that statistical learning is not equiva-
lent across perceptual modalities. This study examined learning when iden-
tical statistical information is presented as instantiated in both visual and audi-
tory modalities and how perceptual conditions, influenced learning outcomes.
Perceptual conditions were influenced through changes in presentation rate.
Results demonstrated that learning is significantly affected across modalities
and perceptual conditions. Specifically, statistical learning proceeds for a given
modality only in amenable perceptual conditions. Additionally, the experi-
ments reported in Chapter 3 also examined the influence of selective attention.
Recent research has suggested that statistical learning may also be affected by
selective attention, as reviewed in Section 1.5.1. Baker et al. (2004) and Pacton
and Perruchet (2008) suggested that selective attention may be the mechanism
by which perceptual conditions, such as perceptual grouping, influence statis-
tical learning. However, we found no evidence that selective attention could
compensate for poor perceptual conditions. In fact, the results suggest that the
effects of selective attention on statistical learning are also affected by perceptual
conditions: There was no increase in statistical learning from attended stimuli
in poor perceptual conditions. Overall, these results suggest that selective at-
tention and perceptual processes each influence statistical learning.
Overall, the results from Chapter 3 suggest that statistical learning is medi-
ated by mechanisms that are sensitive to the perceptual nature of the input in
addition to its statistical structure (e.g., transitional probabilities and frequen-
cies). Neuroimaging evidence has also suggested just such a scenario: Turk-
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Browne et al. (2009) report increased visual cortex activity, specifically in visual
object region LOC, during the observation of learnable visual sequences. Taken
together with the behavioral results supporting differences in learning across
perceptual modalities, this pattern of activity suggests that the visual cortex is
likely involved in learning the underlying structure from visual statistics (in ad-
dition to results from Chapter 3 see Conway & Christiansen, 2005, 2009; Robin-
son & Sloutsky, 2007; Saffran, 2002).
In light of these findings, Chapter 3 summarizes three possible architectures
for a cognitive mechanism supporting SL (or ISL as referred to in Chapter 3).
Schematics of these mechanisms are presented in Figure 3.6. The aim of this
work is not to conclusively support one type of mechanism for statistical learn-
ing but to further elucidate the importance of perceptual processing in learn-
ing from statistical regularities. However, as asserted in Chapter 3, both the
modality-specific and the embodied mechanisms more readily support differ-
ential learning across the visual and auditory modalities, while the standard
view, which suggests an amodal or abstract mechanism, does not readily fit
with the findings of modality-specifity such as those in Chapter 3.
Findings of modality-specific learning also provide a entre´e to understand-
ing how statistical learning proceeds outside the laboratory. This section now
turns to the second point above, that understanding how perceptual processing
affects statistical learning is important for understanding how statistical learn-
ing unfolds outside of the laboratory or in the wild. The field has expanded
evidence of statistical learning to many different types of statistical information
present in sensory input. In these experiments, the only learnable statistical in-
formation presented to the observer is along a single, relevant dimension. For
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example, when examining statistical learning of sequences, there is no variabil-
ity in the presentation of the objects (i.e., no distributions in sensory informa-
tion, as in Kirkham et al., 2002; Saffran et al., 1996). Similarly, studies exam-
ining learning from distributions of sensory information present this informa-
tion in non-predictable sequences (i.e., no higher-order statistical information
is present, as in Maye et al., 2002; Yoshida et al., 2010). Outside of the labo-
ratory, statistical information is typically present along multiple dimensions of
sensory input simultaneously. Thus, statistical learning experiments that ex-
amine learning along a single dimension do not provide a clear idea of how
learning proceeds outside the lab where learning is a multidimensional prob-
lem. This issue is discussed at length in Chapter 2 and the paper presented in
Appendix D. The finding that perceptual processing affects statistical learning
may make the problem of understanding how statistical learning operates in
the wild more tractable.
One of the major difficulties in understanding how statistical learning mech-
anisms operate outside the laboratory is the lack of constraints on learning and
the ubiquity of statistical information in sensory input received from the envi-
ronment. Indeed, a domain-general, amodal learning mechanism posits that
learning depends only upon the presence of statistical information, and thus
this type of mechanism has no obvious constraints.
Considering amechanismwhere statistical learning is affected by perceptual
processing provides an initial view of how learning can be constrained to a sub-
set of the statistical information. Chapter 2 examines how perceptual processing
can bias the multidimensional statistical learning task of language acquisition.
Specifically, the relevant statistical information was defined across groups or
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categories of novel sounds and participants were tested as to whether they seg-
mented the stream based on this higher-order statistical information. In this
way, the statistical learning paradigm was similar to the studies of Kirkham et
al. (2002); Saffran et al. (1996) and the experiments presented in Chapter 3. How-
ever, these experiments presented exact repetitions of objects in different orders
to produce higher-order statistical regularities. Diverging from this methodol-
ogy, the experiments in Chapter 2 asked participants to segment pairs from the
auditory stream based on variable presentations or multiple exemplars from
novel sound categories. Thus, participants must both resolve the perceptual
variability to determine which sounds conform to the same category as well as
use the information defined across categories, not single sounds, to segment the
acoustic stream. The inclusion of perceptual variability across successive expe-
riences allowed for the investigation of how perception of the sounds affected
learning and specifically, whether the perceptual organization of the sounds
supported the categories used to define the higher-order statistical information.
Two broad theoretical possibilities were contrasted: 1) statistical learning is pri-
marily “top-down” – that is, statistics defined across sound categories can be
optimally learned, regardless of the perceptual organization of these sounds;
2) statistical learning is primarily “bottom-up” – that is, the perceptual organi-
zation at lower levels is relied upon to define statistical information at higher
levels. The results are more consistent with the latter view: Perceptual organi-
zation constrained what statistical information was learned (see Chapter 2 for
an indepth discussion).
Broadly, the results reported in Chapter 2 suggest some constraints on the
statistical learner: If higher-order statistical information is not supported by
lower level perceptual organization, then the statistical information is not read-
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ily learned from, and the corresponding environmental structure is not uncov-
ered. This finding has important implications for the conceptualization of how
statistical learning contributes to language acquisition, as discussed at length
in that chapter. Relevant to the current point that considering how perception
affects statistical learning provides some insight into how learning can proceed
in the wild, the differences in perceptual abilities, such as speech categoriza-
tion, will provide different access to statistical information present in the speech
stream. Thus, any change speech categorization abilities could potentially re-
veal new statistical information to the observer. Thus, perceptual processing can
be said to apply some constraints on the statistical learner and correspondingly
some indication of what would be learned from the statistically-rich sensory
input received outside the lab.
There are similar implications for the results presented in Chapter 3: What
statistical learning outcomes are constrained by the perceptual modality and
the corresponding perceptual conditions. Specifically, at slow rates of presen-
tation, visual statistical regularities were learned from but not auditory statisti-
cal regularities; however, at fast rates of presentation, the opposite pattern was
found, where auditory statistical regularities were learned from but not visual
statistical regularities. These findings suggest that the same auditory and visual
statistical regularities are learned from under different perceptual conditions.
This perceptual constraint suggests that different aspects of the statistical in-
formation present in sensory input will be learned within different modalities.
To illustrate, consider a single multisensory input endowed with statistical reg-
ularities such as the audiovisual input of a talking person. Following from the
results in Chapter 3, the visual system would be more likely pick up on the sta-
224
tistical regularities that unfold more slowly over time (e.g., the manual gestures
of the talking person) while the auditory system may pick up on the statistical
regularities that occur more quickly (e.g., the rapid-fire statistical information
present in fluent speech). Thus, perceptual constrains across modalities suggest
that different statistical regularities from the same sensory signal will be learned
across modalities, a kind of division of labor.
Moreover, we find evidence that differences in statistical learning across per-
ceptual modalities can change over developmental time. Chapter 4 provides
evidence that visual statistical learning is possibly more robust than auditory
statistical learning. In fact, we see evidence for more robust visual learning in
infants younger than 9.3 months and no evidence for auditory superiority in
older infants. This result is surprising given the typical pattern of auditory su-
periority in adult learning. These results demonstrate that there is not a static
relationship between perceptual processing and statistical learning with a dif-
ferent pattern of learning across modalities found in infancy and adulthood.
Similar to how changes in speech categorization abilities could reveal differ-
ent statistical information present in the speech stream, differences in statisti-
cal learning across sensory modalities could shift what statistical information is
learned from across development.
Section 1.5.2 argued that statistical learning is grounded by the observer’s
niche and specifically, that the effect of an observer’s niche on learning could
be mediated by perceptual processing. This dissertation presents evidence in
Chapter 2 that statistical learning is constrained by perceptual organization and
in Chapter 3 and 4 that statistical learning is affected by the specific perceptual
modality receiving the relevant sensory input across the lifespan. This evidence
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that statistical learning is affected by perceptual processing provides insight into
the nature of the mechanisms supporting statistical learning, and specifically
that an amodal view of statistical learning is not adequate to capture the differ-
ences in learning seen across perceptual conditions.
6.1.1 The Effects of Perceptual Variability on Statistical Learn-
ing
The previous section argued that understanding how perception affects statis-
tical learning will provide insight into the mechanisms underlying statistical
learning and how these mechanisms operate in the wild to support experience-
based developmental change. Building on the argument that perceptual pro-
cessing affects statistical learning, this section asserts that perceptual variability
can also affect statistical learning. Learning from experience with statistical reg-
ularities cannot occur as a result of a single event or experience. Instead, learn-
ing from statistical information as conceived by the field of statistical learning
(e.g., transitional probabilities, distributions of frequency) must occur as a result
of numerous individual experiences (see Section 1.4.2). However, most statisti-
cal learning studies, focused on how statistical information alone affects learn-
ing, have typically employed repetitions of objects and do not consider how
variability across these multiple experiences affects learning.
Sensory input varies widely across multiple experiences of even the same
object or utterance. Taking the example of language, it is well known that there
exists a large amount of acoustic variability across themultiple utterances of any
given linguistic unit, even within the productions of a single speaker. Chapter 2
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reviews the ways in which speech variability necessitates the development of
speech categorization to map variable utterances to their functional categories.
Variability of sensory input is even possible within the same objective sensory
input. Chapter 5 emphasizes that visual sampling or eye movements affect sen-
sory input and the patterns of eye movement are related to perceptual abilities
in infancy and appear to co-develop with selective attention (e.g. Amso et al.,
2005; S. Johnson et al., 2004).
Despite the ubiquity of variability across experiences, little is known about
how statistical learning is affected by perceptual variability. As reviewed in the
previous section, most statistical learning experiments present statistical infor-
mation along a single, relevant dimension of the sensory input. For example,
using exact repetitions of utterances. While additional statistical information
could be included by adding an informative distribution to the utterances, ad-
ditional perceptual or non-statistical information could be added by permitting
variability across experiences with an utterance. The inclusion of perceptual
variability would bring statistical learning paradigms closer to the sensory ex-
perience received outside the laboratory, but few experiments have investigated
learning in paradigms that include non-statistical, perceptual variability.
An understanding of how perceptual variability affects statistical learning
is of increased importance given the current demonstrations that perceptual
processing affects learning. If statistical learning were supported by a domain-
general, abstract mechanism focused on statistical information only, perceptual
variability would not be relevant. Following from an abstract view of statistical,
the role of perception in statistical learning could simply be the detection of the
occurrence of an object or sensory experience or the discrimination of a given
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object from the set of objects used in the study. According to this view, percep-
tual variability could affect statistical learning in so far as perceptual variability
affects discrimination of individual objects. However, if perceptual variability
would likely be irrelevant to statistical learning as long as the identity of the
object remains equally discriminable. However, this dissertation presents ev-
idence that perceptual processes have a much greater influence on statistical
learning than proposed by standard accounts, and thus, perceptual variability
could have a large effect on statistical learning.
The empirical results presented in Chapter 2 provide evidence that learn-
ing from higher-order statistical regularities can proceed despite the presence
of perceptual variability. These experiments required participants to statistically
segment a stream based upon four novel acoustic categories, each instantiated
in six different exemplars. Because the higher-order statistical information was
not reliable based upon a single exemplar or pair of exemplars, participants had
to group the variable exemplars in order to uncover reliable statistical informa-
tion. Overall, we found evidence that adult statistical learning is robust to a
large amount of acoustic variability.
However, the way in which learning proceeds with variable exemplars re-
sults in perceptual restriction of what is learned. Participants appear to use
their naı¨ve perceptual organization of the sounds to support learning in the
presence of perceptual variability instead of focusing only on the top-down op-
timal statistical structure of the auditory stream. Specifically, participants group
the variable exemplars into three clusters and use these clusters to uncover the
higher-order statistical information. The authors found that using perceptual
organization to learn despite the presence of perceptual variability is both a
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benefit and a detriment to learning. Participants are able to generalize their
knowledge gained through statistical exposure to novel sounds that occupy the
same perceptual space or clusters, suggesting that perceptual processes can pro-
vide a knowledge robust to perceptual variability. However, given that these
clusters differ from the four experimenter-defined categories, the participants
have suboptimal learning and poorer prediction of successive sounds. While
not directly tested, it is most likely that if participants had been given a single,
prototypical exemplar from each category (i.e., no perceptual variability), learn-
ing would have occurred optimally because perceptual processes would not
have been needed to resolve the variability and separate overlapping acoustic
categories. Similarly, if participants had been given varying exemplars for cate-
gories that are already supported by perceptual processes, learning would also
have occurred optimally (e.g. Brady & Oliva, 2008; Baldwin et al., 2008). Thus,
learning in the presence of perceptual variability changes the character of learn-
ing and specifically that the presence of perceptual variability may enhance the
constraints placed on learning by perceptual processes.
While it seems intuitive that perceptual variability would obfuscate statis-
tical patterns in sensory input and require additional processing to overcome
variability to learn, as reported above, there is also evidence that variable ex-
perience can support more robust, behaviorally-effective learning. The learn-
ing paradigm employed in Chapter 5 also employs perceptual variability, but
the presence of perceptual variability appears to support learning, while sim-
ple repetition does not. Specifically, the same Target Scene was employed in
both an Experimental Condition and a Control Condition. This Target Scene
contained a novel Target Object that was occluded such that it was ambiguous
whether there was a single, occluded object or two separate objects. All par-
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ticipants initially perceived the Target Object as two disconnected parts. The
same repetition of the Target Scene was present across conditions, which pro-
vided 100% co-occurrence between these two object parts. However, in the Con-
trol Condition, very few participants changed their perception. Participants in
the Experimental Condition received additional, variable exposure to the Target
Object. Despite every experience being locally ambiguous, as the object was al-
ways occluded in some way, many more participants receiving this additional
variable exposure changed their perception of the Target Object. This experi-
ment suggests that variable exposure may in fact support better learning rather
than obstructing learning or obfuscating statistical information.
Building on this finding, there is also evidence for a relationship between
the presence of variability during exposure and the level of abstraction at which
statistical information in learned. In Section 1.4.2, it was suggested that there
is there is a relationship between amount of variability given during exposure
and the level of abstraction required by a given learning task with tasks requir-
ing rule-like or abstract knowledge providing a greater amount of variability
during exposure (e.g. rule-learning tasks, Marcus et al., 1999). While statistical
learning tasks typically display both an intermediate amount of variability and
abstraction, an increased level of variability might support learning at a more
abstract level of the sensory input. A recent study found evidence for category-
level learning in a statistical learning task with generalization to novel exem-
plars (Brady & Oliva, 2008). This study also exposed participants to many dif-
ferent exemplar scenes for each category during a long exposure, so participants
would not have been able to learn based on specific exemplars. The paper pre-
sented in Appendix D presents evidence that when observers could learn from
statistical regularities based on semantic categories as well as object-identity,
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learning is constrained to the less abstract, object-based regularities. However,
as with the results from Brady and Oliva (2008), if the statistical information
based on object-identity is not reliable, participants will learn based on semantic
categories. This result suggests that statistical learning might be biased towards
less abstract statistical regularities. However, the presence of perceptual vari-
ability at lower levels of abstraction during exposure can support more abstract
learning.
A relationship between variability and learning of deeper or more abstract
aspects of the sensory input was suggested by E. J. Gibson (1969), specifically
that variability of experience could allow the observer to distinguish what as-
pects of the sensory signal are an integral part of a higher-order pattern or in-
variant. Again, rather than obfuscating statistical learning, these results suggest
that perceptual variability might reveal important statistical information and
specifically that variability may be necessary for observers to learn from more
abstract statistical information. A link between higher variability and more
abstract learning suggests another way to elucidate how learning can proceed
from naturalistic sensory experience. For example, for sensory experiences sup-
ported by more abstract statistical information, greater variability of experience
may be necessary for the appropriate learning to take place. The opposite may
also hold that the more variability inherent in sensory input, the more abstract
any patterns of learning.
However, not all variability is likely to affect statistical learning. As illus-
trated in J. J. Gibson and Gibson (1955), participants are able increase their abil-
ity to pick out a specific novel drawing despite being presented with perceptual
variability. Relevant perceptual variability was presented along three dimen-
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The analysis of these cues made by one
of the authors in terms of stimulus gen-
eralization and differentiation (4) sug-
gests the present line of thought. It has
also led to a series of experiments con-
cerned with what we call identifying
responses. Motor reactions, verbal re-
actions, or percepts, we assume, are
identifying responses if they are in
specific correspondence with a set of
objects or events. Code learning (13),
aircraft recognition (7), and learning
to name the faces of one's friends are all
examples of an increasingly specific cor-
respondence between the items of stim-
ulation presented and the items of re-
sponse recorded. As a given response
gains univocality, the percept is re-
ported to gain in the feeling of familiar-
ity or recognition and to acquire mean-
ing.
AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXPERIMENT 2
In order to provide a clear example of such
learning, we studied the development of a
single identifying response. The 5 was pre-
sented with a visual item consisting of a
nonsense "scribble"; his recognition of it was
tested when it was interspersed in a series
of similar scribbles, and theri the single show-
ing and the multiple presentation were re-
peated until the item could be identified. We
devised a set of 17 scribbles intended to be
indistinguishable from the critical item on the
first trial, and another set of 12 items in-
tended to be distinguishable from the critical
item on the first trial.
The items which had to be differentiated
are shown in Fig. 1. The critical item, a
four-coil scribble, is in the center and 16 other
items are arranged outward from it. The
eighteenth item (a reversal of the critical
item) is not shown. It may be noted that
there are three dimensions of variation from
the critical item: (a) number of coils—three,
four, or five, (6) horizontal compression or
stretching, and (c) orientation or right-left
reversal. The latter two kinds of variation
were produced by photographic transforma-
2 This experiment was first reported at the
meeting of the American Psychological Associ-
ation in September 1950 in a paper read by
Eleanor J. Gibson, and an abstract has been
published (6).
FIG. 1. Nonsense items differing in three
dimensions of variation.
tion. There are three degrees of coil fre-
quency, three degrees of compression, and two
types of orientation, which yields 18 items.
Since one of these is the critical item, 17 re-
main for use in the experiment. The reader
may observe that when these differences are
verbally specified and the figures are dis-
played for immediate comparison, as in Fig.
1, they are clearly distinguishable. The Ss
of the experiment, however, saw the items
only in succession.
The 12 additional items presented on each
recognition trial are shown in Fig. 2. Each
differs from every other and from all of the
FIG. 2. Nonsense items differing in many
dimensions of variation.
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FIG. 2. Nonsense items differing in many
dimensions of variation.Figure 6.1: Fr m J. J. Gibson and Gibson (1955), the left pa el presen s
nonsense items differing along three dimensions and the right panel presents
items differing along ma y imensions
sions: number of circles, tightn ss and direction (see left panel of Figure 6.1).
Without feedback, both adults and children were able to increase their ability to
pick out the standard items (located in the center of the left panel of Figure 6.1).
However, their ability to pick out the target item amongst perceptual variability
will not increase if variability is presented along too many dimensions (see right
panel of Figure 6.1). Thus, for perceptual variability to affect learning, it must be
along the relevant dimensions or bear some perceptual relationship with what
is being learned.
One unique contribution of this dissertation considers variability of per-
ceptual experience in relation to learning from statistical information. Over-
all, these studies find that learning can be robust to large amounts of percep-
tual variability even without the benefit of specialized or explicit categorization
abilities (see Chapter 2). In fact, the presence of perceptual variability might
support invariant object representations (see Chapter 5). Finally, Appendix D
presents evidence that the level of abstraction learned by an observer from sta-
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tistical information might change based upon the presence of variability, and
correspondingly that variability might be necessary for learning in some cases.
The effect of perceptual variability on statistical learning suggests that the un-
derlying mechanisms of statistical learning are intimately tied with perceptual
processing. Additionally, the fact that perceptual variability has an impact on
statistical learning (e.g., more variability results in more abstract knowledge)
provides another way to understand how learning can proceed from natural-
istic sensory experience. For sensory experiences supported by more abstract
statistical information, greater variability of experience may be necessary for
the appropriate learning to take place.
6.2 Learning and Memory Systems Can Affect Perception
The thesis of this dissertation is that perceptual systems mutually influence
learning and memory systems during experience with novel statistical regular-
ities in sensory input. The previous section discussed in depth the findings and
implications in relation to how perceptual processing, and relatedly perceptual
variability, can affect learning outcomes or memory. This section discusses the
converse claim: that learning and memory systems can affect perception.
The broader argument in this dissertation suggests that differences in expe-
rience can support changes in perceptual processing through the response of
learning and memory systems to this experience. This form of feedback loop
supports dynamic change in how the observer perceives the world and in turn
affects what aspects of future experience are learned from.
This dissertation argues that patterns of statistical learning across percep-
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tual modalities differ in infants and adults. It is an open question as to why
these developmental changes occur. However, recent work reviewed in Chap-
ter 4 has suggested that the pattern of visual input is markedly different for
infants. Through the use of head-mounted cameras, Smith et al. (2011) found
that the visual input for infants 17- to 19-months-old was often dominated by
single objects in succession while the adults’ field of view often contained vi-
sual information from a number of objects. Thus, compared to adults, the in-
fants’ everyday visual input may be similar to the visual sequences presented
in the current study: sequential presentations of single objects. One possibility
is that visual statistical learning abilities in the learning paradigms employed
in Chapter 4 shift as visual input shifts from infant to adult views. We also
found evidence for a shift in auditory statistical learning between the ages 8 to
10 months. This shift in statistical learning abilities could be supported by sig-
nificant changes in language processing abilities occurring at this age (Bates et
al., 1998). While future research will be necessary in order to establish a direct
link between language development and changes in auditory statistical learning
as well as between visual processing and visual statistical learning, the frame-
work presented in this dissertation suggests that differences in experience drive
changes in perception and then changes in statistical learning. An integral part
of this view is that differences in experience must be able to result in adaptive
changes in perception.
This section discusses the effects of statistical regularities on learning and
memory systems and how this influence in turn affects perceptual systems.
First, an argument is presented that even though statistical learning is a pas-
sive and incidental type of learning task, statistical learning is not the result of
a passive absorption of statistical information. Instead, the author argues that
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statistical learning may be supported by the active process of prediction and
generating prediction errors. Then, the relevant empirical study reported in
Chapter 5 is reviewed and integrated with broader evidence that predictability
affects activity in perceptual cortices.
6.2.1 Is Statistical Learning Active?
Statistical learning and other forms of incidental learning are behaviorally pas-
sive in that they do not require an overt, relevant behavioral response for learn-
ing to occur. However, the current section proposes that incidental learning can
be considered active in so far as it may involve the process of prediction and
reduction of prediction error.
It is a prominent distinction within the area of learning and memory,
whether a learning task is active or passive. Tasks that are considered active of-
ten involve the participant engaging in behavioral responses that are relevant to
the learning outcomes. For example, reinforcement learning tasks often provide
feedback to a participant’s actions and this feedback is necessary for learning
(e.g. Shohamy, Myers, Grossman, et al., 2004). Passive learning tasks can often
have the same computational character as active learning tasks but either do
not require an overt behavioral response at all or require a behavioral response
that is not relevant for what is learned. Passive learning is often also referred
to as incidental learning. In the absence of a role for overt and relevant behav-
ior during the learning process, learning can be seen to occur as an unplanned
by-product of some other process or incidental to experience.
There is inconsistent evidence as to whether the involvement of a behav-
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ioral response essentially changes the quality of the learning task or the neural
systems supporting learning. There is some evidence that active and passive
learning have different neural underpinnings. For example, work by Shohamy,
Gluck, Myers and colleagues have found that the presence or absence of feed-
back affects whether the learning task is supported by basal ganglia learning
and memory systems (Shohamy, Myers, Onlaor, & Gluck, 2004; Shohamy, My-
ers, Hopkins, Sage, & Gluck, 2009). Touching on the vast results from the an-
imal learning and memory literature, separate neural mechanisms have been
proposed for instrumental vs. classical conditioning paradigms, active and pas-
sive learning tasks respectively (e.g., Berridge, 2000). However, studies of as-
sociative or reinforcement learning in humans have found parallel involvement
of the basal ganglia during learning for activity and passive versions of a re-
inforcement learning task (e.g., McClure, Berns, & Montague, 2003; Pagnoni,
Zink, Montague, & Berns, 2002). Thus, there is some compelling evidence that
the active vs. passive character of behavioral responses importantly affects the
mechanisms underlying learning; however, recent work with human partici-
pants has suggested that similar neural mechanisms can support learning in
both active and passive paradigms.
Considering the active-passive dichotomy presented above, statistical learn-
ing is certainly a passive learning task consistent with other forms of incidental
learning. Participants in statistical learning tasks are never given a directive to
learn from the patterns present in sensory input. In fact, explicit instruction
to learn from sensory input affects and sometimes disrupts learning abilities
(e.g. Reber, Kassin, Lewis, & Cantor, 1980). Participants often provide no re-
sponses at all during exposure to test stimuli. In paradigms where participants
are asked to provide a response, the response is not relevant to the learning as
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the response does not help to reveal the underlying structure of the test stimuli
and is specifically designed to be orthogonal to the information to be learned
(see experiments in Chapter 2 and 3 for non-relevant behavioral tasks during
exposure). Thus, statistical learning tasks are unambiguously behaviorally pas-
sive.
Despite no active external change in behavior, incidental learning could be
considered to be active in the sense that the brain could be learning through
predicting successive sensory inputs and reducing prediction error (see Sec-
tion 1.2.1). A passive view of learning from statistical regularities would involve
no prediction or effort on the part of the observer to reduce their prediction er-
ror. For example, passive statistical learning of a sequence of stimuli would
involve reflexive, as opposed to predictive, association where each successive
stimulus simply produces an update on the associative strength, frequency, etc.
for that stimulus and the previous one. An active view of statistical learning
would posit that the presentation of a stimulus would result in a prediction of
what the next stimulus will be, and in turn this prediction can generate an esti-
mate of prediction error. As a result of prediction error, the observer can update
their internal model of the environment. This active model of incidental learn-
ing is broadly consistent with contemporary views of learning as a reduction of
prediction error (McClelland, 2002; Redgrave & Gurney, 2006; Rescorla & Wag-
ner, 1972) and specifically with the Predictive Coding Theory of cortical function
proposed by Friston (2005) which involves both prediction or predictive coding
as well as prediction error. The Predictive Coding Theory of cortical responses
will be discussed a more length later in this section.
One of the implications of the view of statistical learning as a passive accu-
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mulation of statistical information is that more experience with statistical regu-
larities will result in better statistical learning. However, there is some sugges-
tion that the amount of experience is not the only factor affecting learning out-
comes. First, there is evidence that the equivalent amount of exposure results in
greater learning when the relevant information is selectively attended. There is
also some evidence that experience without selective attention results in no sta-
tistical learning (Toro et al., 2005; Turk-Browne et al., 2005 and results presented
in Chapter 3, however see Saffran et al., 1997). Second, results from Chapter 4
suggest that greater exposure might not support greater learning. The experi-
ments in this study employed infant-controlled habituation methods which al-
low a greater measure of the infant’s selective attention than fixed habituation. 2
In both visual and auditory conditions, non-habituated infants received greater,
overtly attended exposure to statistical information (this result was significantly
reliable in the auditory condition only). However, non-habituated infants do
not show evidence for greater learning. In fact, both groups of non-habituated
infants fail to show a statistically significant direction of preference at test, the
measure for statistical learning for that experiment (see Section 4.4.5 for a dis-
cussion of these data). Again, this result entail that greater exposure does not
necessarily support greater statistical learning suggesting that the passive ab-
sorption of statistical information is not the sole factor supporting statistical
learning. An emerging line of evidence exploring suggest that infants’ social
knowledge affects statistical learning. The use of a social attention cue (e.g. eye
gaze) helps infants learn in a difficult but ecologically-valid statistical learning
task (Wu, Gopnik, Richardson, & Kirkham, 2011). Without a social attention
cue, infants receive almost twice the exposure to the statistical information but
2However, infant-controlled habituation only controls for overt attention as measured by eye
gaze and not other more precise attentional measures such as heart rate deceleration (Richards
& Gibson, 1997).
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do not show as robust learning effects (Wu & Kirkham, 2010). Providing paral-
lel results from those presented in Chapter 4, Wu, Kirkham and colleagues find
that differences the internal processes (such as selective attention) facilitated by
the presence of an informative social cue result in greater learning even when
infants receive much less overall exposure. Overall, these findings suggest that
greater exposure to statistical information does not necessarily result in greater
statistical learning. This provides some indication that a view of statistical learn-
ing as a passive accumulation of statistical information might not capture the
nuances of the learning process in these tasks. Instead, internal, possibly active,
processes, such as socially-based selective attention, appear to influence what is
learned from experience with statistical regularities.
There is behavioral evidence that statistical learning involves processes of
prediction error, a process generally believed to underlie active learning pro-
cesses. Learning through the reduction of prediction error is well captured in
the Rescorla-Wagner (R-W) model (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). Famously, this
model predicted two curious behavioral effects: blocking and overshadowing.
3 According to R. Miller et al. (1995), the a priori prediction of overshadow-
ing and blocking by the R-W model are among the model’s great successes.
There is some evidence for blocking and/or overshadowing effects in statisti-
cal learning. Previous exposure to stimuli employed in statistical learning tasks
affects later learning. Evidence for reduction in learning has been found when
3In both blocking and over-shadowing procedures, two CSs are paired with a single US. In
the case of blocking, prior exposure of CS1 and the US prevents the conditioning of the second
CS. In short, blocking is the deficit of a conditioned response to CS2 after CS1-CS2 → US in
which CS1 was previously paired with the US. The former event is explained by the R-Wmodel
as the blocked CS having no associative strength. In the case of overshadowing, both CSs are
presented with the single US from the beginning, but one CS develops a stronger CR than the
other. This can be modulated by the relative intensity or salience of the CSs, for example. In
this case, the prediction error is attributed to the more salient stimulus (R. Miller, Barnet, &
Grahame, 1995).
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stimuli have been previously presented in random temporal sequence (Catena,
Scholl, Isola, & Turk-Browne, 2010) or in an unpredictive context (Junge´, Scholl,
& Chun, 2007). In addition, previous learning of a statistical sequence (Gebhart
et al., 2009) leads to decreased learning of a second sequence using the same
stimuli. These behavioral results are consistent with predictions from the R-
W model which relies upon prediction of successive stimuli for learning sug-
gesting that statistical learning is also supported, at least in part, by predictive
learning.
There is evidence that statistical learning, and incidental associative learn-
ing more broadly, includes a prediction error signal in the striatum. Striatal
responses to unpredicted events have been mapped onto prediction error as
conceptualized in a number of prediction-based learning models such as the
R-W model. This pattern of results has been found in both passive and active
reinforcement tasks in human learners (e.g., McClure et al., 2003; Pagnoni et
al., 2002). Evidence of a striatal involvement in prediction error has also been
found in an incidental learning task similar to statistical learning: den Ouden,
Friston, Daw, McIntosh, and Stephan (2009) found that when a stimulus (an au-
ditory tone) predicted the presentation of a second, visual stimulus, there is ev-
idence that striatal responses represent prediction error. Thus, in passive learn-
ing tasks where the only basis for learning is the statistical regularity of succes-
sive stimuli, there is evidence for the involvement of prediction error. While
this study did not specifically examine whether such responses are consistent
with prediction error, Turk-Browne et al. (2009) found preferential responses
of the striatum during experience with statistically-defined sequences of visual
stimuli. Importantly, there was no difference in the relative frequency of indi-
vidual items, another possible reason for striatum involvement in a sequence
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learning task (Amso et al., 2005). Thus, there is some evidence that incidental
learning broadly, and statistical learning specifically, involve prediction error as
evidenced in striatal function.
Finally, recent studies have argued that perceptual cortices exhibit predictive
responses as a result of experience with statistical regularities in sensory input.
These studies support a theory of cortical responses called Predictive Coding.
As summarized in the paper by den Ouden et al. (2009),
Predictive coding posits a hierarchy of connected brain areas in
which each level strives to attain a compromise between information
about sensory inputs provided by the level below and predictions (or
priors) provided by the level above. The central learning principle is
to establish a good model of the world, which is achieved by chang-
ing connection strengths such that prediction errors are minimized
at all levels of the hierarchy. ... Predictive coding may be a general
principle of brain function in which statistical relationships in the
world are monitored, even when they are .. not relevant for ongoing
behavior. This would allow the brain to ignore predictable and there-
fore uninteresting events in the environment, thereby enhancing the
saliency of unexpected events. (p. 1849)
This model is often contrastedwith a feature-based viewwhere bottom-up stim-
ulus features drive the cortical responses and responses decline with repetition
of the same stimulus features in what is called repetition suppression (e.g., Grill-
Spector et al., 2006). In addition to finding evidence for straital-based prediction
error, den Ouden et al. (2009) found evidence for predictive coding in the pri-
mary visual cortex. Specifically, the visual cortex responded most when an un-
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expected visual stimulus was presented but also when an expected visual stim-
ulus was not presented. This latter response is not predicted by a feature-based
theory of cortical responses (e.g., Grill-Spector et al., 2006) but is consistent with
Predictive Coding models of cortical response (e.g., Friston, 2005). Parallel re-
sults are reported by Egner et al. (2010); this study found that activity in the
ventral visual stream responds differently based on the relatively predictability
of categories of complex visual stimuli. The probability that a face or a house
stimulus would be presented was manipulated by a cue.4 According to models
of Predictive Coding, activity in the ventral visual cortex will not respond sim-
ply based upon the features of the given stimuli but based on whether that type
of stimulus is predicted. Figure 6.2 provides an illustration of the cortical re-
sponses predicted from a Predictive Coding model and standard, feature-based
models of cortical response. Activity in a face-selective area of the visual cor-
tex (fusiform face area, FFA) was found to be modulated by the probability of
receiving a stimulus from a given category (see Figure 6.3). Taken together,
these results support a view that responses in perceptual cortices are predic-
tive in character and modulated by the relative predictability of sensory input.
While future research is necessary to establish the extent to which these effects
generalize to other statistical-based incidental learning tasks such as canonical
statistical learning paradigms, evidence of predictive coding during inciden-
tal learning suggests that statistical learning could be supported by an active,
prediction-based learning process.
In sum, considering the active-passive dichotomy presented in the begin-
ning of this section, statistical learning and other forms of incidental learning
4Participants were asked to perform a cover task of categorizing occasional inverted stim-
uli. This task is arguably an irrelevant behavioral task as the target inverted stimuli were not
manipulated by the cue and was orthogonal to the perceptual expectation manipulation. Thus,
Egner et al. (2010) is also passive as defined in the beginning of the section.
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Figure 6.2: From Egner et al. (2010), graphs depict the fusiform face area (FFA)
population response patterns predicted by the Predictive Coding and feature
detection theories of cortical function. A, Predictive coding argues that FFA
population responses reflect the sum (right) of activity generated by
representation units (face expectation, left) and error units (face surprise,
middle). B, Feature detection views suppose that the FFA population response
is driven by stimulus features, with face stimuli eliciting stronger responses
than house stimuli.
are certainly passive in so far as they do not involve task-guided behavior or
feedback. However, this section argues that the cognitive processes underlying
incidental learning, and statistical learning specifically, can be conceived to be
active in that they involve prediction of successive stimuli and prediction error
rather than the passive absorption of statistical information. This section both
presented behavioral results that are inconsistent with such a passive view of
the mechanisms supporting statistical learning and evidence for both predic-
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Figure 6.3: From Egner et al. (2010), A, FFA localizer group results and B, mean
group beta estimations for the ROI defined by the FFA localization displayed
in A.
tion error and predictive coding in incidental learning tasks driven by relative
predictability of sensory input.
6.2.2 Information Gathering and Statistical Regularities
Even if incidental learning, such as statistical learning, and more active forms
of learning, such as reinforcement learning, have some overlapping learning
mechanisms, it is an important area for future research to determine how inci-
dental learning and more behaviorally-active learning interact to support de-
velopmental change. There is some indication that experience with statisti-
cal regularities might affect behaviorally active forms of learning and specifi-
cally with active information gathering or exploration. Goldstein et al. (2010)
proposes an interaction of statistical significance, to be picked up incidentally,
and behavioral-significant, such as reinforcement through social interaction, in
learning from structure. Thus, an interaction of incidental and active learning
244
could bias the process of learning structure in general and specifically, language
acquisition. Building on this example, this subsection explains the role of ex-
ploration in developmental change according to the Ecological perspective and
reviews some evidence that experience with regularities can affect such infor-
mation gathering activities.
Exploration is an important tool at the disposal of the observer and sup-
ports changes in perception as a result of experience. The layman’s definition
of exploration entails an overt, conscious searching of the environment. By con-
trast, Ecological approaches emphasize a connection between perception and
exploration. Exploration does not occur after perception but in the service of
perception. Thus, exploration can be viewed as a form of directed information
gathering (E. J. Gibson, 1969).
There are many possible avenues for exploration or information gathering.
For example, in her first year of post-natal life, an observer could employ man-
ual and oral exploration, reaching, sucking, crawling, attentive listening, etc.
One key method for sensory exploration, available to the newborn and impor-
tant throughout the lifespan, is eye gaze. In fact, within the first few months
of post-natal life, infants make millions of eye movements (Haith et al., 1988).
Recent research has linked changes in eye movements to changes in visual ob-
ject perception (Amso & Johnson, 2006; S. Johnson et al., 2004). This research
emphasizes that exploration of sensory input changes the resulting perception
of that sensory input and such information gather abilities increase throughout
development and with experience (E. J. Gibson, 1969; E. J. Gibson & Pick, 2000).
There is some evidence that information gathering behaviors can be affected
by the presence of predictive regularities in sensory input. Haith et al. (1988)
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found that experience with statistical regularities supported changes in ex-
ploratory eyemovements in 3.5-month-old infants. As reviewed in Section 1.3.1,
infants were presented with either a predictable sequence of visual stimuli or
an unpredictable sequence. Even though infants had no control over the visual
stimuli in both conditions, infants viewing the predictable sequence exhibited
more anticipatory eye movements (eye movements produced before the pre-
sentation of the visual stimulus) and had faster facilitated eye movements (eye
movements elicited after the presentation of the visual stimulus). This study
specifically finds a relationship between experience with statistical regularity
and infants’ exploration.
This dissertation also presents empirical evidence that experience with en-
vironmental regularities can shape exploration strategies. Chapter 5 examined
eye movements during experience with structured sensory input (Experimental
Condition) compared to sensory input without any supportive structure (Con-
trol Condition). Eye movements to the Target Scenes to examined in relation to
exposure condition but also whether a participant changes their post-test per-
ception of the Target Object. We found that the strongest predictor of eye move-
ment patterns is exposure condition: participants in the Experimental Condition
had markedly different patterns of fixation compared to the Control Condition
regardless of whether they changed their perception. We do also find evidence
of modest differences in eye movements for participants who change their per-
ception in the Experimental Condition and specifically, differences in visual ex-
ploration of the Target Scene. These results build on research in infants showing
that individual differences in visual exploration predict individual differences
in visual object perception and suggest that experience with statistical regular-
ities in sensory input might facilitate changes in exploration strategies and in
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turn support changes in perception.
A relationship between incidental experience with statistical regularities and
visual exploration might be a powerful mechanism to support developmental
change. Haith et al. (1988) emphasize that such a relationship will facilitate
the development of a number of important behaviors including motor develop-
ment, which depends on visual monitoring, such as reaching and catching but
would likely also support behavioral-interaction with visual objects in general.
A similar argument is made by Fernald and colleagues. A number of studies
have found that childrens’ visual exploration can be affected by predictive rela-
tionships in language (presumably learned through incidental language experi-
ence) such as the first syllable of a word or the marker of grammatical gender
which is spoken before a noun. Fernald and colleagues have argued that faster
visual exploration based on predictive relationships in language is particularly
important to the development of language comprehension given that language
is a fast-paced temporally unfolding and transient signal (also reviewed in Sec-
tion 1.3.1, see Fernald et al., 2001; Lew-Williams & Fernald, 2007).
As asserted by Piaget (1971) “anticipatory function... is to be found over
and over again at every level of the cognitive mechanisms and at the very heart
of the most elementary habits, even of perception” (p. 19). The current sec-
tion argues that incidental learning from statistical regularities can be consid-
ered active in the sense that it likely involves both predictions and prediction
error. Despite any overlap between the mechanisms supporting behaviorally-
active and behaviorally-passive learning, the interaction between these types of
learning may uncover powerful mechanisms for developmental change. As an
example, the author outlines evidence that experience with statistical regulari-
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ties can support changes in eye movements. It is important to note that given
that this mechanism depends on the mechanisms of visual selective attention,
there will be cognitive limits on the effectiveness of this mechanism early in the
first post-natal year, see Section 5.3. However, the possible relationship between
incidental learning and information gathering strategies remains an important
area for future study.
6.2.3 Sensory Predictability Can Affect Perception
This dissertation provides some initial evidence for the claim that learning and
memory systems can shape perception as a result of experience with regular-
ity in sensory input. Briefly, Chapter 5 found that structure present in sensory
input can drive changes in object perception through the involvement of both
the medial temporal lobe, likely binding across variable experiences to extract
invariant representations of the novel Target Object, and fronto-striatal circu-
ity which may drive changes in eye movements seen during the Experimental
condition. Thus, structured sensory input can affect perception through activity
in learning and memory systems. Moreover, this mechanism is available in in-
fancy and could potentially drive changes in object perception early in the first
post-natal year (see Section 5.3)
While the results in Chapter 5 present one mechanism by which experience
with regularity in sensory input can affect changes in object perception through
the involvement of learning and memory systems, this dissertation suggests
that this specific mechanism by which learning and memory systems can affect
perception is simply one avenue by which learning and memory systems can
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affect perception. While much future empirical work is needed in this vein, this
section builds on the proposal that statistical learning is the result of prediction-
based processes and suggests a second avenue by which experience with statis-
tical regularities can affect perception.
Differences in predictability of sensory input have been shown to modu-
late cortical responses in relevant perceptual regions and cortical connectivity
between regions. As reviewed in the previous section, recent studies have
found that when predictability of given stimuli is modulated (e.g., the asso-
ciative strength of a visual stimulus following an auditory cue or the relative
predictability of a certain category of visual stimulus) that perceptual cortices
respond in accord with this predictability (den Ouden et al., 2009; Egner et al.,
2010). den Ouden et al. (2009) also found that the relative predictability of a vi-
sual stimulus following an auditory stimulus affects the cortical connectivity be-
tween primary auditory and visual regions. Specifically, dynamic causal mod-
eling techniques revealed that the strength of an A1→ V1 connection changed
as a function of the associative strength predicted by the R-W model. Together
these findings suggest that functions of perceptual systems can be affected by
the relative predictability of sensory input.
Consistent with the proposal put forward in this dissertation, recent evi-
dence has suggested that these changes in activity of perceptual systems are
the result of influences from learning and memory systems. den Ouden et al.
(2009) found some indirect evidence that the cortical connectivity between pri-
mary auditory and visual regions was mediated by the striatum: A dynamic
causal modelling found that the superior model included a single mediating
connection between A1 and V1; a parallel pattern of activation in the striatum
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suggested that the striatum was the mediator between A1 and V1. If the stria-
tum was indeed the mediating connection, its function would be to adjust cor-
tical connectivity between these regions based upon prediction errors and af-
fect predictive coding in V1. Extending these results, den Ouden, Daunizeau,
Roiser, Friston, and Stephan (2010) employed a cross-modal associative learn-
ing task, similar to the one employed in den Ouden et al. (2009). However,
in this follow-up study, participants were asked to discriminate amongst two
types of visual stimuli (faces and pictures of places). These two types of stimuli
were preceded by different auditory cues. Specific auditory cues predicted spe-
cific types of visual stimuli with different levels of strength. The relationship
between cues and targets varies dynamically across the experiment requiring
participants to continuously update the predictive relationship between acous-
tic and visual stimuli. Trial-by-trial changes in associating strength were mod-
eled using a Bayesian learning model. As with den Ouden et al. (2009), striatal
activity was found to approximate the prediction errors for both visual stimuli
and two distinct regions of the visual cortex corresponding to the fusiform face
area and the parahippocampal place area also exhibited predictive coding. Crit-
ically, den Ouden et al. (2010) found that prediction errors in the striatum mod-
ulated connectivity between these stimulus-specific visual areas and the motor
regions supporting the discriminative response (premotor cortex). This result
extends the findings of den Ouden et al. (2009) in two important ways: First,
this study provides direct evidence that striatal prediction error is used to tune
functional connectivity in cortical networks, and specifically, connectivity with
perceptual cortices; second, these results provide some evidence that these trial-
by-trial changes in predictability and effects of predictive coding have some be-
havioral efficacy as predictability was associated with response speed and accu-
250
racy. Thus, the results from den Ouden et al. (2009) and den Ouden et al. (2010)
suggest a second avenue by which learning and memory systems can translate
experience with statistical regularities into changes in perception. Specifically,
prediction errors produced in the striatum can be used to modulate cortical con-
nectivity with stimulus-specific regions of neocortex. However, future research
is needed to determine whether such modulations of cortical connectivity and
predictive coding can produce lasting changes in perception before these results
can be more directly applied to the lasting experience-based changes in percep-
tion that this dissertation aims to explain.
This dissertation proposes that experience can shape perception is through
the response of learning and memory systems to statistical regularities. This
proposed framework is potentially powerful given the ubiquity of statistical
information in sensory input. Chapter 5 presents a specificmechanism bywhich
variable visual experience with objects can support changes in object perception
through activity in multiple learning and memory systems (MTL and BG). This
section also outlines a second mechanism by which prediction error produced
in the striatum can affect activity in perceptual cortices and changes in stimulus
detection.
6.2.4 Learning and Memory Systems Can Affect Perception:
Conclusions
Perceptual processing has typically been conceived as a passive detector of in-
formation in the environment. The studies reviewed in this section suggest that
perceptual cortices, as well as learning and memory systems, can engage in pre-
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dictive coding and produce prediction errors in response to experience with
statistical regularities. The involvement of active predictive processes in re-
sponse to statistical information presents a more active view of perception and
one that is shaped by experience, in accord with the Ecological views presented
in Chapter 1. This section discusses empirical evidence both from this disserta-
tion (Chapter 5) and from other recent findings (e.g. den Ouden et al., 2010) that
learning andmemory systems are involved in translating experience with statis-
tical regularity into adaptive changes in perceptual processes. While currently
the evidence for the direct impact of learning andmemory processes on changes
in perception is sparse and there are many areas remaining for future study in
order to support this argumentation, these results support the broader frame-
work presented in this dissertation that learning and memory system and per-
ceptual systems are mutually influential to support adaptive experience-based
change in perceptual processing throughout the lifespan.
6.3 Implications for Developmental Psychology
The field of developmental psychology studies systematic psychological
changes that occur across the lifespan. The current empirical work examines
learning from statistical regularities in sensory input. Statistical learning has
been implicated in the development of a number of perceptual-cognitive tasks
and, most notably, language acquisition (e.g., Saffran & Thiessen, 2007). De-
spite a number of studies demonstrating statistical learning using many types
of sensory input and some consensus that statistical learning is involved in de-
velopmental change, very few studies have helped to elucidate the nature of
the learning mechanism(s) supporting statistical learning and how these mech-
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anisms operate given the complex and variable sensory experience that drives
language development (Romberg & Saffran, 2010). This dissertation contributes
a novel view to both of these important open questions. Indeed, a greater un-
derstanding of both the mechanisms of statistical learning and how these mech-
anisms can operate given real-world sensory input is the major contribution of
this dissertation to the field of developmental psychology. See Section 6.1 for an
in-depth discussion on this topic.
The empirical evidence presented in this dissertation is broadly consistent
with a number of contemporary approaches to cognitive development. While
the goal of the current work is not to take a stance on the origins of human
knowledge, the specific emphasis on experience with statistical information
found in sensory input in developmental change is most consistent with empir-
ical approaches to development and de-emphasizes the need for innate knowl-
edge in adaptive developmental change, as proposed by nativist theories. Cur-
rently there are a number of developmental theories or frameworks that em-
phasize the role of experience-driven changes in perception and cognition, in-
cluding Connectionism (e.g. Elman et al., 1996; Thelen & Bates, 2003), Bayesian
inference (e.g. Gopnik & Tenenbaum, 2007; Tenenbaum et al., 2011), Neurocon-
structivism (Mareschal et al., 2007) and Neo-Constructivism (S. Johnson, 2010).
These frameworks have different foci and the current work has overlapping em-
phasis with all of these approaches. For example, Neuroconstructivism empha-
sizes the interrelationship between neural and cognitive development, while
Connectionism emphasizes the need for prediction error in driving changes in
representations.
The major division within the contemporary theoretical approaches, indi-
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cated above, is between constructivist approaches (e.g., Neo-constructivism,
Neuroconstructvism and Bayesian inference) and associationist approaches to
learning and development (e.g. Connectionism). While this dissertation re-
mains generally neutral on this theoretical division, current results do weigh on
this debate within the area of visual statistical learning. Constructivism empha-
sizes changes in knowledge as a result of experience. For example, Neurocon-
structivism emphasizes that development results in changes in the complexity
of representation and Bayesian inference emphasizes a hierarchical integration
of knowledge. Associationism emphasizes that developmental change can oc-
cur through changes in connections as a result of experience. Associationists
criticize Constructivist approaches for building in abstract, complex represen-
tations, and conversely, Constructivist approaches criticize Associationism for
failing to capture the complexity of human cognition including abstract think-
ing and ability to generalize knowledge. Some recent work has sought to de-
termine whether patterns of statistical learning is more consistent with Associa-
tionist or Constructivist (specifically, Bayesian) approaches. Orba´n, Fiser, Aslin,
and Lengyel (2008) presented evidence that the ability of human observers to
chunk visual elements into single multi-element entities is captured by Bayesian
models but not associationist models. These behavioral findings are reminis-
cent of the results presented in Chapter 5 where the consistent association of
two parts of a single object in a scene did not support a unified perception (in
the Control Condition), but variable experience with the Target Object in addi-
tional scenes did support a change to a completed percept (in the Experimental
Condition). This result fits well with Bayesian and, by extension, Constructivist
views of experience-based perceptual-cognitive change.
The goal of the current work is not to refute or support specific theoretical
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views; however, this work generally supports an empirical view that develop-
ment can result from experience and specifically, experience with sensory input
endowed with statistical regularities. This view is broadly consistent with a
number of contemporary approaches to development. Instead, the implications
of this dissertation to developmental psychology is to provide some insight into
the mechanisms by which experience with statistical information in sensory in-
put can result in adaptive changes in perception.
6.4 Implications for Cognitive Science and Cognitive Psychol-
ogy
As summarized in the beginning on this chapter, a major focus of contempo-
rary cognitive science, and specifically cognitive psychology, is elucidating the
nature of cognitive processes and the representations they act upon. An impor-
tant component of this pursuit is the debate about which, if any, mental pro-
cesses are modular or informationally-encapsulated and which processes are
informationally-continuous (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Spivey, 2007). This section will
discuss the implications the results presented in this dissertation have for this
debate.
The modularity debate includes the nature of perceptual processes: Some
researchers defend a modular view of perception, while others assert that per-
ception is continuous with cognition. This section will focus on the modular-
ity debate as it is relevant for visual perception, but the theoretical views are
relevant to questions concerning all perceptual modalities. One can frame the
modularity debate as answers to the question “Why do we perceive the world
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the way that we do?” and contrast answers. Considering visual perception,
the question of why we see things the way we do in large measure
still eludes us: Is it only because of the particular stimulation we
receive at our eyes, together with our hard-wired visual system? or
is it also because those are the things we expect to see or are prepared
to assimilate in our mind? (Pylyshyn, 1999, p. 341)
If the former answer, that we see things the way we do because of the pat-
tern of sensory input we receive, is consistent with a modular view of visual
perception: visual perception is affected only by the visual sensory input pro-
vided and the static response of the system to that input (see Pylyshyn, 1999).
The latter answer is consistent with a continuous view of perception and cogni-
tion. Visual perception is permeable to cognitive functions such as expectations.
Following from Bruner (1957), a common line of evidence for this view is the
permeability of perception based on motivation and experience (see a nice sum-
mary of this field by Pylyshyn, 1999). Recent research in this vein by Balcetis
and colleagues has found that an observer’s political partisanship affects an ob-
server’s perception of a candidate’s skin-tone (Caruso, Mead, & Balcetis, 2009),
and that desired objects are seen as closer than undesirable objects in both vi-
sual estimates of distance and in their motor responses (bean bag tosses) to the
object (Balcetis & Dunning, 2010). Similarly, evidence for top-down influences
in visual perception also support a continuous view of visual perception. A
classic example of this is perception of Mooney faces. Mooney faces are impov-
erished images of faces that are extremely difficult to recognize (Mooney, 1957).
However, primes of less impoverished visual images of the faces supports rapid
and robust perception of the impoverished Mooney faces. Recent research with
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Mooney faces has also found evidence that prior experience with a face (e.g., a
famous face such as Albert Einstein) supports differences in the perception of
impoverished Mooney faces of that individual (Jemel, Pisani, Calabria, Crom-
melinck, & Bruyer, 2003).
This dissertation argues for an informationally-continuous view of percep-
tion and cognition. The author argues for an informational interrelationship be-
tween perceptual and learning and memory systems. Building on the research
reported in the previous paragraph, the study in Chapter 5 finds evidence that
activity of learning and memory systems during variable yet regular experi-
ence with a novel object can change the perception of that object, without any
changes in the sensory input (i.e., the Target Scene is identical both across exper-
imental conditions and throughout the experiment but experience modulates
changes in perception of the Target Object in this scene). The finding that per-
ception can change without changes in sensory input and that these changes are
dependent upon the type of visual experience refutes a modular view of visual
perception as outlined above and in Pylyshyn (1999).
In sum, an important debate in Cognitive Science is whether perceptual
processes are informationally-encapsulated from other aspects of cognition.
The author argues that perceptual processes are not modular or encapsulated
but rather are informationally-continuous with other aspects of cognition and
specifically learning and memory systems. Building on evidence that percep-
tion changes with motivation and top-down modulation, findings in Chapter 5
provide evidence that representations created in part by the activity learning
and memory systems can change perception.
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6.5 Implications for Cognitive Neuroscience
The field of Cognitive Neuroscience investigates the relationship between men-
tal or cognitive and neural processes. This dissertation has argued for an in-
terrelationship between perceptual processes and learning and memory pro-
cesses during experience with novel statistical regularities in sensory input. In
the field of Cognitive Neuroscience, specific neural regions are associated with
these cognitive processes; occipital cortices is believed to support visual pro-
cesses and themedial temporal lobe is believed to support learning andmemory
processes. Recent research has challenged the exclusive association between ac-
tivity in the medial temporal lobe and learning and memory and proposed that
some regions of the medial temporal lobe might support perceptual functions.
The current section discusses how the framework presented in this document
may influence this ongoing debate in the field of Cognitive Neuroscience.
While compelling and convergent evidence exists that the medial temporal
lobe is involve in learning andmemory functions, recent research has suggested
that regions in themedial temporal lobe are also important for perception. Some
of the early evidence for continuity between visual perception and learning and
memory was provided by studies of monkeys with perirhinal cortex lesions.
Specifically, these monkeys exhibited a deficit in an oddity-discrimination task
(Buckley et al., 2001). In this task, a number of visual stimuli are presented si-
multaneously with one “odd” stimulus; see Figure 6.4. Monkeys with perirhinal
cortex lesions showed deficits in oddity-discrimination only when the stimuli
were complex, as illustrated in this figure (see Baxter, 2009; Suzuki, 2009, for
other compelling results). Accordingly, some researchers have suggested that
rather than a clear distinction between the perceptual functions of the ventral
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Another noteworthy feature of the procedure was that all
animals were exposed to the 15 different monkey face views in
an earlier discrimination learning task. Accordingly, control
animals, but not perirhinal-lesioned animals, might have
benefited from an accruing long-term memory for the individual
monkey face images that would have allowed them to start asso-
ciating the different views of the same face together in memory
even before the difficult version of the task began. Similar argu-
ments can be made for the human face oddity task and the
object oddity task used in the same study. Buckley and Gaffan
(2006) argue that an associative learning deficit cannot explain
the impairment found on the scene oddity task where three
copies of the same scene were shown together with a different
scene (Figure 2B). However, because only ten such scenes
were used, a stronger long-term memory for the identity of the
individual scenes could have helped the control group relative
to the perirhinal lesion group by allowing them to recognize
and differentiate the individual scenesmore quickly across trials.
Thus, by this view, impaired associative learning or long-term
memory for individual scenes rather than impaired visual percep-
tion could have contributed to all the deficits reported for the
perirhinal-lesioned group in Buckley et al. (2001).
Bussey et al. (2003) used a different strategy to try to manipu-
late perceptual difficulty without taxing memory. In this experi-
ment, control and perirhinal-lesioned monkeys first learned
a simple visual discrimination until they performed well. As
expected, there was no impairment in the learning of this easy
discrimination problem. The monkeys were then tested on the
same stimulus pair but with the discriminations now made more
difficult by using a morphing program to increase the feature
overlap between the two original items. Perirhinal-lesioned
animalswere significantly impairedat identifying the correct stim-
ulus in the ‘‘high feature overlap’’ version of the task. The authors
concluded that thedeficit is indicative of a significant contribution
of the perirhinal cortex to perception. However, as the authors
themselves point out (Bussey et al., 2006), to perform this task
animals must compare the high feature overlap stimulus to the
original target stimulus held in memory. Despite the fact that
the perirhinal-lesioned animals learned the simple discrimination
task normally, a poor long-term memory of the more complex
target imagescouldhave impaired theperformanceof theperirhi-
nal-lesioned group in the absence of a perceptual impairment.
According to this interpretation, the performance of control
animals even on the first few trials of themore difficult discrimina-
tion would surpass the performance of perirhinal-lesioned
animals, not because of the superior perceptual abilities of the
controls but because they bring a better long-term memory of
the target items to their performance of the task.
Baxter (2009) comments on a different study by Bussey et al.
(2002) in which the latter group tested monkeys with perirhinal
lesions on discrimination learning problemswith either low, inter-
mediate, or high levels of feature ambiguity. Impairment was
observed in perirhinal-lesioned animals only for learning the
stimuli with high feature ambiguity. Baxter (2009) argues that
given the demands on learning and memory were consistent
across the three different learning conditions tested, it is is diffi-
cult to attribute any observed deficits to impaired learning or
memory per se and therefore these findings support the idea
that the perirhinal cortex is involved in perception of stimuli
with high amounts of feature overlap. An argument against this
interpretation is that in the context of a discrimination learning
task where learning is measured over multiple trials, using items
with high levels of stimulus overlap may increase the memory
demand of this task disproportionately more than the same
discrimination tested with simple, easy to discriminate stimuli.
This is because learning discriminations between two items
with high feature overlap likely requires higher levels of both
learning and memory for the detailed object and/or spatial
features of the correct item that must be retained over multiple
learning trials in order to effectively discriminate the correct
item from its foil. The same learning/memory demand is much
reduced when simple, easy to discriminate stimuli are used.
For these reasons, the impairments of the perirhinal-lesioned
group in Bussey et al. (2002) can be best understood as
a memory impairment rather than a perceptual impairment.
Two studies that reported no evidence of perceptual deficits
following perirhinal lesions in monkeys also deserve mention.
Hampton and Murray (2002) trained control and perirhinal-
lesioned monkeys on a visual discrimination task until they per-
formed well. They then tested perceptual generalization by
presenting a small number of nonrewarded probe trials in which
the target stimuli had beenmodified in variousways (i.e., rotated,
Figure 2. Oddity Discrimination Task
(A) Illustration of the monkey face oddity task. In this more difficult version of
the task, three different views of the same monkey face are shown together
with an odd individual’s face, and the animal must identify the odd individual
for reward. The face pictured in the top right corner is the odd face.
(B) Illustration of the scene oddity task in which three copies of the same scene
are shown together with an odd scene, and the animal must identify the odd
scene for reward. The scene in the lower left corner is the odd scene. Taken
from Buckley et al. (2001), courtesy of Journal of Neuroscience.
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Review: Point/Counterpoint
Figure 6.4: An illus r tion of the oddity-discrimination task employed by
Buckley et al. (2001). In this task, an animal us identify the dd stimulus in
an array to receive a reward. Panel A presents illustration of the monkey face
ddity task. The face pictured in the op right corner is the odd face. Panel B
presents a scene oddity task. The scene in the l wer left corner is the od scene.
visual cortex (e.g. visual object processing, Gauthier et al., 1999; Kanwisher
et al., 1997; Logothetis & Sheinberg, 1996) and the learning and memory func-
tions of the medial temporal lobe (e.g., Eichenbaum& Cohen, 2001), there exists
a continuum between visual perception and learning and memory with some
parts of the medial temporal lobe contributing to some aspects of perception in
addition to learning and memory functions.
However, one of the outstanding issues in this debate is how to determine
if higher-level visual tasks are purely perceptual or involve some learning and
memory. Returning to the oddity-discrimination task developed by Buckley
and c llea ues and summarized in the previ us paragraph, this task is believed
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to be a result of perceptual processes and not learning and memory processes
because all stimuli are presented on the screen simultaneously. However, these
tasks could also be considered to involve some aspects of associative learning
and memory processes. Specifically, as argued by Suzuki (2009), “[t]o success-
fully identify the odd stimulus in this task, animals needed to associate the dif-
ferent views of the same face as one”(p. 659) as illustrated in Panel A of Fig-
ure 6.4. Thus, the field is unclear about what comprises a perceptual task and
when a task conflates learning and perception.
This dissertation argues against a clear distinction between the process of
perception and the processes of learning and memory. Again, the results pre-
sented in Chapter 5 suggest that activity in the medial temporal lobe is impor-
tant for adaptive changes in visual object perception as a result of experience.
The author does not argue that there is no learning component in the experiment
employed in Chapter 5 and correspondingly that the activity of the hippocam-
pus associated with perception is evidence for medial temporal lobe involved
in purely perceptual tasks. Adopting a different approach, the author suggests
that instead of searching for a clean division between what tasks are perceptual
with no aspect of learning and memory and vice versa, it might be fruitful to ex-
amine to what extent themedial temporal lobe, already associatedwith learning
and memory, are also involved in perceptual tasks and to what extent cortices
already associated with perceptual processes are involved in learning andmem-
ory function. It has already been observed that perceptual tasks that involve a
high degree of ambiguity and featural overlap involve the medial temporal lobe
(Suzuki, 2009). It is important to question why such tasks benefit from the in-
volvement of medial temporal lobe structures, which other tasks with a percep-
tual component also recruit these regions, and why some perceptual tasks do
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not benefit from the involvement of learning and memory systems. In sum, the
author suggests that instead of pursuing a distinction between perception and
learning and memory contributions in high-level visual tasks, it might be fruit-
ful to take a different approach as presented in this dissertation: to investigate
how these systems interact during vision tasks to support robust and adaptive
internal representations of the external world.
To conclude, there is an ongoing debate as to whether regions of the medial
temporal lobe are involved exclusively in functions of learning and memory or
whether they are also involved in high-level visual perception. Evidence pre-
sented in this dissertation suggests that learning and memory systems may aid
in the shaping of visual perception and specifically object perception. How-
ever, the author suggests that while the question of how to cleanly dissociate
the learning and memory from high-level vision is an interesting philosophical
question, investigating the interaction of these systems might lead to a deeper
understanding how the brain creates a robust, adaptive and rich internal repre-
sentation of the external world.
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APPENDIX A
FIFTEEN SHAPES USED IN ALL EXPERIMENTS IN CHAPTER 3
GROUPED INTO ARBITRARY TRIPLETS
APPENDIX A
Fifteen shapes used in all experiments,
grouped into arbitrary triplets
APPENDIX B
Monosyllabic nonwords used as auditory
stimuli in all experiments
The 225-ms monosyllabic nonwords used in Experiments 1 and
3A
bu, cha, da, el, feng, jic, leep, rau, roo, rud, sa, ser, ta, wif, zet
The 450-ms monosyllabic nonwords used in Experiments 2
and 3B
bu, cha, dak, eeg, feng, jeen, jic, meep, pel, rauk, rous, rud, sa,
ser, wif
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APPENDIX B
MONOSYLLABIC NONWORDS USED AS AUDITORY STIMULI IN
CHAPTER 3
The 225-ms monosyllabic nonwords used in Experiments 1 and 3A
bu, cha, da, el, feng, jic, meep, rau, roo, rud, sa, ser, ta, wif, zet
The 450-ms monosyllabic nonwords used in Experiments 2 and 3B
bu, cha, dak, eeg, feng, jeen, jic, meep, pel, rauk, rous, rud, sa, ser, wif
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APPENDIX C
TESTING FOR VISUALMASKING AT FAST RATES OF PRESENTATION
Given the comparably reduced temporal resolution of the visual modality, it
is important to test whether the reduction in visual ISL at faster rates of presen-
tation is due to a reduction of discriminability in the visual modality and not
due to a reduction in learning due to temporal presentation more generally. In
order to test this possibility, we compared the accuracy at making simple judg-
ments at the two rates of presentation employed in the current experiment. To
confirm that there are no differences in simple discrimination across modali-
ties and rates of presentation, the current experiment has participants perform
a same-different judgment using both visual and auditory stimuli at both rates
of presentation.
C.1 Method
Participants.
Twenty participants were recruited from Psychology classes at Cornell Uni-
versity earning extra credit. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, no serious auditory deficits, or neurological problems.
Materials.
The same 15 visual shapes were used as in the experiment reported in the main
text, as were the two sets of non-words employed at each presentation speed.
For each participant, for each task, a different subset of 5 visual or 5 auditory
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stimuli was used in the control task. Over all participants, each stimulus within
each set of stimuli was paired with every other stimulus from the same set.
Auditory and visual stimuli were presented at the same duration as they
were presented during the main experiment (750ms SOA or 375ms SOA), with
a 1000ms blank screen before and after the presentation of the two successive
stimuli.
Procedure.
Trials were blocked according to presentation speed and modality of presenta-
tion; blocks were presented in random order. Within each block, each shape
or non-word of the subset was paired with every other as well as with itself to
form 60 trials and presented in random order. Participants were simply asked
to report whether the two stimuli they saw were “the same” or “different” by
pressing keys 1 and 4, respectively, on a 4 button box.
C.2 Results and Discussion
In all groups, participants responded with high accuracy: visual, slow presen-
tation: mean = 99.3%; visual, fast presentation: mean = 99.7%; auditory, slow
presentation: mean = 98.4%, auditory, fast presentation: mean = 99.2%. Planned
paired t-tests were conducted to directly compare performance a) withinmodal-
ity for each presentation speed and b) within each presentation speed for each
modality. None of the above comparisons yielded significant differences be-
tween conditions: auditory (slow vs. fast presentation): t(20) = -1.56, p > 0.1;
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visual (slow vs. fast presentation): t(20) = -0.55, p > 0.5, slow presentation (au-
ditory vs. visual modality): t(20) = 0.641, p > 0.5, fast presentation (auditory
vs. visual stimuli): t(20) = 1.101, p > 0.25. A univariate ANOVA confirmed
that there is no main effect of either presentation speed nor modality and no
interaction between factors.
If masking did indeed obfuscate the perception of visual stimuli at the faster
rates of presentation, simple identity judgments should decline at faster presen-
tation rates. The current results confirm that there is no difference in simple dis-
crimination of the stimuli employed in the current experiment either between
modalities (auditory vs. visual) and/or at different rates of presentation (fast vs.
slow). Thus, the supplementary results support our main thesis that temporal
perceptual grouping factors interact with learning beyond simple differences in
stimuli discrimination across timing conditions.
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APPENDIX D
STAYING GROUNDED: IS STATISTICAL LEARNING CONSTRAINED
TO LESS ABSTRACT PATTERNS?
The content of this chapter is under review at Cognitive Science; see Emberson
and Rubinstein (under review)
This paper examines statistical learning in the presence of regularities
at multiple levels of abstraction. We presented participants with pic-
tures of objects where picture order was predicted by both object iden-
tity and object category. In Experiment 1, we establish that participants
learn based on object-specific regularities when regularities exist at both
levels of abstraction. In Experiment 2, we investigate whether partici-
pants engage in additional category-level learning and find evidence
that learning is constrained to less abstract, object-specific patterns. In
both experiments, we find equal learning between participants who
viewed typical and atypical exemplars suggesting, again, that partici-
pants do not gain category-level knowledge. Overall, our results indi-
cate participants preferentially learn based on object-specific regulari-
ties over more abstract, category-level regularities in a statistical learn-
ing task. These findings suggest a novel constraint on learning from
environmental statistics, and a possible direction of learning across mul-
tiple levels of abstraction in a complex environment.
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D.1 Introduction
Throughout our lifetime, experience shapes our mental model of the world.
Learning from patterns, regularities or statistics found in the environment con-
stitutes one way to shape cognition as a result of experience. Despite the clear
importance of learning from patterns in the environment, there are many out-
standing questions about the nature of the mechanisms that support learning
from real-world experience. A central problem in this literature is how learn-
ing mechanisms operate given the richness of the information we get from the
world. Are learning mechanisms a priori constrained to learn particular pat-
terns? This is especially difficult given the multiplicity of ways in which an
object can be represented in a cognitive system. This paper examines whether
learning mechanisms are biased towards patterns of low levels of representa-
tional abstraction or higher-level, more abstract patterns.
We focus on a type of environmental learning called statistical learningwhere
participants passively learn from stimuli embedded with probabilistic informa-
tion. Previous research has supported the view that these experiential learning
mechanisms are largely unconstrained: statistical learning has been demon-
strated in multiple sensory modalities (Conway & Christiansen, 2005) and
across a wide range of perceptual input. For example, in the visual modality,
learning can occur from sequences of gestures (Baldwin et al., 2008) or simple
shapes (Fiser & Aslin, 2001). While the majority of these studies have focused
on learning probabilistic relations of individual objects, there is evidence that
learning can occur at higher levels of informational abstraction including based
on categories of nonsense words (Saffran, 2002) or familiar semantic categories
(Brady & Oliva, 2008). Overall, these studies support the view that environ-
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mental learning is unconstrained. That is, if there is any reliable probabilistic
information in the environment, humans can learn from it regardless of level of
abstraction or perceptual properties.
However, these demonstrations of unconstrained learning arise from
paradigms where environmental regularities exist only at a single perceptual
and/or informational dimension. To illustrate, Brady and Oliva (2008) use a
paradigm where the categories of scenes are predictive of picture order but in-
dividual scenes are not (e.g. beaches predict kitchens as categories of scenes but
beach1 does not predict kitchen1). In this paradigm, it is not possible to learn
based on individual scenes because only category-level regularities are present.
Thus, these studies provide an existence proof of an unconstrained learning
mechanism but they arise under specific, restricted conditions.
In actuality, the learners environment is characterized by regularities at
many levels of abstraction observed simultaneously and often redundantly. For
example, the predictive relationship between dogs and leashes exists based on
abstract categories as well as in the actual objects or exemplars seen in the world
(e.g. dogs have their specific leashes). Reflecting this key aspect of everyday ex-
perience, the current paper examines learning when participants are exposed
to environmental regularities at multiple levels of abstraction. Do participants
learn from the multiple levels of predictive dependencies simultaneously or are
they biased to learn at a certain level of abstraction?
To address these questions, we devised a novel statistical learning task
where predictive regularities are learnable and redundant across two levels of
abstraction. Specifically, participants were presented with sequences of previ-
ously unseen exemplars from known basic-level categories. Both the categories
269
Figure D.1: A sample familiarization stream. The same familiarization was
given to participants in both experiments. Pictures were organized into pairs of
categories (e.g. birds→ dogs) as well as specific objects within these categories
(e.g. robin→ beagle). Thus, predictive regularities were redundant across
multiple levels of abstraction resulting in two pairs of categories and eight
pairs of objects or exemplars of these categories. In the sample stream, birds
predict dogs and flowers predict fish.
(e.g. dogs-fish, flowers-birds) and the individual exemplars of these categories
(e.g. dog1-fish1, dog2-fish2) were predictive of picture order (see Figure D.1).
This experimental design provides ample opportunity for learning at the ab-
stract, categorical level. First, previous research has established that the cate-
gories used in the current experiment are initially processed at the basic-level,
the level of categorical regularities in the current task, rather than the subordi-
nate level (e.g. dog as opposed to the subordinate level of beagle; Rosch, Mervis,
Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). Second, we employed the same stimu-
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lus timing (short durations and long inter-stimulus-intervals) as employed by
Brady and Oliva (2008) which likely taps into the fast, gist-based recognition of
the pictures. Finally, the stream has fewer pairs of categories than objects (see
Figure D.1). Thus, category level learning is, in some sense, easier than object-
specific learning. Moreover, using the same methodology as Brady and Oliva
(2008) and described above, pilot testing confirmed that participants can learn
from categorical regularities when they are the sole predictor of picture order:
mean = 62.6%, t(13) = 2.80, p < 0.05. These results confirm that if object-based
regularities are not present, category-level learning is possible using the current
stimuli.
In addition, we manipulated object typicality, providing another means to
examine learning at the category level. Atypical objects are processed differ-
ently from typical objects (Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007) and tend to be more
quickly processed below the basic-level categories (e.g. penguin as opposed to
bird; Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn, 1984). Thus, we expect the participants fa-
miliarized with atypical exemplars to have weaker category-level learning but
equivalent learning at the object-specific level. Figure D.2 presents the atypical
exemplars, while all other figures present typical exemplars.
D.2 Experiment 1: Testing for Object-Level Learning
We first examined whether participants continue to be sensitive to object-
specific regularities when more abstract regularities are present. Employing
a well-established testing procedure (e.g., Brady & Oliva, 2008; Fiser & Aslin,
2001), participants were asked to distinguish pairs of pictures from familiariza-
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Figure D.2: All atypical exemplars used in the current paper, organized by
category (from left: dog, flower, fish, bird). Half of participants received
familiarization with atypical exemplars, pictured here, and half were
familiarized with typical exemplars depicted in Figures D.1 and D.3. The test
was conducted with the same pictures as familiarization. We hypothesize that
any category-level learning will be modulated by typicality of exemplars with
atypical exemplars resulting in weaker category-level learning.
tion (e.g. bird1-dog1) from a foil pair created from the same pool of pictures but
which violated contingency patterns of the familiarization stream. To isolate
knowledge at the object-specific level, the foils were designed to violate object-
based regularities while maintaining categorical regularities (e.g. bird1-dog2,
see top panel of Figure D.3). Since participants require object-specific knowl-
edge of the familiarization stream in order to distinguish the foils from the pairs,
the ability to distinguish pairs from foils would be evidence that participants
can learn based on object-specific regularities.
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D.2.1 Methods
All participants were Cornell undergraduates who took part in exchange for
course credit and provided informed consent consistent with the Cornell Insti-
tutional Review Board. The 22 participants in Experiment 1 (age: M = 20.7, SD
= 1.75; 2 left handed; 10 female) were randomly and evenly assigned to either
the typical or atypical conditions.
Familiarization
A statistically-structured familiarization sequence was presented, using
PsyScope X B53 on a MacMini computer with a 17 in CRTmonitor. Each picture
was displayed for 300ms with a 700ms inter-stimulus interval (Brady & Oliva,
2008).
There were four categories of pictures: birds, dogs, fish, and flowers. For
each category, four different exemplars were used (dog1, dog2, etc.). We em-
ployed both typical and atypical exemplars counterbalanced across partici-
pants. These four exemplars were selected based on pilot testing to be both
recognizable for their semantic category and typicality or atypicality based on
six candidate pictures. They were then grouped into eight pairs such that both
the categories and the specific exemplars were predictive of picture order. For
example, bird1-dog1 would always occur as a pair, as would bird2-dog2, bird3-
dog3, and bird4-dog4 (Figure D.1). To control for any effect of specific pairings
on learning, different categories and object pairings were employed across par-
ticipants. Simply instructed to look at the pictures, participants saw each pair
28 times in random order without repetition.
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Testing
After familiarization, participants were tested by comparing two pairs of pic-
tures presented sequentially: 700ms between pictures in the same pair, and 1200
ms separating the pairs. One pair was from the familiarization (e.g. bird1-dog1),
and one was a foil pair (e.g. bird1-dog2; Figure D.3). The foils were designed
to violate the structure only at the exemplar level, and not the category level.
The participants were instructed to choose which of the pairs seemed more fa-
miliar, based on the familiarization task. No time constraint was imposed for
their responses. There were 64 test trials. After the experiment, the participants
completed a survey in which they rated the pictures they had seen on a scale of
1-5 for “interestingness” and typicality and were debriefed.
D.2.2 Results and Discussion
The current experiment was designed such that only object-specific knowledge
could distinguish pairs seen during familiarization and foils. Performance was
evaluated against chance (50%) for evidence of learning. Overall, participants
reliably distinguished pairs from foils (M = 75.4%; SD = 22.8; t(21) = 5.24, p
< 0.0001) indicating that participants learned object-specific regularities even
though more abstract, category-level regularities were also present (Figure D.4).
We hypothesized that any contribution of categorical knowledge would be
modulated by the typicality of the exemplars. To this end, we conducted a t-
test examining the effects of typicality on test performance. We report no effect
of exemplar typicality (Atypical M = 77.0%, SD = 21.5; Typical M = 73.9%, SD
= 24.9, t(21) = 0.315, p = 0.76) suggesting that there was no contribution from
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Figure D.3: The sole difference between experiments was the composition of
foils used at test: In Experiment 1, foils were designed to assess learning at the
object or exemplar-specific level. In this case, the category-level relationship of
birds predicting dogs is held constant but the specific dog is changed to violate
the object-specific regularities. In Experiment 2 foils allow for knowledge at
both levels of abstraction (object and category) to influence test performance.
Illustrated in the figure, now the birds predicting dogs regularity is being
violated by the bird being presented with a flower in the foil.
category-level knowledge in the current experiment.
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Figure D.4: Results for Experiments 1 and 2 are presented with the red bars
representing performance for all participants and the blue bars presented
means for participants grouped by whether they viewed typical or atypical
exemplars. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
D.3 Experiment 2: Testing for Additional Category-Level
Knowledge
Having established that participants can learn from object-specific regularities
in the presence of more abstract regularities, Experiment 2 examined whether
learning occurs along multiple levels of abstraction simultaneously (e.g. ob-
jects: bird1-dog1; abstract, categories: birds-dogs). To this end, we changed the
foils used at test so that both object-specific and category-level patterns could be
used to distinguish pairs seen during familiarization from foils (e.g. bird1-dog1
vs. bird1-flower3; Figure D.3). We hypothesized that if participants learn from
regularities at both levels of abstraction, test performance should increase in Ex-
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periment 2 compared to Experiment 1 where only object-specific knowledge
could be used at test. Conversely, failure to observe a significant increase in test
performance suggests that learning does not occur at the abstract categorical
level in addition to the object-specific knowledge demonstrated in Experiment
1.
Again, participants viewed objects that were either typical or atypical for
their basic-level categories. In Experiment 1, we did not observe any asymmetry
of performance between these groups; however, categorical knowledge would
have interfered with test performance. In the current experiment, categorical
knowledge would be of benefit. Thus, we hypothesize that if participants have
access to category-level knowledge after familiarization, participants who view
typical exemplars will have a greater boost in test performance than those who
view atypical exemplars.
D.3.1 Methods
Another 24 participants were recruited from the same subject pool and ran-
domly and evenly assigned to each condition (16 female, 1 left handed, age:
M = 19.6, SD = 1.28, typical = 12). The procedure in this experiment differed
from Experiment 1 in only one respect: the foil pairs during the test violated
the statistical structure of the familiarization sequence at the exemplar and the
category level (Figure D.3).
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D.3.2 Results and Discussion
As with Experiment 1, we report significant learning overall in Experiment 2
compared to chance performance of 50% (M = 67.7%, SD = 21.2; t(23) = 4.10,
p < 0.0001; Figure D.4). As with Experiment 1, we hypothesized that if cate-
gorical knowledge was acquired during exposure then it would be modulated
by the typicality of exemplars. A t-test comparing performance based on object
typicality revealed no effect of object typicality (atypical M = 65.4%, SD = 19.8;
typicalM = 70.1%, SD = 23.1; t(23) = 0.53, p = 0.60).
We also hypothesized that if participants learned from both category-level
and object-specific regularities, Experiment 2 performance would increase com-
pared to Experiment 1. Results from both experiments were analyzed in a two-
way ANOVA (Experiment 1 vs. 2, Typicality). This analysis confirmed the pat-
tern of results depicted in the bottom panel of Figure D.3: there is no main effect
of Experiment (F(1, 42) = 1.37, p = 0.25). Additionally, we confirm that across
both experiments there is no main effect of typicality of exemplars (F(1, 42) =
0.01, p = 0.91) and no interaction between these factors. Thus, test performance
is equivalent across experiments indicating that participants likely did not ac-
quire categorical knowledge during exposure to the familiarization stream.
All participants rated both typical and atypical pictures on “interestingness”
and typicality. T-tests comparing ratings within categories revealed that partic-
ipants rate atypical and typical exemplars distinctly and also rate the atypical
exemplars as more interesting (ts(150) > 5.0; ps < 0.001). These results vali-
date the assumption that participants view atypical and typical exemplars dif-
ferently. Despite robust self-reported differences in typicality judgments, we
consistently find no effect of exemplar typicality on learning.
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Overall, these results suggest that violating both object-specific and
category-level regularities learned during familiarization does not boost test
performance compared to a test where only object-level regularities are violated.
These findings cast doubt on the possibility that participants learn from predic-
tive regularities at the higher level of category, in addition to the less abstract,
object-specific patterns found consistently across both experiments.
D.4 General Discussion
We investigated statistical learning in a paradigm designed to reflect a key as-
pect of the complexity of daily experience: participants viewed streams of pic-
tures with regularities at multiple levels of abstraction. Specifically, both in-
dividual objects and the categories to which they belonged predicted picture
order, so that both object and categorical patterns could be learned. We consis-
tently find evidence for learning at the lowest level of abstraction: participants
respond at test according to the patterns of specific objects and do not show ev-
idence of having learned at the more abstract level of categories even when ab-
stract knowledge could aid test performance. Moreover, we find no modulation
of learning by object typicality. These findings suggest that participants do not
learn from more abstract regularities when less abstract, more grounded statis-
tical information is present. Instead, they appear to be biased towards learning
patterns based on specific objects or the least abstract pattern presented to them.
Previous research has shown that learners are sensitive to abstract, category-
based regularities, but only under conditions where these are the only patterns
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present and learnable.1 In light of these findings, current results suggest that
abstract patterns are more readily learnable when less abstract regularities are
absent. When less abstract patterns are present, as in many daily experiences,
our findings also suggest that learning likely starts based on the regularities of
specific objects, only then proceeding towardsmore abstract patterns. Future re-
search is required to more closely examine the time-course and the relationship
between learning across levels of abstraction. Current work examines learning
in adults based on known categories. Future work will seek to expand these re-
sults to younger learners and novel categories. Nevertheless, this finding may
have important implications for more efficient teaching methods and could in-
form computational modeling of learning and development of human cognitive
processes where the abstraction of representation is often an assumption built
into the model.
Overall, this work aims to uncover how simple learning mechanisms oper-
ate in complex, naturalistic environments. We increased the complexity of the
learning task, relative to previous experiments, by having environmental reg-
ularities at multiple levels of abstraction. These results inform the on-going
debate as to whether domain-general learning mechanisms are largely uncon-
strained, as previous behavioral studies would have suggested. We believe that
these results show some level of constraint on statistical learning where more
grounded, less abstract statistical relationships are learned preferentially when
categorical and object-specific knowledge are both learnable.
1See Experiment 4 in Brady and Oliva (2008) for an interesting demonstration: with less
abstract regularities present, participants can learn the order of the labels for the categories of
scene. It is not clear if this result is a demonstration of abstract-level learning when lower level
regularities are present.
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